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The Peace Negojvatioxs of IJSz axd IJ8j. 



DELIVERED BEFORE THE 

New York Historical Society, 

ON ITS 

SEVENTY-NINTH ANNIVERSARY, 

Tuesday, November 27, 1883. 

BY 

JOHN JAY, 

LATE AMERICAN MINISTER TO VIENNA. 




NEW YORK: 
PRINTED FOR THE SOCIETY, 

1884. 



The Peace Negotiations of iy82 and lySj. 



. . -J- o 



:Hn 2ltrtiress 

DELIVERED BEFORE THE 

New York Historical Society 

ON ITS 

SE VENTY- NINTH ANNIVERSAR V, 

Tuesday, November 27, 1883. 

BY 

JOHN JAY. 



^^ 




NEW YORK: 

PRINTED FOR THE SOCIETY 

1884. 
Co 



OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY, 1884. 



PRESIDENT, 

AUGUSTUS SCHELL. 

FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT, 

HAMILTON FISH, LL.D. 

SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT, 

BENJAMIN H. FIELD. 

FOREIGN CORRESPONDING SECRETARY, 

WILLIAM M. EVARTS, LL.D. 

DOMESTIC CORRESPONDING SECRETARY, 

EDWARD F. DE LANCE Y. 



RECORDING SECRETARY, 

ANDREW WARNER. 

TREASURER, 

BENJAMIN B. SHERMAN. 

LIBRARIAN, 

JACOB B. MOORE. 



EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. 



FIRST CLASS — FOR ONE TEAR, ENDING 1885. 

JOHN A. WEEKES, WILLIAM LIBBEY, 

ROYAL PHELPS. 

SECOND CLASS — FOR TWO YEARS, ENDING 1886. 

EDWARD F. DE LANCEY, JACOB D. VERMILYE, 

WiLLARD PARKER, Jr., M.D. 

THIRD CLASS — FOR THREE TEARS, ENDING 1887. 

JOHN TAYLOR JOHNSTON, ROBERT LENOX KENNEDY, 
JOHN C. BARRON, M.D. 

FOURTH .CLASS — FOR FOUR YEARS, ENDING 1888. 

BENJAMIN H. FIELD, WILLIAM DOWD, 

GEORGE H. MOORE, LL.D. 

JOHN A. WEEKES, Chairman. 
JACOB B. MOORE, Secretary. 

[The President, Recording Secretary, Treasurer, and Librarian are members, 
ex-ojficio, of the Executive Committee.] 



COMMITTEE ON THE FINE ARTS. 

ASHER B. DURAND, DANIEL HUNTINGTON, 

ANDREW WARNER, CEPHAS G. THOMPSON, 

.JOHN A. WEEKES, GEORGE H. MOORE, LL.D. 

ASHER B. DURAND, Chairman. 
ANDREW WARNER, Secretary. 

[The President, Librarian, and Chairman of the Executive Committee are mem- 
bers, ex-ojficio, of the Committee on the Fine Arts.] 



CORRESPONDENCE. 



New York Historical Society, 
New York, February 6, 1883. 

Hon. John Jay, 191 Second Avenue. 

Sir : — We have the honor, in behalf of the New York Historical 
Society, to invite you to deliver the Address at the Celebration of the 
Seventy-ninth Anniversary of the Founding of the Society, on Tuesday 
evening, November 27, 1883. 

The time at which this Anniversary will occur suggests, as a fitting 
subject for the occasion, the history of that important treaty by which 
Great Britain recognized the freedom and independence of the United 
States, a recognition alike unqualified and irrevocable, notwithstanding 
the efforts to make it otherwise, and subject it to the contingencies of 
the policy, influence, and authority of France. 

The part which your honored ancestor had in all these transactions 
will give peculiar interest to the results of studies in which you have an 
hereditary interest ; and we trust that you will not be reluctant to render 
this service to history in setting out the fair record of so great a son of 
New York in connection with so great an event. "The glory of children 
are their fathers," and New York desires to do honor to the best mem- 
ories of her best men, in full sympathy with all the reverence of filial 
piety. 

We have the honor to be, 

Your obedient servants, 

Augustus Schell, President. 
Andrew Warner, Recording Secretary. 
Royal Phelps, Chairman pro tem. of the Ex- 
ecutive Committee. 
William Dowd, 
Jacob D. Vermilye, 
John Taylor Johnston, 

Jacob B. Moore, Secretary of the Execntiiie 
Committee. 



No. 191 Second Avenue, 

New York, February 14, 1883. 

To the Honorable Augustus Schell, President ; Messrs. Andrew 
Warner, Recording Secretary ; Royal Phelps, Chairman of the 
Executive Committee ; Willlam Dowd, Jacob D. Vermilye, 
John Taylor Johnston, and Jacob B. Moore, Secretary of the 
Executive Committee. 
Gentlemen : — I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of Feb- 
ruary 6th, in which, on behalf of the New York Historical Society, you 
invite me to deliver the Address at the Celebration of the Seventy-ninth 
Anniversary of the Founding of the Society, on Tuesday evening, No- 
vember 27, 1883. 

You remark that the time at which this Anniversary will occur sug- 
gests as a fitting subject for the occasion the history of the important 
treaty of peace negotiated with Great Britain, notwithstanding the 
effort to subject it to the policy, influence, and authority of France. 
You allude to the part borne by my grandfather in that transaction, as 
having given an interest to my studies in that direction, and in terms of 
graceful courtesy you express your trust that I will not be reluctant to 
render the service which you ask. 

Permit me to say that I very highly appreciate the honor of being 
asked to deliver the Anniversary Address, and still more the generous 
confidence with which you ask me to present before our honored and 
venerable Society "the fair record" of that negotiation, which as re- 
gards the sutSciency of the grounds on which the American Commis- 
sioners, under the lead of Jay, violated the instruction of Congress to 
undertake nothing in the negotiation without the knowledge or concur- 
rence of the ministers of the King of France, and ultimately to govern 
themselves by their advice and opinion, has been for a century a subject 
of controversy. 

Had no new light been thrown upon the subject, I might well have 
hesitated, even at your request, weighted alike with persuasion and 
authority, to undertake a task so delicate ; but, as you are aware, impor- 
tant historic material, bearing directly on the question, and which has 
not yet been collated, has been recently furnished, partly by our historic 
collections and in part by the governmental archives of England and the 
Continent. Among them is the report in the Thomson Papers in your 
collections for 1878, of the secret proceedings in the Continental Con- 
gress in July and August, 1782, on a motion to revoke the instructions to, 
the Commissioners of Peace, which, it was admitted, had been a sacrifice 
of the national dignity to national policy, but which, it was contended, 
could not safely be revoked. 

Then there is the interesting sketch of the peace negotiations from 
an English point of view, given by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice in the 



life of his grandfather, Lord Shelburne, with a note of the effort of M. 
de Rayneval, in his visit to that minister, to defeat the American ;claim 
to the fisheries, the Mississippi, and the Ohio. ' 

Lastly, we have the volume of unedited documents from European 
archives, published at Paris in 1876, by the Count Adolphe de Circourt, 
containing confidential correspondence on the American claims to be 
recognized by treaty, between the Count de Vergennes and his diplo- 
matic agents — the Count de Montmorin at Madrid, M. Gerard and the 
Count de la Luzerne at Philadelphia, and his secretary, M. de Rayneval, 
at London 

These new disclosures, and especially the instructions of the Count 
de Vergennes to the French ministers in America, are of the highest 
authority, for they were gathered by our associate, Mr. Bancroft, and 
they definitely settle the questions of fact which have been raised as to 
the correctness of the views officially expressed by the American Com- 
missioners in regard to the policy of France ; views that impelled them 
to break the instructions which would have made the French king 
" master of the terms of peace." 

It only remains to interweave this additional material with that which 
had been already gathered, to round and complete the story of the nego- 
tiation, and to end the speculations and controversies of the past by a 
simple presentation of the truth of history. The task will be rendered 
the more easy for me by the kind expressions of your letter, whose in- 
vitation to deliver the Anniversary Address, and whose suggestion of 
the subject I have the honor to accept. 

With sincere thanks for your friendly courtesy, 

I am. Gentlemen, 

Faithfully yours, 

John Jay. 



PROCEEDINGS. 



At a meeting of the New York Historical Society, held at 
the Academy of Music, in this city, on Tuesday evening, No- 
vember 27, 1883, to celebrate the Seventy-ninth Anniversary of 
the founding of the Society, 

The President of the Society, Hon. Augustus Schell, on in- 
troducing Mr. Jay, remarked: 

Our distinguished feilow-citizen, a member of this Society, the Hon. 
John Jay, has accepted the invitation of the Society to deliver the Ad- 
dress on this occasion. 

Mr. Jay is a descendant of that eminent jurist and accomplished 
statesman, John Jay, who, with his distinguished associates, Franklin 
and Adams, as Commissioners on the part of the United States, nego- 
tiated the treaty with Great Britain which recognized the independence 
of America and established peace between the two countries. 

The subject of the Address is "The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 
1783." 

I have now the pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Jay. 

Mr. Jay then delivered the Address on "The Peace Nego- 
tiations of 1782 and 1783." 

Upon its conclusion, George H. Moore, LL.D., submitted, 
with remarks, the following resolution : 

Resolved, That the thanks of the Society be presented to Mr. Jay for 
his eloquent and instructive discourse delivered this evening, and that 
he be requested to furnish a copy for publication. 

The resolution was seconded by the Hon. William M. 
Evarts, with remarks. 

The resolution was then adopted unanimously. 

Extract from the minutes. 

Andrew Warner, 

Recording Secretary. 



THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1782 
AND 1783. 



Mr. President, Members of the Historical Society, 

Ladies and Gentlemen : 
We are assembled on the seventy-ninth anniversary of The 
New York Historical Society to commemorate the treaty 
of peace which a hundred years ago gave to our country its 
name and place among the powers of the world. That treaty 
marked the triumphant close of the Revolution, and invested 
the young Republic with boundaries and resources imperial in 
their extent ; it is an event which, for Americans, is fraught 
with sacred memories of the past, with pride and thankfulness 
in the present, and with the highest incentives and hopes for 
the future. 

Negotiated and signed in Paris, it fixed the destinies of 
America. It was received by our countrymen with thanks- 
givings and rejoicings, of which we were strikingly reminded 
yesterday, when the vast population of this metropolis, swelled 
by thousands of citizens and citizen-soldiers, by the Presi- 
dent and the Cabinet from Washington, and by the Gov- 
ernors and representatives of the old thirteen States, joined in 
commemorating the final departure of the British flag ; on 
the day when, as the silver-toned orator* at the unveiling of 
the statue of Washington on the spot where he was inaugu- 
rated so picturesquely described, Colonial and Provincial 
America had ended and National America had begun, 

* The Honorable George William Curtis. 



lO The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

^ Take the famous diplomatic councils and congresses of 
modern times which rank as historic events ; which have 
helped to shape the law of nations, to modify the map of the 
world, or to promote the advance of civilization and the hap- 
piness of mankind ; take the peace of Westphalia, with its 
political and religious results, concluded after a session of 
some five years,* attended by representatives of most of the 
European powers, and ending the thirty years' war that had 
desolated so much of Europe. Look at other treaties of im- 
portance, the peace of Utrecht, the several treaties of Vienna 
arranging and rearranging, for a brief season, dynasties and 
boundary lines and petty sovereignties. Which one of them, 
in simple, permanent grandeur and far-extending results, com- 
pares with our part of the general peace negotiated at Paris 
in 1782 and '83, to which England, France, Spain, and Holland 
were parties, when the future of this continent was at stake, 
and when the treaty of peace ushered into power the Amer- 
ican Republic, with a territory secured for Christianity and 
free civilization : and made it from its birth independent, not 
only of Great Britain, but of the world, and so far as human 
judgment could provide, not for a day but for all time ? 

While we are commemorating that treaty, the echoes have 
hardly ceased of the joyful thanksgivings which, in divers lands 
and tongues, have hailed the four hundredth anniversary of 
the birth of Luther, and we begin to hear the note of prepara- 
tion for the approaching commemoration, in the Old World 
and in the New, of the four hundredth anniversary of the dis- 
covery of America. Looking not at religious differences, 
which were laid aside in our war of the Revolution, when 
Americans and Frenchmen, Protestants and Romanists, fought 
side by side, calling forth a cordial tribute from Washington 
to the patriotic part Roman Catholics had borne, and the im- 
portant assistance we had received from France : but looking 
at the great political results of the Reformation as regards 
free government and popular institutions, there should be no 
discord between the thoughts awakened by the names of 
Luther and Columbus and those which are to-night aroused 

* The Congress of Westphalia lasted from July, 1643, to October, 1648. 



TJic Peace Negotiations of 1782 aiid 1783. 11 

by the remembrance of the treaty of 1783. Both recall the 
founders of the thirteen colonies, representing the best 
and bravest blood in Europe, who came here to lay deep 
and strong in the world of Columbus the foundations of 
civil and religious liberty with the freedom of conscience 
and the right and duty of private judgment, the open Bible and 
the common school, that constitutional birthright of citizens 
of whatever creed which form the glory and the bulwark of 
the Republic whose birth we celebrate to-night. 

Indeed, although the fact has been scarcely appreciated by 
the present generation — and it has been unappreciated simply 
because it was unknown — one of the most striking features of 
the American peace negotiation, that closely connects it with 
the subject of the great principles of the Reformation which 
lie at the basis of our own and all other free governments, is 
the fact that it directly involved the destiny of the great Valley 
of the Mississippi. It involved the question whether that vast 
and fertile region, and that great river which has been called 
the guardian and pledge of the American Union, should pass 
under the shadow of the rule which has darkened and en- 
feebled Spain and her colonies, or whether it should be in- 
cluded within the boundaries of our happier land, and enriched 
with the light and life of American institutions ? 

In alluding to the fate then impending of the Mississippi 
River, Mr. Bancroft says : * 

" States larger than kingdoms flourish where he passes, 
and beneath his step cities start into being more marvellous 
in their reality than the fabled creations of enchantment. His 
magnificent valley, . . . salubrious and wonderfully fer- 
tile, is the chosen muster-ground of the most various elements 
of human culture, brought together by men summoned from 
all the civilized nations of the earth, and joined in the bond 
of common citizenship by the strong invisible attraction of re- 
publican freedom. 
^" From the grandeur of destiny foretold by the possession 

* Bancroft's History, x., p. 193. Lecky (iv., 277) speaks of this valley as 
'' the great field in which the ultimate expansion of the English race might be 
anticipated." 



12 \\TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

of that river and the land drained by its waters, the Bourbons 
of Spain, hoping to act in concert with Great Britain as well 
as France, would have excluded the United States totally 
and forever." 

That attempt to exclude the United States from the great 
Valley of the Mississippi, planned and elaborated by the most 
noted diplomats of the French and Spanish Courts, was but a 
part of the larger scheme to exclude the Republic also from 
the great Northwestern territory beyond the Ohio, to deprive 
it of the New England fisheries, to restrict the extent and 
influence of the young Republic, and render it easily con- 
trollable by the powers of Europe, That was the scheme of 
which the instructions of Congress dictated by the French 
Minister formed so notable a part, and whose discovery and 
defeat by the American Commission has given a singular in- 
terest and importance to the negotiations at Paris. 

The assembling at the French capital, in 1782, of the Peace 
Commissioners from Great Britain, the United States, and 
Spain, was a reminder to the world of the part which France 
had borne in the war for American independence, from the 
date of her treaty of alliance with the United States.* Made 
immediately after the surrender of Burgoyne, whatever the 
motives which inspired the policy on the part of France, the 
alliance was greeted in America with enthusiasm ; and if 
the explanation given by the Court of France to that of Lon- 
don presented only interested reasons as having induced the 
move, that explanation was little noted by the Americans 
rejoicing in the accession of so great an ally, when on July 
II, 1780, the French fleet of Admiral de Ternay, with the 
army of Rochambeau, arrived at Newport with over five thou- 
sand men, in regiments commanded by nobles of ancient and 
historic names, of Laval-Montmorenci, Saint Maime, Deux- 
Ponts, de Custine, d'Aboville, and de Lauzun, with general 
officers and aids like Viomenil, de Chastellux, de Fersen, 
de Dumas, de Noailles, and Montesquieu — never forget- 

* February 6, 1778. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 a7id 1783. 13 

ting our early and faithful friend, the youthful and gallant 
Lafayette. 

Their distinguished services, and those of the French fleet 
under Admiral the Count De Grasse, who sailed from Brest 
(March 22, 1781) with a convoy of one hundred and fifty 
ships,* form a brilliant chapter in our history, crowned by 
the decisive affair at Yorktown. The centennial commemora- 
tion of that event and the welcome given to our guests bearing 
the names of Rochambeau, Lafayette, and the other heroes 
of France whose fame is intertwined with that of Washington 
and his generals, showed the continuing warmth and fresh- 
ness on the part of this generation of the feeling of gratitude 
and good-will with which Americans of the last century re- 
garded the aid given them by the Court of Louis XVL and 
Marie Antoinette, whose portraits, asked for by Congress and 
presented by the King, held an honorable place in the Con- 
gressional chamber of our Federal Hall. The tragedy of the 
French Revolution softens all thoughts of the unhappy sover- 
eigns. We still read with sadness the apostrophe of Burke to 
the young Queen of France, as he had last seen her decorat- 
ing and cheering the elevated sphere she had just begun to 
move in, glittering like the morning star full of life and splen- 
dor and joy. We recall her gracious words to the youthful 
Lafayette on his first return from America, "Tell us good 
news of our dear Republicans, of our beloved Americans," 
and we do not wonder that grave historians linger for a 
moment on the touching spectacle of the sovereigns of that 
brilliant Court espousing with gayety and enthusiasm the 
cause of freedom in the rising Republic of the West.t 

Bancroft says that when they embarked for the liberation 
of America, pleasure on the prow and the uncertain hand of 
youth at the helm, they might have cried out to the young 
Republic which they fostered : " Morituri te salu.tant " — the 
doomed to die salute you. 

But the thought is the sadder that, unlike the gladiators 

* Yorktown Centennial Hand-Book, by John Austin Stevens, p. ii. New 
York, 1 88 1. 

f Lecky, iv., p. 53; Bancroft, x., p. 47. 



14 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

who saluted Caesar, Louis and his fair queen were smiHngly 
unconscious of the impending terror and the final stroke. 

Soulavie, the author of " Historical and Political Memoirs 
of the Reign of Louis XVL," asserts that Congress voted a 
statue to the King at Philadelphia, and he gives a copy of 
the inscription it was to bear, which he says was received by 
him from Mr. Franklin.* 

John Adams wrote in 181 1 : *' The King was the best and 
sincerest friend we had in France." f 

However unfriendly or disingenuous the policy of the 
French Court toward America in reference to the conditions 
of the peace, it was the policy of the Court and not of the 
people ; and whether that policy was due to the weakness or 
the exigencies of the Court, the conditions of the Spanish 
alliance, dynastic influences or family compacts, the intent 
of that unfriendly policy was happily arrested ; it worked no 
harm to the success and prosperity of the Republic ; while 
the assistance which France gave us in the war had the most 
beneficial and permanent results, and justified the cordial 
sentiment which exists to-day between the two nations, and 
which Congress has fitly recognized by appropriating a site 
and providing for the care of the gigantic statue about to be 

* The work of Soulavie, translated from the French, was published at London, 
1802, in six volumes. The inscription, as given by M. Soulavie, is as follows : 

" Post Deum 
Diligenda et servanda est libertas, 

Maximis empta laboribus 
Humanique sanguinis flumine irrigata 
Per imminentia belli pericula 
Juvante 
Optimo Galliarum principe rege, 

LUDOVICO XVI. 
Hanc Statuam principi Augustissimo 

Consecravit. 
Et aeternam pretiosamque beneficii. 
Memoriam 
^ Grata Reipublicre veneratio 

Ultimis tradit nepotibus."- — P. 343. 
f Adams' Works, i. , p. 657. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 15 

presented to us for erection in the harbor of New York, 
representing Liberty enlightening the world. 



The Historic Question. 

In view of the pre-eminent and permanent importance of 
the treaty of peace, our review of its negotiation may be 
preceded by a glance at the very curious rise and fall of the 
great historic question which has so long been agitated as to 
the position occupied by the Court of France: whether that 
Court really favored or secretly opposed our claims to the 
boundaries toward the south, the west, and the north, to the 
Mississippi and the fisheries. 

Touching that question, when Jay first became convinced 
that France was opposed to us on the points most essential 
to the dignity and interest of America : the recognition of 
our independence in the Commission to Oswald, on the fish- 
eries, the boundaries, and compensation to the loyalists ; and 
that the instruction of Congress to be guided by the opinion 
of the French Court no longer applied to the situation, Frank- 
lin differed with Jay as to the correctness of his views and 
the propriety of his proposed action. When in pursuance 
of Jay's resolve to conduct the negotiation without consulting 
with the French Cabinet — a resolve which John Adams on 
his arrival thoroughly approved, and in which Franklin pres- 
ently acquiesced — terms were obtained by the Provisional 
Articles so favorable that Vergennes expressed the astonish- 
ment of the Government of France, and Secretary Livingston 
the joy of the people of America, the latter nevertheless 
doubted the correctness of the ideas of the Commissioners in 
regard to France, and Congress debated the matter till the 
signing of a general peace.* Next, Washington and his Cab- 
inet, in 1797, reviewed at length the entire subject in a mas- 
terly Tetter by Mr. Secretary Pickering in answer to a charge 
of ingratitude made by the French Minister Adet, and said : 

" We see then that in forming connection with us in 1788 
the Court of France, the actual organ of the nation, had no 

* Rives' Madison, i., 363. See also Appendix. 



1 6 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

regard to the interests of the United States, but that their 
object was, by seizing the occasion of dismembering the 
British empire, to diminish the power of a formidable rival, and 
that when, after we had carried on a distressing war for seven 
years, the great object for which we had contended, inde- 
pendence, was within our reach, that Court endeavored to 
postpone the acknowledgment of it by Great Britain, and 
eventually to deprive us of its fairest fruits — a just extent of 
territory, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the fisheries." 

Mr. Pickering also quoted the instructions given to Mr. 
Genet when he was coming to the United States as Minister 
of the French Republic in 1793, which said : " The executive 
council has called for the instructions given to citizen Genet's 
predecessor in America, and has seen in them with indigna- 
tion, that ^t the very time the good people of America ex- 
pressed their gratitude to us in the most feeling manner and 
gave us every proof of their friendship, Vergennes and 
Montmorin thought that it was right for France to hinder 
the United States from taking that political stability of which 
they were capable, because they would soon acquire a strength 
which it was probable they would be eager to abus.e--' . 
The same Machiavellian principle influenced the operations of 
the war for independence ; the same duplicity reigned over 
the negotiations for peace."* , 

Two editions of that letter, about fifteen hundred copies, 
were widely distributed in Europe, t and it placed the subject 
at rest until the year 1830, when Mr. Jared Sparks, in editing 
for the Government the diplomatic correspondence of the 
Revolution, introduced into the eighth volume the well-known 
note I in which he stated that he had " read in the French 
Office of Foreign Affairs the entire correspondence of the 
Count de Vergennes during the whole war with the French 
Ministers in this country, developing the policy and designs 

* Pickering to Pinckney, communicated to Congress by Washington, by spe- 
cial message, January 19, 1797: Am. State Papers, i., pp. 559, 576. 

f Gen. Pinckney to the Department, Hague, June 28, 1797: Trescott's Dip- 
lomatic History, 180. 

X Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, viii. , pp. 208, 212. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 17 

of the French Court in regard to the war and the object to 
be obtained by the peace ; " and that after examining these 
and other papers with care and accuracy he was " prepared to 
express his behef most fully that Mr. Jay was mistaken both 
in regard to the aims of the French Court and the plans pur- 
sued by them to gain their supposed ends." . . . This 
note was followed by similar and perhaps yet stronger state- 
ments in his " Life of Gouverneur Morris," his "Life of Frank- 
lin" "' and in the North American ReviewA In none of these 
is any reference made to the review of the matter by the Gov- 
ernment of Washington, nor to the statement, in Marshall's 
" Life of Washington," that Genet had exhibited to our Gov- 
ernment official documents disclosing France's opposition to 
our claims at the peace ; and the correctness of Sparks' state- 
ment of the character of the Vergennes correspondence, as 
read by himself, was received by many as settling the question. 
Successive historians followed his lead. Among them have 
been Schlosser, the German author of a " History of the 
Eighteenth Century ;" J Mr, Parton in his "Life of Frank- 
in ;" § Mr. Rives in his " Life of Madison ; "|| Mr. George 
Ticknor Curtis in his recent paper on the "Treaty of Peace 
and Independence " in Harper's Magazine,^ and a recent 
writer in Leslie's Popular Magazine .** The extent to which 
the history of the negotiation has been caricatured is shown 
in the last-named paper, where Jay and Adams are gravely 
arraigned for having interfered with the designs of France 
and Spain. The author says, " John Jay's persistent refusal 
to accede to the demands of Spain, aided and abetted by 
Adams, led to more delays" (p. 259). 

" England and France," adds the writer, " were harmo- 
nious in nearly every respect, and finally matters were arranged 
through the strenuous efforts of Rayneval the French pleni- 
potentiary, Franklin,' and Count d'Aranda.'' 

As the articles were negotiated without the knowledge of 

* Vol. iv,, 34. f For January, 1830, No. Ixvi., p. 15. 

X Vol. v., p. 297, of Davidson's translation. London, 1845. 
§ Vol. ii., 484. i Vol. i., 359. 

1 For April and May, 1883. ** For September, 1883. i 

2 



\ \ 

1 8 The Peace Negotiations -of \'J%2 aiid 1783. 

the agents of France and Spain, and secured for America 
the great territories, the Mississippi, and the fisheries, of 
which Rayneval and the Count d'Aranda would have de- 
prived us, the statement is as luminous and exact as if the- 
author had referred to the brilliant victory won by Burgoyne 
at Saratoga, or to the surrender of Washington's army and 
the French fleet to Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. 

Such being the confused position of the matter to-day, 
the Historical Society has done me great honor in asking 
me to address you on this subject, and on this occasion. It 
was a request enforced by weighty names, and the most 
graceful courtesy gave it the force of a command.* And yet 
I might have hesitated to assume the task, if I had not 
recently gathered, at home and abroad, newly discovered 
and conclusive evidence upon the points at issue, including 
much from the secret correspondence of Vergennes in the 
French archives, which has been partially published, and 
which seemed to be as yet little known or understood in this 
country. 

The Question Settled by Conclusive Evidence. 

The evidence has come, happily, in the last decade of the 
century, to end, let us hope forever, the dispute which, after 
the calm, judicial review by Washington and his Cabinet, 

* The letter of invitation, bearing the signature of the President of the His- 
torical Society and other venerable and distinguished names, said : 

'' The time at which this anniversary will occur suggests a fitting subject for 
the occasion — the history of that important treaty by which Great Britain recog- 
nized the freedom and independence of the United States, a recognition alike 
unqualified and irrevocable, notwithstanding the efforts to make it otherwise, 
and subject it to the contingencies of the policy, influence, and authority of 
France. 

" The part which your honored ancestor had in all these transactions will give 
peculiar value to the results of studies in which you have an hereditary interest, 
and we trust that you will not be reluctant to render this service to history in 
setting out the fair record of so great a son of New York in connection with so 
great an event. ' The glory of children are their fathers,' and New York desires 
to do honor to the best memories of her best men, in full sympathy with all the 
reverence of filial piety." 



/ 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 19 

should never have been re-opened. Had that review, with 
its reference to official proofs in the French archives, been 
studied and verified, instead of accepting with haste and cre- 
dulity personal suggestions and assurances from any person, 
however respectable, we should have been spared the traves- 
ties of the history of the peace negotiations which for half a 
century have misled the world. 

In the peace negotiations was fought a diplomatic battle, 
on the result of which was to depend the fairest fruits of the 
seven years' war of the Revolution. 

As in that war we were aided by France and Spain, 
anxious to secure the separation of the American colonies 
from England, to weaken the power and effect the humilia- 
tion of their ancient rival ; so, in the negotiations for peace, 
when we were seeking to secure a vast extent of territory at 
the South, West, and North, with the Newfoundland fisheries, 
all essential to our national dignity, independence, and power, 
we stood alone. Our allies in the war had no further interest 
in our success. The situation had become changed. They 
had become our active and determined Opponents. It was 
no longer America, France, and Spain against England, but 
it was England, France, and Spain against the young Re- 
public, whose future greatness loomed unpl^santly upon the 
troubled vision of the Continental statesmen^ 

The position of Spain to those familiar with our. own 
diplomatic records requires no explanation. She entered into 
the war with hesitation and reluctance, and only upon the 
agreement of France to assist her in enlarging her American 
possessions, and in restricting the limit of the young Republic 
whose future influence she feared and whose approaching 
independence she saw with grief. "^Jlie devotion of Spain to 
her own interests as pictured by the Count de Vergennes, the 
diplomatic chief of her great ally, was conspicuous even 
among the grasping powers of Europe. "We never," he 
said, '* lose sight of the fact that Spain will strive to set her 
own interests before everything else." 

The Count de Montmorin, a year later, described the 
feeling of Spain toward American independence as one "of 



\ i 



V 



20 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

indifference or even actual repugnance," and he refers to 
Spain's having brought the American delegates to the brink 
of bankruptcy for a matter of forty or fifty thousand dollars' 
worth of exchange, which had been accepted in consequence 
of some hopes having been held out.^^ 

The aim of France in aiding the American colonies ex- 
tended beyond the blow which their loss would be to the 
power and prestige of Great Britain. The instructions given 
to M. Gerard when he was sent to the United States aa 
resident agent advised him that " the independence of North- 
ern America, and its permanent iinioji zvitJi France, have 
been the King's principal object." f 

This distinct avowal goes far toward explaining the desire 
of the Court of France to confine the United States to narrow 
boundaries, to surround them with European powers, to de- 
prive them of the fisheries which would constitute a nursery 
for seamen, :|: to exclude them from the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi, to prevent their extension at the North beyond the 
Ohio, to keep alive the jealousy of England, and " make it 
feel," in the words of Vergennes, " the need of sureties, allies, 
and protectors." § 

The sources from which the proofs have come are now 
open to almost all the world, the principal proofs are already 
accessible. 

In London I had the opportunity, through the courtesy 
of Lord Salisbury, and of our late lamented friend. Lord 
Tenterden, of the High Commission, of examining all papers 
relating to the treaty in the State Office, which, on special 
application, are generously opened to inspection, including 

* Count de Vergennes to Count de Montmorin, January 22, 1781, III. de 
Circourt, 319; and Montmorin to Vergennes, Madrid, March 30, 1782, III. de 
Circourt, 327. 

\ Memoire pour servir d'instruction au Sieur Gerard, Secretaire du Conseil 
d'fitat, allant resider de la part du roi, aupres du Congres general des Etats Unis, 
29 Mars, 1778 ; III. de Circourt, Documents originaux inedits, p. 255. 

\ Lord St. Helens : Memoranda on Jay's Life, quoted in the New York Re- 
view, Vol. IX., pp. 306-7, cited in the text supra. 

§ Le Comte de Vergennes au Comte de Montmorin, October 30, 178S, III. de 
Circourt, 310. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 21 

the minute and valuable letters of Mr. Oswald, of which there 
is now a copy among the Franklin papers in the State De- 
partment of Washington. I had collected also historic evi- 
dence, not yet reprinted here, afforded by secret and confi- 
dential correspondence from the French archives, of the Count 
de Vergennes with his skilful diplomatic agents, the Count 
de Montmorin at Madrid, M. Gerard and M. de la Luzerne 
at Philadelphia, and M. de Rayneval at London. These 
authentic documents while exhibiting the resolve of France 
which even the Court of Spain could not shake, to guarantee 
the actual independence of the United States of the English 
dominion (but not its acknowledgment by that power), a 
resolve which had been carried out faithfully and generously 
during the war, exhibits also with equal clearness her policy 
in connection with the Court of Spain, to which she was 
bound by the Bourbon family compact, as well as by the 
special alliance, to subject American interests to those of the 
Spanish colonial system ; to restrict our boundaries and our 
future power ; to shut us off from the Gulf, the Mississippi, 
and the Lakes ; to bound us on the north by the Ohio, 
and, in fact, to confine the new Republic to a narrow strip 
along the Atlantic, and to deprive us of the Newfoundland 
fisheries^ 

After the statement officially and repeatedly made by the 
late Dr. Sparks,* that nothing of this policy was to be found 
in the entire correspondence of the Count de Vergennes, dur- 
ing the whole war, with the French Ministers in this country, 
which he had read with care and accuracy, some doubt might 
perhaps be naturally felt as to the authenticity of the. corre- 
spondence now brought to light, which sustains by accumulat- 
ing proof the views expressed by Franklin, Adams, and Jay 
in their joint letters, and by Adams and Jay in their separate 
letters, in regard to the policy of the two courts. But the fact 
that the documents in question were gathered from the French 
archives by our learned associate Dr. George Bancroft, and 
that they were given by him to the Cpunt de Circourt of the 
French Diplomatic Service, by whom they were printed at 

* Dip. Cor., vol. vii., p. 208 et seq. Boston, 1830. 



22 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

Paris,* divests them of doubt and entitles them to entire con- 
fidence. To Mr. Bancroft and the Count de Circourt all 
thanks are due for placing the correspondence of Vergennes 
before the world in a shape that the facts it discloses can 
never more be successfully misrepresented. Next in import- 
ance to these JParis documents is the evidence afforded by 
the papers of/ Lord Shelburne, whose life has been published 
by his grandson, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, now (1883) As- 
sistant Secretary in the Foreign Office, of which his illus- 
trious ancestor was the chief. The third volume contains a 
very valuable and interesting sketch of the negotiation from 
the British point of view. It is illustrated with maps, one 
of which (p. 294) shows the two northern frontier lines " as 
settled in October and November, 1782, respectively, by Mr. 
Oswald," and another (p. 170), a map of part of " North 
America, showing the boundaries of the United States, Can- 
ada, and the Spanish possessions, according to the proposals 
of the Court of France." This map shows at a glance what 
our boundaries would have been had the instructions of Con- 
gress been obeyed. The volume also discloses the part taken 
by Rayneval in his conference with Lord Shelburne and Lord 
Grantham against the American claims to the fisheries, the 
boundaries, and the Mississippi ;- and the effect upon Lord 
Shelburne of the almost simultaneous arrival of Vaughan, 
who had been dispatched by Jay, to counteract the opposi- 
tion of Rayneval, and who brought back the new commission 
to Oswald, and the result of whose visit marks it as the turn- 
ing-point of our success,. Through the obliging courtesy of 
Mr. Bancroft I have also had the opportunity of examining in 
his library at Washington his very valuable MS. volumes 
entitled " America, France, and England." 

The tenth volume of Bancroft's History contains many 
important extracts from the French documents, not contained 
in the volume of Circourt, and an interesting sketch of the 

* The title of the work is Histoire de I'Action commune de la France et de 
I'Amerique pour 1' Independence des Etats-Unis, par George Bancroft, etc. 
Traduit et annote par le comte Adolphe de Circourt, etc. Tome troisieme. 
Documents originaux inedits. Paris : F. Vieweg. 1876. 



TJic Peace i\egotiations of 1782 and 1783. 23 

formation by Vergennes of the alliance with Spain, and of the 
concessions or pledge which to secure it he consented to 
make, in regard to the American claims, in agreeing to adopt 
and further the policy of Spain, which tended to limit our 
boundaries and restrain our power. 

"Ivir. Bancroft, in the preface, remarks that the embarrass- 
ments of Vergennes, arising alike from his entanglements re- 
specting Gibraltar and the urgency of his king for peace, 
" explain and justify the proceedings of the American Com- 
mission in signing preliminaries of peace in advance," and 
that " the requirement of the change in Oswald's commission, 
so grateful to the self-respect of America, is due exclusively 
to Jay^!? ^ ' 

Mr. Bancroft had not then seen the "Life of Lord Shel- 
burne," by his grandson, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, with 
its disclosure of the efforts of Rayneval in his interview 
with Shelburne and Grantham to -prejudice the American 
claims, and the complete success of the mission of Vaughan, 
who returned with the new commission to treat with the 
United States, leaving the British Ministry resolved upon a 
policy that should relieve America from dependence upon 
French and Spanish influence. When advised of this, Mr. 
Bancroft remarked that he would carefully review his state- 
ment on this subject for his revised edition. 

It would be impossible within the limits of an address 
suited to this occasion to give more than an outline of the 
negotiation, leaving much to be supplied by notes and appen- 
dices. With your kind permission I will briefly recall its 
leading features, which are well known from the records of 
our own Commissioners, and you can then judge of the im- 
portance of the new evidence, showing that France and Spain 
were united against us on the fisheries, the boundaries, and 
the Mississippi, and exhibiting the difficulties and dangers 
of the negotiation, arising from their opposition and the in- 
struction of Congress, and the singular skill with which these 
difficulties were not merely avoided, but made to contribute 
to our success. 



24 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

The Position in England. 

The surrender of Cornwallis on November 25, 1781, which 
was received by Lord North with the exclamation " O God ! 
all is over," created in England a conviction of the hopeless- 
ness of conquering America. Burke, Fox, and the younger 
Pitt assailed the Government ; public meetings in London and 
Westminster strengthened the opposition ; and after a series 
of debates in Parliament, Lord North, on March 20, 1782, 
anticipated his dismissal by announcing his resignation, and 
with North fell the Tory party and their system of government. 
The king, after a threat of abdication and a return to Han- 
over, reluctantly accepted as his Minister that respectable and 
honorable statesman Lord Rockingham, and it was said by 
Lord North that while the late opposition had often accused 
him of issuing lying Gazettes he had never issued any Gazette 
which was half so false as that in which his successors an- 
nounced their installation to office, with the words " His 
Majesty has been pleased to appoint." * 

The Cabinet of Rockingham was divided into two parts, 
of which Fox said one belonged to the king and the other to 
the public. 

Fox as Secretary for the Foreign, and Shelburne for 
Home and Colonial Department, showed for each other 
personal dislike and political hostility, and this variance dis- 
turbed their efforts to inaugurate a negotiation for peace. 

Shelburne sent, in April, Mr. Richard Oswald to confer 
with Franklin, who alone of the American Commission was at 
Paris. Fox sent Mr. Thomas Grenville to communicate with 
the Count de Vergennes, and a memorandum for Oswald 
(dated April 28, 1782) showed this significant instruction: 
" Insist in the strongest manner that, if America is inde- 
pendent, she must be so of the whole world. No secret, 
tacitj,.or ostensible connection with France." 
' [On April 22d Franklin wrote to Jay, at Madrid : " Here 
you are greatly wanted, for messengers begin to come and 

* Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, iv., p. 221. "■ 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 25 

go, and there is much talk of a treaty proposed, but I can 
neither make nor agree to propositions of peace without the 
assistance of my colleagues. Mr. Adams, I am afraid, can- 
not just now leave Holland. Mr. Jefferson is not in Europe, 
and Mr. Laurens is a prisoner, though abroad upon parole. 
I wish, therefore, that you would render yourself here as 
soon as possible. You would be of infinite service. Spain 
has taken four years to consider whether she should treat 
with us or not. Give her forty, and let us in the meantime 
mind our own business. ... I am ever, my dear friend, 
most affectionately yours,> . . ."* 

On May 28th the Cabinet authorized Grenville to make 
certain propositions of peace to the belligerent powers. 
When the news of the great victory of Rodney had materially 
modified the situation, the Cabinet authorized Grenville to 
propose the independency of America in the first instance, 
instead of making it a condition of general treaty. 

On June 4th Grenville wrote to Fox a letter, which showed 
that the jealousy and hostility of the two secretaries had ex- 
tended to their agents in Paris. The fact that Shelburne 
had received from Franklin a confidential paper of impor- 
tance to the negotiation of which he had not advised the 
Cabinet, was referred to by Fox as "this duplicity of con- 
duct." The unsatisfactory language of Vergennes had led 
them to think that he desired to postpone the negotiation, 
and " they imagined that peace might still be made separately- 
with America, or at least that America might become so far 
neutral that the whole energies of England might be concen- 
trated on her European enemies." 

On June 30th Fox, greatly displeased at this, moved in 
the Cabinet that the independence of America should be un- 
conditionally acknowledged. The motion, if carried, would 
have placed the negotiation with America in the province of 
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It was lost by a majority 
of four. Fox at once announced to his colleagues that ' ' his 
part was taken to quit his office," but the next day Rocking- 

* Jay's Life, ii., p. 4. 



26 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

ham died ; * and Walpole remarked that, upon the death of 
Rockingham, the crown devolved upon the King of England. 

Rockingham was succeeded by Shelburne, to whom the 
King the same day offered with the post the fullest political 
confidence.f 

Fox, whose sympathies had been so strongly with the 
Americans that when, ten years later, he expressed to his 
nephew his joy at the defeat of the Duke of Brunswick by 
the French at the battle of Valmy, he said: "No public 
event, not excepting Saratoga and Yorktown, ever happened 
that gave me such delight," | — declined to remain in the 
Cabinet, taking the first step toward the restoration to 
power of Lord North and the Tories by what a late and 
much lamented English historian calls "the most unscrupu- 
lous coalition known in our history." § His resignation was 
followed by those of Lord Cavendish, Lord Althorpe, and 
Mr. Montague, of the Treasury Board ; by Burke and Sheri- 
dan, the Duke of Portland, Fitzpatrick, and Solicitor-General 
Lee. The vacant offices were filled by William Pitt as Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer ; Thomas Townsend in the Home 
and Colonial Department, with the lead in the House of 
Commons ; Lord Grantham, for many years minister at 
Madrid, whose long diplomatic experience was expected to 
prove of invaluable service ; Richmond and Conway in their 
old places ; Lord Camden as President of the Council ; 
Pepperarden, Solicitor- General Of the eleven ministers 
who formed the Cabinet, three were Chathamist Whigs, the 
followers of Rockingham, Grantham of no political party, and 
the Chancellor representing the King.! 

This was the Cabinet which, however unfortunate they 
may have been deemed when overthrown by a coalition 
which English historians condemn as infamous, have the great 
honor on the page of history of having solved the American 

* Shelbume's Life, iii., p. 221. July i, 1783. 

f Ibid., p. 222, •' The King to Shelburne," July i, 1782. 

X Lecky, iv., 335, note i. 

§ Green's History of England, p. 760. 

II Shelburne' s Life, iii., p. 227, 8, 9. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 27 

question by a treaty which, at the end of a long and em- 
bittered civil war, laid the foundation of a permanent and 
cordial friendship between the two great English-speaking 
nations, on whose harmonious action depend in no small 
degree the progress of civilization and the peace and happi- 
ness of the world. 

Surprise has sometimes been intimated or expressed by 
both English and American writers, that the negotiation 
should have been entrusted to a diplomat as inexperienced 
as Mr. Oswald, and one so little fitted to cope with men of the 
marked ability and training of Franklin, Adams, and Jay. But 
the interests of Great Britain were but measurably entrusted 
to Mr. Oswald, whose common sense, honesty, and good-will 
were admirably calculated to smoothethe path of negotiation, 
and whose intelligence and indefatigable industry kept Lord 
Shelburne and his associates advised of each varying phase of 
the negotiation, of everything said by the American Ministers, 
jointly or separately, as nearly as possible in their own words, 
and with a note, whenever they were significant, of their tone 
and manner. Mr. Oswald's personal suggestions as that the 
Americans could not be expected to make compensation to 
the loyalists, or that he was himself in favor of ceding Canada, 
carried little weight with the Cabinet at London, and every 
concession made to the American Commission, whether in 
the change of the Commission to the form prepared by Jay, 
or in the course of the negotiation when Oswald was alone, 
or when assisted by Fitzherbert and later also by Strachey 
before the Provincial Articles were adopted and signed, was 
made by Lord Shelburne and his accomplished secretaries, 
Thomas Townsend and Lord Grantham. And these eminent 
diplomats, supported by William Pitt, the Duke of Richmond, 
and the rest of the Shelburne Cabinet, were in the peace 
negotiations the able champions of the honor and interests of 
Great Britain, and the real antagonists whom the American 
Commission had to deal with and convince. 

When Fox resigned, Grenville followed his example, al- 
though Shelburne wished him to remain, and Mr. Alleyne 
Fitzherbert, the English minister at Brussels, was appointed 



28 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

in his place ; and Franklin intimated to Oswald that, until 
some acknowledgment was made and the treaty formally 
began, propositions and discussions seemed, on consideration, 
to be untimely.* 

Jay, owing to unavoidable delays, did not arrive at Paris 
until June 23d. He waited that afternoon on Doctor Franklin 
at Passy, by whom he was cordially welcomed. On the 24th 
they went together to see Vergennes, who gave Jay " a very 
friendly reception," and on the 29th they both waited by ap- 
pointment on the Count d'Aranda, who received them in a 
friendly manner, and expressed his wishes that close connec- 
tion might be formed between our countries on terms agree- 
able to both. The Count returned their visit and invited them 
to dinner, but on the day named Jay was taken sick and con- 
tinued so for many weeks, and he wrote in September that he 
was^not yet perfectly recovered. t 

/His first impression of Paris was favorable. To the Count 
de Montmorin, the P'rench Ambassador at Madrid, he wrote : % 
" What I have seen of France pleases me exceedingly. Doc- 
tor Franklin has received some late noble proofs of the King's 
liberality in the liquidation of his accounts, and the terms 'and 
manner of paying the balance due on them. No people un- 
derstand doing civil things so well as the French. The aids 
they have afforded us received additional value from the gen- 
erous, and gracious manner in which they were supplied, and 
that circumstance will have a proportionable degree of influ- 
ence in cementing the connection formed between the two 
countries?*-' 

Of Vergennes, Jay wrote to Livingston : " His answer to 
the British minister appeared to me ably drawn. It breathes 
great moderation, and yet is so general as to leave room for 
such demands as circumstances at the time of the treaty may 
render convenient^' Of Franklin he wrote : " I have en- 
deavored to get lodgings as near to Doctor Franklin as I can. 

* Shelburne (iii., p. 246) quoting Franklin to Oswald, July 12; Oswald to 
Shelburne, July 12, 1782. 

f Jay to Livingston, Dip. Cor., viii., p. 149. 

X Jay to Montmorin, June 26, 1782, Jay's Life, ii., p. 100. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 ajid 1783. 29 

He is in perfect good health, and his mind appears more 
vigorous than that of any man of his age I have known. He 
certainly is a valuable minister and an agreeable companion." t\ ' 
On July 9th Franklin communicated to Oswald the outline 
of the condition for a treaty, including an essential, complete 
independence, a settlement of the boundaries, a confinement 
of the boundaries of Canada, and a freedom of fishing on the 
banks of Newfoundland. Parliament rose on July nth and 
Shelburne, in the words of his biographer, despatched to Paris 
Benjamin Vaughan, the political economist and intimate 
friend of Franklin, " to give private assurances to the latter 
that the change of administration brought with it no change 
of policy, t 

The First Commission to Oswald. 

On July 27th Shelburne wrote to Oswald : "A com- 
mission will be immediately forwarded to you containing full 
power to treat, to conclude ; with instructions ... to 
make the independency of the Colonies the bases and pre- 
liminaries of the treaty now depending ; you will find the 
ministry united, in full possession of the King's confidence, 
and strongly devoted to peace if it can be had on reasonable 
terms ; if not, determined to have recourse to every means of 
arousing the kingdom to the most determined efforts." | 

By the commission drawn by the Attorney-General, Os- 
wald was empowered " to treat, consent, and conclude with 
any commissioner or commissioners named or to be named 
by the said Colonies or Plantations, and any body or bodies 
whatever, a peace or truce with the said Colonies or Planta- 
tions, or any of them, or any part or parts thereof." § 

* Jay to Livingston, June 25th, Dip. Cor., viii., pp. 114, 115. 

f Shelburne's Life, iii., p. 243. 

X Bancroft's MSS., America, France, and England, 1781-82, vol. i. 

§ By the instructions to Oswald given at the same time, he was told, "In 
case you find the American Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms 
but that of independence, you are to declare to them that you have authority to 
make that concession." 

He was directed " to claim, as a matter of absolute justice, all debts incurred to 



30 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

Mr. Oswald, writing to his Government on August^--7, 
1782, said that the courier arrived with the conrrnission the 
day before, and he had carried a copy of it to Dr. Franklin, 
at Passy. He added that Dr. Franklin, " after perusal, said 
he was glad it had come ; that he had been at Versailles yes- 
terday and Mons. de Vergennes had asked about it, and 
upon the Doctor telling him it had not come he said he 
could do nothing with Mr. Fitzherbert till it arrived, as both 
treaties must go on together, hand in hand. ... I pro- 
posed calling on Mr. Jay, the only other Commissioner, in 
Paris. The Doctor said it was right and returned me the 
copy of the commission to be left with Mr. Jay, which he 
would bring back to the Doctor as he was to dine at Passy. 
I accordingly returned to Paris and called on Mr. Jay. He is 
a man of good sense, of frank, easy and polite manners. . . . 
After reading the commission he said he hoped some good 
would be done. I replied if I did not think so I would not 
be here. He said he was so informed by Dr. Franklin, and 
then began upon the Article of Independence, and continued 
» the conversation in the manner as has been mentioned, in the 
coolest unreserved method and determined style of language 
that any common subject could be treated, and with a free- 
dom of expression and disapprobation at home and abroad 
respecting America, as shows we have little to expect from 
him in the way of indulgence, and I may venture to say that 
although he has lived till now as an English subject, though 
he has never been in England, he may be supposed (by any- 
thing I could perceive) as much alienated from any particular 

the subjects of Great Britain before 1775, and the interposition of Congress with 
the several provinces to procure an ample satisfaction upon this point ; to demand 
the restitution of the confiscated property of the Loyalists or an indemnification ; to 
claim New York, which was still in possession of the English troops, and the un- 
granted domains in each province as a possible means of obtaining this indemnifi- 
cation ; to do everything in his power to prevent the United States entering into 
any binding connection with any other power ; to propose an unreserved system 
of naturalization as the foundation of a future amicable connection ; to act in per- 
fect harmony with the envoy sent to negotiate with the European belligerents (Mr. 
Fitzherbert), and if necessary, to dispose the American Commissioners towards a 
separate negotiation." * 

* Shelbume's Life, iii., p. 250. 



The Peace Negotiatiofis of 1782 ajid 1783. 31 

r^^ard for England as if he had never heard of it in his Hfe. 
I sinceiely .trust I may be mistaken, but I think it proper to 
make the r^emark, as Mr. Jay is Dr. FrankHn's only colleague, 
and being a much younger man and bred to the law, will of 
course have a great share of the business assigned to his 
care." * 

Mr. Oswald's power was promptly communicated by 
Franklin and Jay, in conformity with their instructions, to the 
Count de Vergennes. The Count, in a note of August 8th, 
promised to examine it with the greatest attention, and to 
confer with them on the subject on the loth. On that day 
the Count advised the American Commissioners, for reasons 
which Jay deemed singular and fallacious, that it would do : 
and the Count subsequently communicated that advice to 
Mr. Fitzherbert, the British Minister. 

Franklin "believed the commission would do," but Jay 
was clear that it would not. [He wrote to Livingston : " On 
returning,! could not forbear observing to Doctor Franklin that 
it was evident the Count did not wish to see our indepen- 
dence acknowledged by Britain until they had made all their 
use of us. It was easy for them to foresee difficulties in bring- 
ing Spain into a peace on moderate terms, and that if we 
once found ourselves standing on our own legs, our inde- 
pendency acknowledged and all our terms ready to be granted, 
we might not think it our duty to continue in the war for the. 
attainment of Spanish objects. But on the contrary, as we 
were bound by treaty to continue the war till our indepen- 
dence should be attained, it was the interest of France to post- 
pone that event until their own views and that of Spain could 
be gratified by a peace, and that I could not otherwise ac- 
count for the Minister advising us to act in a manner incon- 
sistent with our dignity, and for reasons which he himself 
had too much understanding not to see the fallacy of. 

"The Doctor imputed this conduct to the moderation of 
the Minister and to his desire of removing every obstacle to 
speedy negotiations for peace. He observed that this Court 
had hitherto treated us very fairly, and that suspicions to their 

* III. Bancroft's MS. volumes : America, France, and England, p. 25. "^ 



32 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

disadvantage should not be readily entertained. He also 
mentioned our instructions as further reasons for our acqui- 
escence in the advice and opinions of the Minister."* 

/ Jay wrote to Livingston when enclosing a copy of a trans- 
lation of the intercepted letter of Marbois : f 

" I am persuaded, and you shall know my reason for it, 
that this Court chooses to postpone an acknowledgment of 
our independence by Britain to the conclusion of a general 
peace, in order to keep us under their direction until not only 
their and our objects are attained, bnt also until Spain shall 
be gratified in her demands to exclude everybody from the 
Gulf, etc. . . This Court as well as Spain will dispute our 
extension to the Mississippi. . . I ought to add that Doc- 
tor Franklin does not see the conduct of this Court in the light 
I do, and that he believes they mean nothing in their proce- 
dure but what is friendly, fair, and honorable. Facts and fu- 
ture events must determine which of us is mistaken. 
Let us be honest and grateful to France, but let us think for 
ourselves.^ 

The justice of Jay's view that Vergennes foresaw difficul- 
ties in bringing Spain to a peace on moderate terms, and was 
unwilling that the United States should be released from 
their engagement to continue the war by an immediate ac- 
knowledgment of her independence, is confirmed by the in- 
teresting account given by Mr. Bancroft in the eighth chap- 
ter of his tenth volume of the negotiation between France 
and Spain, which resulted in the treaty of alliance signed on 
April 12, 1779. 

On August 17th Oswald wrote that he had advised 
Franklin and Jay of the arrival of the Commission under the 
great seal, and he quoted Jay as saying : 

KAnd upon the whole they would not treat at all until their 
independence was so acknowledged as that they should have 
an equal footing with us and might take rank as parties to an 
agreement. . . . He also hoped that a happy conciliation 

* Dip. Cor., pp. 135, 136. 

f Jay to Livingston, September i8, 1782, Dip. Cor., viii., p. 127. For tlie 
letter of Marbois to Vergennes, dated March 18, 1782, see Jay's Life, i., 490. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 33 

and friendship would be restored and perpetuated between 
the countries notwithstanding all that had happened, which 
he said would give him great pleasure. 

" But that if we neglected this opportunity and continued 
our hesitation on that head, we should then convince them 
of the justice of their suspicions of designs which he would 
not name, and should force them into measures which he 
supposed I had discernment enough to guess at without com- 
ing to further explanation. That he should be extremely 
sorry to see things run into that strain, and therefore as the 
method proposed was indispensable, he could not but se- 
riously advise and recommend it. A good deal more this 
gentleman said to the same purpose, and without any ap- 
pearance of excitement or disguise ; on the contrary he de- 
livered his sentiments in a manner the most expressive of 
sincere and friendly interest in Great Britain." * 

Mr. Oswald recognized the reasonableness of the objection 
raised by Jay, and he recommended his Government, but 
without effect, to adopt a declaration of the independence 
of the colonies which Jay had prepared at his request and 
corrected with Dr. Franklin. Jay then suggested the issuing 
of a new Commission to treat with " Commissioners vested 
with equal powers by and on the part of the United States 
of America." In this Oswald concurred, and Jay prepared 
the draft of a joint letter to Oswald, in which it was among 
other points suggested, that the referring an acknowledgment 
of their independence to the first article of a treaty would 
imply that they were not to be considered in that light until 
after the conclusion of the treaty, and their acquiescing would 
be to admit the propriety of their being considered in another 
light during that interval. 

*' I submitted this draft," wrote Jay, " to Doctor Franklin. 
He thought it rather too positive, and therefore rather im- 
prudent, for that in case Britain should remain firm, and 
future circumstances should compel us to submit to their 
mode of treating, we should do it with an ill grace after such 
a decided and peremptory refusal. Besides, the Doctor 

* III. Bancroft MS. volumes : America, France, and England. 

3 



34 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. » 

seemed to be much perplexed and fettered by our instructions 
to be guided by the advice of this Court. Neither of these 
considerations had weight with me ; for as to the first I could 
not conceive of any event which would render it proper, 
and therefore possible for America to treat in any other char- 
acter than as an independent nation ; and as to the second, 
I could not believe that Congress intended we should follow 
any advice which might be repugnant to their dignity and 
interest." * 

The draft of this letter was at his request given to Oswald, 
who approved of it, and wished to submit it to his Government. 
No satisfactory reply, however, came from London, and Jay 
attributed the ill success of Oswald's request for a new com- 
mission to the announcement by Fitzherbert tHat France held 
the first to be sufficient;), 

Vaughan Sent to London. 

Three other incidents occurring in quick succession com- 
bined to induce, on the part of Jay, an extraordinary step, the 
sending of a special messenger to Lord Shelburne. 

The first was a letter from M. de Rayneval, the confiden- 
tial secretary of Vergennes, addressed to Jay as Minister to 
Spain, giving what he called his " personal ideas " about the 
manner of terminating his discussions with the Count 
d'Aranda f about boundaries. The memoir enclosed by 
Rayneval proposed as " a reasonable conciliation," a line 
excluding us from a vast territory, from which Jay drew the 
conclusions : % 

1. That the French Court would at a peace oppose our 
extension to the Mississippi. 

2. That they would oppose our claim to the free naviga- 
tion of that river. 

3. That they would probably support the British claim to 
all that country above the 31st degree of latitude, and cer- 
tainly to all that country north of the Ohio. 

* Dip, Cor., Jay to Livingston, viii., p. 146. 

f Dip. Cor., viii., p. 156. % Dip. Cor., viii., p. 160. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 35 

\^ He was clear that the first and confidential secretary of the 
Count de Vergennes would not without his knowledge and 
consent declare such sentiments and ofifer such propositions, 
and that too in writingr 

The^s^tond incident was the secret departure of Rayneval 
for England, of which Jay learned on September 9th, with an 
advice that it was pretended that he had gone to the country, 
and that several precautions had been taken to prevent his 
real destination from being known. In regard to the at- 
tempts to keep the visit a secret, Mr. Charles F. Adams 
alludes to his having travelled under an assumed name, and 
M. Ra3''neval himself, in his letter to Mr. Monroe,* after 
remarking that the object of the mission was to learn the 
truth of propositions of peace, said to have been made to 
Admiral de Grasse, distinctly says that it was decided that 
he should be sent secretly to England. Jay learned, also, 
that on the morning of Rayneval's departure, Count d'Aranda 
had gone to Versailles, and had an interview with Rayneval 
and Vergennes.'^-' 

zThe third incident, which occurred on September lOth, 
was the receipt of a translation of the famous letter of 
Marbois, the French Secretary at Philadelphia, against our 
sharing in the fisheries?" 

jThe facts in reference to M. Rayneval led Jay to conjec- 
ture that M. Rayneval's visit to England was connected with 
the question of the American claims, and that he was in- 
tended, among other things, to let Lord Shelburne know 
that the demand of America to be treated by Britain as in- 
dependent previous to a treaty were not approved or coun- 
tenanced by the French Court ; to sound Lord Shelburne on 
the subject of the fishery, and to discover whether Britain 
would agree to divide it with France, to the exclusion of all 
other nations ; and to impress Lord Shelburne with the de- 
termination of Spain to possess the exclusive navigation of 
the Gulf of Mexico, and of their desire to keep us from the 
Mississippi, and also to limit the propriety of such a line as, 

* Dated November 14, 1795, published in the Appendix D, vol. i., page 655, 
of Rives' Life of Madison. Boston, 1859. 



36 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

on the one hand, would satisfy Spain, and on the other, leave 
to Great Britain all the country north of Ohio. 

Having, after much consideration, become persuaded that 
such were M. Rayneval's objects, Jay mentioned his journey 
to Mr. Oswald with some degree of caution ; but reflecting 
upon the importance of Lord Shelburne knowing the aroused 
sentiments and resolutions respecting that matter, he con- 
cluded that it would be prudent to send over Mr. Benjamin 
Vaughan, who was strongly attached to the American cause, 
and who had been confidentially employed by Lord Shel- 
burne. Mr. Vaughan agreed to go, and in advance wrote to 
Lord Shelburne " desiring that he would delay taking any 
measures with M. Rayneval until he should either see or hear 
further from him." 

The substance of the points which Mr. Vaughan was 
desired to communicate to Lord Shelburne is given in Jay's 
despatch to Livingston.^ 

Those relating to the acknowledgment of independence in 
advance, as had already been suggested to Oswald, could be 
arranged simply by authorizing the commissioner to treat 
of peace with commissioners with equal powers on the part 
of the United States of America. 

The entire success of Mr. Vaughan's mission, as disclosed 
by the biographer of Lord Shelburne, gives new interest to 
the views set forth in the memorandum with which he was 
entrusted. On the point relating to the treaty with America, 
it was suggested that Britain by a peace, looked forward 
doubtless to other advantages than a mere cessation of hos- 
tilities — to cordiality, confidence, and commerce — and that 
the first step to making friends of those whom she could 
not subdue, was to treat with them on an equal footing, in- 
spiring them with confidence, and showing that the charge 
of insincerity made by her enemies was groundless. 

That any expectations grounded on the affected modera- 
tion of France would be fruitless, although they might pro- 
duce delay, for America would never treat except on' an 
equal footing. 

"Dip. Cor., viii. , pp. 165 et seq. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 37 

That a little reflection must convince Lord Shelburne that 
it was the interest, and consequently the policy, of France to 
postpone, if possible, the acknowledgment of our indepen- 
dence to the conclusion of a general peace, and by keeping it 
suspended until after the war, oblige the Americans by the 
terms of the treaty, and by regard to their safety, to continue 
in it to the end. That it hence appeared to be the obvious 
intent of Britain immediately to cut the cords which tied us 
to France, for that though we were determined faithfully to 
fulfil our treaty and engagement with this Court, yet it was 
a different thing to be guided by their or our construction of 
them. 

That, among other things, we were bound not to make a 
separate peace or truce, and that the assurance of our inde- 
pendence was avowed to be the object of our treaty. While, 
therefore. Great Britain refused to yield this object, we were 
bound, as well as resolved, to go on with the war, although 
perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace arose neither from 
the demands of France nor America ; whereas, that object 
being conceded, we should' be at liberty to make peace the 
moment that Great Britain should be ready to accede to the 
terms of France and America, without our being restrained 
by the demands of Spain, with whose views we had no 
concern. 

The rest of the memorandum touched upon the fact that 
America would not conclude a peace without the fisheries, 
and that an attempt to exclude them would irritate America 
and tend to perpetuate her resentment. That our right to 
extend to the Mississippi was proven by our charter, and our 
right to its navigation was deducible from nature. 

That the true object of an European commercial nation 
was to secure the profits of an extensive and lucrative com- 
merce, and not the possession of vast tracts of wilderness. 
That to attempt to retain that country by extending Canada, 
would be to sow the seeds of future war in the very treaty of 
peace. And that it certainly could not be wise for Britain 
" to lay in it the foundation of such distrust and jealousies as 
on the one hand, would ever prevent confidence and real 



38 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

friendship, and on the other, naturally lead us to strengthen 
our security by intimate and permanent alliances with other 
nations." 

The last suggestion touched a subject on which the confi- 
dential correspondence of the British Cabinet shows them to 
have been extremely sensitive, and no consideration, perhaps, 
had more weight in determining the policy of acceding to 
our claims, to an extent that induced Vergennes to say that 
England had bought a peace rather than made one, than the 
conviction that the American Commissioners were thoroughly 
in earnest, and that the only way to secure our friendship and 
prevent other alliances was to grant our reasonable demands. 

%K.x. Vaughan set off on the evening of September nth, 
and Jay wrote, " It would have relieved me from much anx- 
iety and uneasiness to have concerted all these steps with Doc- 
tor Franklin, but on conversing with him about M. Rayneval's 
journey, he did not concur with me in sentiment respecting 
the object of it, but appeared to me to have a great degree 
of confidence in this Courts and to be much embarrassed and 
constrained by our instructions.^* 

Doctor Franklin, however, agreed with Jay as to the pro- 
priety of writing a letter to the Count de Vergennes, on the 
question of the commission. The letter, which Trescott de- 
scribes as "a masterly vindication of the position," was 
drawn by Jay, and was under revision by Franklin when the 
news of their success in England rendered it unnecessary. 

Jay's Decision Stops the General Negotiations. 

Before quoting from the " Life of Shelburne " the account 
given by him of Rayneval's remarks on American matters, 
and the result of Vaughan's visit, it may be proper to revert 
to the effect which Jay's refusal to proceed under a commis- 
sion which did not recognize the equal sovereignty of the 
United States, had upon the negotiation at Paris with the 
other powers. 

When on August 6th, Oswald waited on Franklin with 

* Dip. Cor., viii., p. 169. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 39 

the copy of the first commission, Franklin said, that the day 
before, at Versailles, Vergennes had said he could do nothing 
till its arrival, as both treaties must go on together hand in 
hand. 

On August 1 8th, Oswald* wrote to Shelburne : "Your 
lordship will see that the American Commissioners will not 
move a step until the independence is acknowledged .... 
Until the Americans are contented Mr. Fitzherbert cannot 
proceed." 

The same day Oswald, who was working in great intimacy 
with Fitzherbert, wrote to Secretary Townsend that the de- 
mand of the Commissioners must be complied with to avoid 
the worst consequences, either respecting them in particu- 
lar or the object of the general pacification, "as to which 
nothing can be done until the American independence is 
settled." 

On September lOth, Oswald wrote to Secretary Town- 
send, that he had seen Jay frequently, and had used every 
argument to get him over his objection to treating without a 
separate and absolute acknowledgment of their independ- 
ence. 

-The correspondence shows that Jay's decision, not to treat 
except as an independent power, in stopping not only the 
American negotiation but the entire plan of pacification, had 
created great concern in England, and had given to the 
American Commissioners a position of control, which made 
them to some extent masters of the situation. 

On September ist, Townsend wrote to Oswald t that 
" His Majesty is pleased, for the salutary purpose of preclud- 
ing all further delay and embarrassment of negotiation, to 
waive any stipulation by the treaty for debts accrued before 
the year 1775, and also further claims of the refugees for 
compensation for their losses, , . . 

" But upon the whole, it is his Majesty's express com- 
mand that you do exert your greatest address to the purpose 

* Oswald's Minutes of Conversation with American Commissioners. Paris, 
August 7, 1782, S. P. O., France, p. 536. Bancroft MSS. 
f Quoted in Slielburne's Life, iii., pp. 255, 256. 



40 TJie Peace Negotiatiotis of 1782 and 1783. 

of prevailing upon the American Commissioners to proceed 
in the treaty and to admit the article of independence as a 
part, or as one only of the other articles which you are hereby 
empowered to conclude." 

From this it would appear that the English Cabinet, while 
ready to grant independence as the first article of the treaty, 
and so anxious to proceed that they were willing to sacrifice 
the debts of their subjects and the claims of the refugees, 
still shrank from dealing with their former colonies as an in- 
dependent power. When Vergennes proposed a truce in 
1778, Adams declined, partly on the ground that " it was to 
play the part of an insurgent endeavoring to make terms with 
a superior power, instead of one sovereign contracting on 
equal footing with others." * Adams was in correspondence 
with Jay in regard to Oswald's first commission, which he 
equally disapproved, and he suggested the simple modifica- 
tion which Franklin and Jay approved, by which it should 
confer authority to treat with the Ministers of the United 
States of America, t 

It would seem that the English Cabinet began to under- 
stand slowly, the policy of France in advising the American 
Commissioners to treat under the commission which described 
the United States as colonies. Secretary Grantham wrote 
to Fitzherbert, September 3, 1782, " I should see with much 
greater concern the several instances of disingenuousness which 
the French Minister has betrayed in treating with you, if I 
did not at the same time mark the acuteness with which you 
do not suffer them to escape you. ... I have reason to 
believe that even the independency of America, however 
ultimately advantageous to France, would not, if accepted 
now by the Commissioners, be a means agreeable to her, as 
the band between them would thereby be loosened before 
the conclusion of a peace." 

Fitzherbert replied on September nth, "Your lordship 
was founded in your suspicion that the granting of indepen- 

* Adams, i., 341. 
[f Ibid., 367, with references to vol. vii., 580, and vol. vii., 606. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 41 

dence to America as a previous measure is a point which the 
French have by no means at heart, and perhaps are not en- 
tirely averse from," 

Oswald, Sparks, and C. F. Adams on Rayneval's 

Mission. 

On September nth, the same day that Vaughan left for 
England, Oswald wrote to Shelburne, that it was said that 
Vergennes was to send his secretary to London on some 
particular negotiation — it was thought in favor of Spain. 
"The Count," he added, " wishes to have the whole of the 
country from West Florida of a certain width quite up to 
Canada, so as to have such cession from England before a 
cession to the Colonies takes place. If that gentleman goes 
over there can be no difficulty in amusing him." 

The suggestion does not appear to have been overlooked. 
After Rayneval's return to Paris, Fitzherbert wrote to Shel- 
burne (October 13, 1782), " M. de Rayneval talks to me in 
raptures of your lordship's reception of him, both in regard 
to your personal marks of kindness and in regard to the great 
candour, frankness and liberality of your sentiments which 
he met with from you in your conversation upon business." 

Recurring to the tone and object of M. Rayneval's con- 
versation in London with the British Minister, Dr. Sparks, in 
his note to the Diplomatic Correspondence, quotes from Ray- 
neval's instructions a passage to the effect that "as it is pos- 
sible that the English Minister may speak to M. de Rayneval 
concerning the affairs of America and the United Provinces, 
he will declare that he has no authority to treat on those 
topics," and again, and this time with a grave error,* he 

* Dr. Sparks, in his " Observations " on Mr. Jay's letter (Dip. Corresp., viii., 
210), attempts to show that Rayneval's visit to London had nothing to do with 
the claims of the United States respecting the fisheries and boundaries, and quotes 
from Rayneval's letter from London to Vergennes, a passage purporting to be 
Rayneval's reply to a remark of Shelburne : " Without doubt the Americans will 
also form pretensions to the fisheries, but he trusted the King (of France) would 
not sustain them." Dr. Sparks says: "To which M. de Rayneval replied — that 
he was ignorant of the views of Congress concerning the object in question, but 



42 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

quotes from a letter written by Rayneval himself, professing 
to state what he did say on American affairs ; and Dr. Sparks 
then says that the above extracts, which might be combined 
by testimony from other sources, " show most clearly that 
Mr. Jay's suspicions were in reality erroneous, on whatever 
grounds he might at the time suppose them to rest. M. de 
Rayneval's visit had nothing to do with American affairs ex- 
cept to insist on unconditional independence." 

Among later writers who have discussed this topic, no one 
has considered it with such breadth of view and careful dis- 
crimination as the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, whose diplo- 

thought he might venture to say that the King would never support unjust de- 
mands ; that he was not able to judge whether those of the Americans were such 
or not ; and that besides, he was without authority in this respect." 

The passage in italics is so emphasized in Dr. Sparks' note, but it does not ap- 
pear in the original French as given by Circourt, iii., p. 46, where the passage is 
as follows : " Est venu enfin le tour de I'Amerique. Mylord Shelburne a prevu 
qu'ils auraient beaucoup de difficultes avec I'Amerique, tant par rapport aux lim- 
ites que par rapport a la peche de Terre-Neuve ; mais il espere que le roi ne les 
soutiendra pas dans leur demande. J'ai repondu que je ne doutais pas de I'em- 
pressement du roi a faire ce qui dependra de lui pour contenir les Americains dans 
les bornes de la justice et de la raison. Et Mylord ayant desire savoir ce que je 
pensais de leur pretentions, j'ai repondu que j'ignorais celles relatives a la peche, 
mais que telles qu'elles puissent etre, il me semblait qu'il y avait un principe sur a 
suivre sur cette matiere, savoir : que la peche en haute mer est res nullitts, et que 
la peche sur les cotes appartenait de droit aux proprietaires des cotes, a moins de 
derogations fondees sur des conventions. Quant a I'etendue des limites, j'ai sup- 
pose que les Americains la prendraient dans leur chartes, c'es-ta-dire qu'ils vou- 
dront aller de I'ocean a la mer du sud. Mylord Shelburne a traite les chartes de 
sottises, et la discussion n'a pas ete plus loin parce que je n'ai voulu ni soutenir la 
pretention Americaine, ni I'aneantir ; j'ai seulement dit que le ministere Angiais 
devait trouver dans les negotiations de 1754, relative a I'Ohio, les limites que 
I'Angleterre, alors Souveraine de Treize Etats-Unis, croyait devoir leur assigner." 

"The Canadian frontier," as Mr. Lecky remarks (vol. iv., p. 274), "had al- 
ways been a matter of doubt," and M. Rayneval's own vei'sion of the manner in 
which he attempted to persuade England to adopt in treating with the United 
States, the boundary which she had attempted to assign to Canada in 1754, when 
Canada belonged to France, in opposition to the pretence that almost the whole 
course of the Ohio made a part of Louisiana, enables us to understand the argu- 
ment on which he based the strong opinion which he expressed to Shelburne and 
Grantham against the claims of the Americans to the Valley of the Ohio. M. de 
Rayneval's memoir on the boundaries authorized by M. Vergennes throws light 
upon this subject as well as upon the pretences on which France sought to deprive 
us of the Valley of the Mississippi" (Dipl. Corresp., viii., pp. 156-160). 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 43 

matic abilities and success, and whose wide experience and 
observation of European finesse under circumstances where 
the highest American interests were concerned, give to his 
conclusions on such a question an unusual weight of authority. 

Mr. Adams, from a careful analysis of M. Rayneval's con- 
fidential letter to Vergennes, came to a conclusion directly 
opposite to that of Dr. Sparks, and said that : "' Without ut- 
tering a single word that could be used to commit him or his 
government with America, M. de Rayneval had succeeded in 
making Lord Shelburne comprehend that France was not in- 
clined to prolong the war by supporting America in unjust 
claims ; what sense M. de Rayneval attached to the word un- 
just will appear as the negotiations proceed." 

Mr. Adams in a note * remarks that a doubt may be per- 
mitted whether a national publication like the " Diplomatic 
Correspondence," is the right medium through which to dis- 
seminate arguments and inferences to sustain any peculiar 
views of the action of those times. Of the two extremes, 
he adds, " the course adopted by Mr. Force in the * Amer- 
ican Archives,' of literally adhering even to obvious errors, 
seems the safest and most satisfactory." 

I am informed by Mr. Bancroft that Mr. Edward Everett 
was of the same opinion on this subject, and Mr. John Quincy 
Adams intimates distinctly his own view when he speaks of 
"the Diplomatic Correspondence recently published by Con- 
gress and somewhat incorrectly edited by Mr. Sparks, I mean 
by the notes with which it is impoverished from the hand of 
the editor." t 

Mr. Donne, the editor of " George the Third's Letters to 
Lord North," % speaks of the golden rule, that an editor should 
regard himself as simply the servant of the author. If to 
this rule there may be exceptions, it seems at least preferable 
to one which allows an editor to constitute himself at once 
the accuser, prosecutor, witness, and judge, of governmental 
commissioners, whose correspondence he is appointed to pub- 
lish, and to incorporate his individual views in the official 

* Adams, i., 368. f J. Q. Adams, to William Jay, August 18, 1882. 

I Vol. ii., 450. 



44 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

volumes in a way to deceive his readers by the boldness of 
his assertions, and induce them to accept his personal opinion 
as the verdict of impartial history. 



The Part taken by Rayneval against America. 

The biographers of Jay and Adams have both alluded to 
the possibility that the part actually taken by Rayneval 
might never become known. But a single paragraph in the 
" Life of Lord Shelburne" discloses the truth, and shows the 
opinion expressed by Rayneval on the American claims. 

i^ord Edmond Fitzmaurice, after giving a sketch of the 
interviews between Rayneval and Lord Shelburne, who was 
accompanied by Lord Grantham, a fact noticeable in view of 
Mr. C. F. Adams' suggestion that Lord Shelburne was be- 
lieved for a time " to have kept the information of the visit 
secret from all his colleagues,"* makes this statement, which 
"Exactly confirms Jay's anticipations of the tone that Rayneval 
would assume on the American question, and which sug- 
gested the expediency as a counter-move of the sending of 
Mr. Vaughan : 

" They then proceeded to speak about America. Here 
Rayneval played into the hands of the English ministers by 
expressing a strong opinion against the American claims to 
the Newfoundland fishery, and to the Valley of the Missis- 
sippi and the Ohio. These opinions were carefully noted by 
Shelburne and Grantham. The conversation then became 
general?^ 

Before proceeding to the effect of Vaughan's mission on 
the attempt of Rayneval which h'ad been so correctly foreseen, 
to prejudice the American claims on the three points most 
important to the Republic, it may be proper to refer to M. 
Rayneval's attempt to explain away the part he played on 
that occasion. In a note to Mr. Monroe, written at Paris, 
November 14, 1795, and published by Mr. Rives in the " Life 

* Adams' Works, i., 369. f Shelburne's Life, iii., 263. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 45 

of Madison,"* he replied to a letter from that gentleman, dated 
October 30th. Mr. Monroe had referred to the fact that the 
American Commissioners had signed the Preliminary Articles, 
which were not to take effect until a peace was concluded be- 
tween France and England, without the knowledge of the 
French Cabinet, and against the instructions they had re- 
ceived from Congress, and he had then said : 

" When the motives of this proceeding was asked, I have 
often heard it said that France, showing indifference on several 
points of our claims against England then contended for by 
our Ministers, had even taken the part of that power against 
us, seeking to discard our claims relating to the fisheries, the 
boundaries, and the Mississippi ; and that you had been 
sent to England for the purpose of deciding the Marquis of 
Lansdowne in his opposition to our demands on these points, 
which you accomphshed in your personal interview with that 
minister; and finally, that if our negotiators succeeded in the 
points which I have named, they owed their success to the 
liberal policy of England, which in rejecting the counsels of 
France preferred to accede to what we asked." 

M. de Rayneval in a rather long reply said that he had 
been sent secretly to England to learn the truth about the 
overtures to Admiral de Grasse. 

" My instructions," he said, " were as simple as they were 
laconic. They asked that I should demand the admission 
or disavowal of the note communicated to M. de Grasse. 
The first article of the note concerned the independence of 
America. I have annexed an extract from the statement 
which I made on my return. ... It was written at the 
end of September, 1782. You will find there the first funda- 
mental article of my instructions, the independence of the 
United States, and that nothing was prescribed in relation 
to the other conditions to be made with the American Com- 
missioners." 

This, it may be remarked in passing, disposes of Dr. 
Sparks' suggestion that it is not improbable that the change 
in Oswald's commission was effected in consequence of M. 

* Appendix D, vol. i., p. 655. 



46 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

de Rayneval's representations.* The actual independence of 
the United States was always insisted on by Vergennes, even 
to Spain, who so persistently opposed it ; and it was already 
known that England was ready to acknowledge it by the 
treaty; the demand of Jay, which Vergennes opposed, was 
that the independence should be acknowledged by the Com- 
mission in advance of the treaty ; and even before the ap- 
pearance of the secret French correspondence and of Lord 
Shelburne's Life, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, with an intel- 
ligence and judgment now confirmed by proof, had shown 
the groundlessness of Mr. Sparks' inference, and the proba- 
bility that it was Mr. Vaughan's verbal communication held 
after his arrival in England which had turned the scale in 
favor of the concession, t 

M. de Rayneval further said in his letter to Monroe, that 
he encouraged no conversation or discussion on the other 
American conditions, that when the English minister intro- 
duced the point he took refuge in his ignorance and his lack 
of instructions ; and that in the opinions which he did express, 
he rather strengthened than weakened the demands of the 
American Commissioners. 

M. de Rayneval, in his letter to Jay dated September 6th, 
with the memoir prepared by instruction from Vergennes, 
had contended that those demands were unfounded, and that 
they should consent to a line which would confine them to 
a narrow strip along the Atlantic, and he added to this 
note this postscript. "P.S. — As I shall be absent for some 
days, I pray you to address your answer to Mr. Stenin, Sec- 
retary to the Council of State at Versailles." " I must desire 
you," said Jay to Livingston, " not to let the perusal of the 
following memoir make you forget the postscript of the above 
letter, for in the sequel you will find it of some importance.":}: 

It proved, in aiding to bring about the mission of Mr. 
Vaughan, of even more importance than Jay anticipated. 
In his letter to Monroe, Rayneval says that Mr. Jay having 
been charged with a negotiation with the Count d'Aranda, 
the two negotiators had chosen him to bring them to- 

* Dip. Cor., viii., 211. f Adams' Works, i., 368. I^Dip. Cor., viii., 156. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 ajtd 1783. 47 

gather {pour les rapprocher), that he had given his advice 
in writing, and that Mr, Jay had agreed with him as to 
its justice and solidity. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, in 
his discussion of the earlier treaty negotiations, referred to 
Vergennes' solemn declaration to Granville, in the presence 
of Franklin, who records it without a word of comment, 
that " France had never given the least encouragement to 
America until long after the breach was made and inde- 
pendence declared. There sat Mr. Franklin," added he, 
" who knows the fact and can contradict me if I do not speak 
• the truth." * 

Mr. Adams speaks plainly of the falsehood, and of the 
audacity of placing Doctor Franklin " under such difficult cir- 
cumstances that even his silence was equivalent to an affirma- 
tion of the fraud " and remarks that the audacity of the false- 
hood is not exceeded even by the deliberate denial of the 
family compact made by the Count de Bussy to Lord Chat- 
ham which Flassan describes as a " mensonge politique^ 
•Mr. Adams did not admit that when the attempt to deceive 
exists, a lie changes its character by being called "a political 
lie." 

In this case the known inexactness of M. de Rayneval's 
statements that Jay had requested his intervention in the 
negotiation with the Spanish Minister, and that Jay had 
approved of the solidity and justice of the views expressed 
in his memoir, shows, to say the least, a facile and con- 
venient memory, which may explain also his declaration 
that, in what he said to Lord Shelburne, he " rather strength- 
ened than weakened the demands of the American Commis- 
sioners." 

Why should he have attempted to strengthen their de- 
mands in London when he had striven to reduce them at 
Paris, and why if such was his intention, did both Shelburne 
and Grantham regard him as playing into their hands by ex- 
pressing a strong opinion, not only against the claims of the 
Americans to the Valley of the Mississippi, but against their 
claims to the fisheries and the Ohio ? On his return to Paris, 

* Adams, i., 307, 30S, and note. 



48 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

M. de Rayneval again urged upon Jay " the conciliatory line 
which he had proposed," * which was to restrict so largely 
our western frontier, in accord with the policy of Spain, and 
with Vergennes' agreement to maintain it. 

The Effect upon the British Ministry. 

What might have been the effect upon the English policy 
toward America of the disclosure by Rayneval of the part 
which France was playing in regard to each of the American 
claims, had the American Commissioners shown themselves, 
either incredulous or indifferent, and ready to obey their in- 
structions, and to recognize the King of France as the master 
of the terms of peace, may be matter of speculation. What 
its actual effect was upon Shelburne and Grantham, when 
accompanied by the proofs afforded by the letters of Oswald 
and Vaughan, and now by the presence of the latter, that the 
disposition of France to restrict the boundaries of America, 
and subject her interests to those of Spain, was understood 
and resented, and would be firmly resisted on the part of the 
American Commission, is a matter of history. 

The doubts which had so long vexed the English Cabinet 
and delayed the issuing of a new commission, were at once 
dismissed, and from that time their policy was marked by a 
confidence in the American Commissioners unknown before. 
The history of diplomacy has rarely taught a finer lesson of 
what intelligence, courage, and good faith can accomplish 
against the trained experience of those most accomplished in 
European intrigue ^Si^ finesse. 

It is to be remarked that both Franklin and Jay were kept 
well advised of the varying phases of English politics; they 
knew that the ministry were aware of the necessity of being 
prepared for the approaching Parliament, and were gradually 
becoming aware of the importance, could it be effected, of 
closing if possible the American question before concluding 
with France and Spain. The advantage of eliminating the 
American element from the general pacification seems to have 

* Diplomatic Corresp, viii., 209. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 49 

been brought into prominence, however unconsciously, by 
Rayneval ; and Shelburne's view of ParHament may perhaps 
be gathered from his remarks to Fitzherbert a little later (Octo- 
ber 2 1 St). "It is our determination that it shall be either 
War or Peace before we meet the Parliament, for I need not 
tell you that we shall have there to meet many opinions and 
passions." 

Of the effect of Vaughan's mission the biographer of 
Shelburne says : " Benjamin Vaughan had arrived almost 
simultaneously with Rayneval. It became clear to the Cabi- 
net that a profound feud had sprung up between the Ameri- 
cans and their European allies, and that all they had to do 
was to avail themselves of it. They at once decided to accept 
the American proposition as to the terms of the commission 
to Oswald. Lord Ashburton gave it as his opinion that it 
came within the terms of the Enabling Act. The new com- 
mission was then made out at once and despatched to Paris 
by Vaughan." " Having said and done everything," Shel- 
burne wrote to Oswald, " which has been desired,* there is 
nothing for me to trouble you with except to add that we have 
put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man, in 
the American Commissioners. It is now to be seen how far 
they or America are to be depended upon. I will not detain 
you with enumerating the difficulties which have occurred. 
There never was greater risk known ; I hope the public will 
be the gainer by it, else our heads must answer for it, and de- 
servedly." 

This tribute to the American Commissioners from the chief 
Minister of George the Third is the more remarkable that it 
was paid by Shelburne himself, amidst the prevailing system 
of diplomatic duplicity. 

The simple, manly, straightforward conduct of the Am- 
erican Commission at Paris, having regard only to the dignity 
and rights of their country, and standing with quiet firm- 
ness on that basis, unmoved alike by solicitation or menace : 
indifferent to the complaint that the American stubbornness 
was blocking the general pacification, and calmly refusing 
* Shelburne to Oswald, September 23, 1782 : Shelburne's Life, iii., pp. 267-68. 

4 



50 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

to treat with Great Britain excepting on a footing of equal 
sovereignty and independence, inspired the respect, regard, 
and confidence implied in those remarkable words : ' We 
have put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in 
man, in the American Commissioners.' " That confidence 
settled the main question whether England should adopt the 
part so much desired by France and Spain in regard to 
the crippling of American power, or whether she should 
endow the rising nation with the territories and resources 
which her position demanded. However skilfully M. Rayne- 
val may have played into their hands 'by expressing his 
strong opinion against the American claims to the fisheries 
and to the Valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio, the argu- 
ments of Jay and Franklin, repeated to Shelburne in the 
letters of Oswald and by Vaughan, as the special agent of 
the Americans, proved more real and effective, and, as 
Vaughan wrote nearly fifty years afterward, he was asked 
but a single question : 

" L. (Lansdowne) only asked me. Is the new Commission 
necessary ? and when I answered yes, it was instantly or- 
dered, and I was desired to go back with it, which I did, carry- 
ing the messenger who had charge of it in my chaise. The 
grant of the Commission," he added, "showed how things 
stood, and I departed joyfully."* 

Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice closes his chapter from which 
the account of Rayneval and Vaughan is taken with the 
remark : 

" It remained to be seen whether the separation thus 
successfully accomplished of the two negotiations could be 
maintained, and what effect it would have on the tone of 
France and Spain." The wish for a " separate negotiation" 
with the United States seems to have been cherished by the 
British Cabinet for a long time, and a letter from Grenville 
to Fox suggests that Franklin had given color to the idea 
by his course in reference to his paper, which he gave to 
Oswald in April, 1782, suggesting the cession of Canada and 

* Benjamin Vaughan to Peter Augustus Jay, January 14, 1830. MS. letter 
in the possession of Miss E. C. Jay, of New York. 



TJic Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 51 

also reparation to the Tories, of which Franklin says in his 
diary that, in giving to Mr. Adams a narrative of what had 
transpired, he omitted all notice to this paper, and " the rea- 
son," he added, "of my omitting it was that on reflection I 
was not pleased at my having hinted a reparation to Tories 
for their forfeited estates, and I was a little ashamed of my 
weakness in permitting this paper to go out of my hands." * 

Grenville had said to Fox : "This paper under the title of 
' Notes of a Conversation,' contained an idea of Canada being 
spontaneously ceded by England to the Thirteen Provinces in 
order that Congress might sell the unappropriated lands, and 
make a fund thereby in order to compensate the damages 
done by the English army, and even that too sustained by 
the Loyalists ; this paper, given with many precautions for 
fear of its being known to the French Court, to whom it was 
supposed not to be agreeable, Mr. Oswald showed to Lord 
Shelburne, who after keeping it a day, as Mr. Oswald sup- 
posed to show it to the King, returned it to him, and it was 
by him brought back to Franklin. I say nothing to the 
proposition itself, to the impolicy of bringing a strange 
neighborhood to the Newfoundland fisheries, or to the little 
reason that England would naturally see in having lost 
thirteen provinces, to give away a fourteenth ; but I mention 
it to show an early trace- of separate negotiation which per- 
haps you did not know before." f 

The secret correspondence of Vergennes affords ample 
proof of the correctness of Doctor Franklin's supposition, that 
the cession of Canada to the United States would not be 
agreeable to the French Court. To Montmorin, Vergennes 
suggested! that it was "important that the English should 
remain masters of Canada and Nova Scotia ; they will keep 
alive the jealousy of this nation, which might otherwise turn 
somewhere else, and will make it feel the need of sureties, 
allies, and protectors," 

* Life of Franklin, ii., 460. See the paper also as taken from the Lansdowne 
MSS. in Shelburne, iii., 180-182. 
f Lecky, iv., 250, June 4, 1782. 
ij: Circourt, iii., 311, October 30,. 1778. 



52 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

Again, on November 2, 1778,* Vergennes wrote to Mont- 
morin : 

" But you may assure him (the minister of the King of 
Spain) that it is not on our part he will meet with difficulties 
with regard to the reservation and guaranteeing of Canada 
and Nova Scotia to England." 

The proposal of Doctor Franklin for the cession of Canada, 
which Oswald seems to have regarded with some approval, 
found no favor with the British Cabinet ; but the suggestion 
of compensation to the Tories, and what they thought a trace 
of separate negotiation, were not readily forgotten. A nota- 
ble incident of Franklin's proposal was the injunction that it 
should be kept secret even from France, an injunction in vio- 
lation of the instructions of Congress ; and it may be remem- 
bered that it was the accidental disclosure of the secret by 
Oswald to Grenville which intensified the quarrel between 
Shelburne and Fo.k, who was about resigning his position in 
the Cabinet when it was dissolved by the death of Rockingham. 

Another noticeable point in connection with Vaughan's 
visit is alluded to by Mr. C. F. Adams, f where he says of the 
Marbois letter : 

" The object of its disclosure on the part of England was 
to make Mr. Jay willing to surrender his objection to imme- 
diate negotiation on the terms of Oswald's commission. Its 
effect was directly the reverse of this, for Mr. Jay made it 
the basis of the strongest representations, communicated 
through Mr. Vaughan to Lord Shelburne, to secure the modi- 
fication which was required. It was this last view, reinforced 
by the written representations made before and the verbal 
communication held after Mr. Vaughan's arrival in England, 
which probably turned the scale in favor of the concession." 

Nor is it to be forgotten, in considering broadly the situa- 
tion of England when she suddenly adopted a more friendly 
policy toward America, that she was at the time without an 
ally in Europe, and that if the attempt for a general pacifica- 
tion should fail, she would have to continue the war at no 
slight disadvantage. 

* Circourt, iii., p. 311. f Adams, i., 368. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 53 

Arrival of the New Commission. 

On the 24th September Townsend wrote to Oswald : "I 
now send you the commission, which has met with no delay- 
more than was absolutely necessary for the forms through 
which it would pass. I hope the frankness with which we 
deal will meet with a suitable return." * 

" On the 27th of September," wrote Jay to Livingston, 
" Mr. Vaughan returned here from England with the courier 
that brought Mr. Oswald's new commission, and very happy 
were we to see it." And he added an assurance that " Mr. 
Vaughan greatly merits our acknowledgments." t 

It was on September 24th that Jay was informed of the 
intention of the British court to give Mr. Oswald such a new 
commission as had been recommended, and on September 
26th Jay visited the Count de Vergennes at Versailles, and 
met there Lafayette and the Ambassador of Spain. The 
latter desired to enter upon the negotiation of a treaty with 
Spain, and wished Jay to accept the assurance of the Count 
de Florida Blanca that he was authorized to treat, and not to 
insist upon an exchange of powers, for the reason that Spain 
had not yet recognized the independence of the United 
States. Jay replied, that they had declared their indepen- 
dence ; that France, Holland, and Britain had acknowledged 
it ; and Lafayette made a remark with which the Spanish Am- 
bassador was little pleased — that it would not be consistent 
with the dignity of France for her ally to treat otherwise 
than as independent. The Ambassador observed that Spain 
did not deny our independence, and he could perceive no 
other reason for Jay's declining to confer with the Ambassa- 
dor about a treaty without saying anything about our inde- 
pendence, an acknowledgment of which would naturally be 
the effect of the treaty proposed to be formed. " I told the 
Count," wrote Jay, " that being independent we should 
always insist on being treated as such, and therefore it was 
not sufficient for Spain to forbear denying our independence, 
* Townsend to Oswald, Whitehall, September 24, 1782. 
f Dip. Corres., viii., 201. 



54 T1ie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

while she declined to admit it ; and that notwithstanding my 
respect for her Ambassador and my desire of a treaty with 
Spain, both the terms of my commission and the dignity of 
America forbade my treating on any other than an equal 
footing''* 

The Count Vergennes carried the Ambassador to his 
Cabinet, and when he retired explained to Jay the reason of 
sending Rayneval to England, to learn if Shelburne were 
really inclined to peace, which he believed to be the case, 
and observed in reference to the new commission that, as it 
removed their former objection, they might now go on to 
prepare the preliminaries, and he recommended, as regarded 
Spain, that they should endeavor to approach and meet each 
other. 

From the Count Jay went to see Rayneval, who gave the 
same reason for his journey, and talked of his memoir, say- 
ing much in favor of the conciliatory line he had proposed, 
which would have greatly reduced the lands toward the Mis- 
sissippi. When Jay repeated to him a remark which he 
had just made to Vergennes about the recent date of the 
Spanish claims, Rayneval imputed their former ideas to 
their ignorance, making it evident to Jay that their present 
ideas had been suggested to them by the French Court, 
and affording additional proof that that Court was actively 
opposed to the American claims, treating them as ill-founded 
and unjust. t 

On the arrival of the new commission empowering Oswald 
to "treat of, consult, and conclude with any commissioners, 
or persons by and on the part of the Thirteen United States 
of America," the American Commissioners, recognized at 
last as the representatives of an independent power, pro- 
ceeded to business. 

The result thus accomplished by a disregard of the in- 
struction of Congress suggested and urged by the French 
Minister, that the Commission should be governed by the 
advice of France, recalls the fact that by the instructions 

* Dip. Corres., viii., 202. 

f See Mr. Chas. Francis Adams' remarks on Rayneval's views, Adams, i., 373. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 55 

resolved upon by Congress (August 14, 1779), the American 
Minister was to make it " a preliminary article to any ne- 
gotiation, that Great Britain shall agree to treat with the 
United States as free, sovereign, and independent States." * 

On October 5th, after a slight delay caused by the illness 
of Franklin. Jay handed to Oswald the plan of a treaty, 
which included the clauses relating to independence, the 
boundaries, and the fisheries. The boundaries were accepted 
by Oswald, with an amendment proposed by Franklin for 
the settlement of the Massachusetts boundary by a commis- 
sion, and Oswald explained to Townsend that the draft so 
favorable to the Americans, was drawn avowedly with the 
object of laying the foundation of future good-will, and leav- 
ing as few causes of future differences as possible between the 
two nations. The map which accompanied the draft treaty 
is stated by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice to be the same which 
was afterward found among the Jay papers, and which now 
belongs to the New York Historical Society. 

The next day, October 6th, Vergennes handed to Fitz- 
herbert two memorials containing the demands of France 
and Spain, whose business had waited until the Americans 
were satisfied with Oswald's commission. On the 8th, Os- 
wald wrote to the Secretary of State : " Mr. Jay said to me 
last night, once we have signed this treaty we shall have no 
more to do but to look on and see what people are about 
here. They will not like to find we are so far advanced, and 
have for some time appeared anxious and inquisitive as to 
our plans of settlement, upon which subject I was lately tried 
by a certain marquis ; but I gave him no satisfaction, and 
wish that for some time as little may be said about it as pos- 
sible." f 

The Sending of Mr. Strachey. 

Oswald received no opinion from his Court on the Articles 
until October 23d, when he was told that the extent of the 
boundaries and the situation of the Tories raised some objec- 

* Secret Journal, Debates, ii., 137-236. 

f From OswaWs letter in the Bancroft collection. 



56 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

tions, and that the Minister's secretary was coming to confer 
with them. 

The object of this move, as Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice 
shows in the Hfe of Shelburne, was to gain, if possible, a 
modification of the American demands in favor of the EngHsh 
creditors and loyaHsts — points to which Shelburne attached a 
larger importance than some of his colleagues — and as Oswald 
had acted in conformity with the express direction of the 
Cabinet, they proposed to send an additional negotiator to 
assist him. 

The great victory of Rodney over the French in the West 
Indies in April, 1782, had been followed in September by 
the memorable defeat of the French and Spanish forces gath- 
ered for the capture of Gibraltar, and the burning of the fleet 
of battering ships. 

This victory stiffened the British Cabinet in opposition 
to the demands of France and Spain ; but realizing that the 
United States would in no case continue the war for purely 
Spanish objects, they resolved to attempt a modification of 
the American demands as well in regard to the northeastern 
boundary as in favor of the English creditors and the loyalists, 
on which Oswald had yielded. 

Oswald had already been assisted by Mr. Fitzherbert, 
who had been sent to Paris from Brussels, and of whom Mr. 
Secretary Townsend had written to Oswald * (July 26, 1782) : 
" I have great pleasure in recommending him to your con- 
fidence, as he is a person of whose talents and discretion I 
have the highest opinion, founded on a long acquaintance." 
And the royal instructions to Mr. Oswald, dated July 31, 
1782, said : " Our will and pleasure is that you preserve the 
most constant and intimate communication from time to time 
with the said colleague Fitzherbert." 

It was resolved to send a new negotiator to their aid, 
and Lord Shelburne selected for this purpose Mr. Henry 
Strachey, who had been the secretary of Clive, and of Lord 
Howe's Commission when it met at Staten Island, where 

* MS. in English Record Office — volume, " France. Mr. Walpole, Mr. Oswald, 
Mr. Fitzherbert, and Mr. Grenville, January to December, 1782. No. 557." 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 ajid 1783. 57 

Franklin and Adams went for a conference. Strachey had 
served also as Secretary of the Treasury under Lord Rocking- 
ham, and then as Under-Secretary in Townsend's depart- 
ment, where, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice says, " he was 
known as a man of great discretion, accuracy, and learning." * 

The English Cabinet had begun to realize the difficulty, if 
not the impossibility, of obtaining what they thought con- 
cerned the honor of England — restitution and compensation 
for the royalist refugees — and Mr. Strachey left with " in- 
structions to urge the claims of England, under the Proclama- 
tion of 1763, to the lands between the Mississippi and the 
western boundary of the States, and to bring forward the 
French boundary of Canada. . . . He was to urge their 
claims and the right of the King to the ungranted domain, 
not indeed for their own sake but in order to gain some com- 
pensation for the refugees." 

" I trust and hope," wrote Shelburne to Oswald, an- 
nouncing the departure of Strachey, " you are well founded in 
your judgment of the American Commissioners now at Paris. 
I am disposed to expect everything from Dr. Franklin's 
comprehensive understanding and character ; and as I krtow 
nothing to the contrary, I am open to every good impression 
you give us of Mr. Jay." f 

After referring to the refugees and the debts, Shelburne 
added : 

"But I beg to recommend the question of policy to your 
most serious reflection. If we are to look to regain the af- 
fection of America, to reunion in any shape, or even to com- 
merce and friendship, is it not of the last degree of consequence 
to retain every means possible to gratify America at a future, 
I hope not very distant, day ? " 

Rayneval's Renewed Objections. 

October 24th Jay dined with Doctor Franklin at Passy, 
meeting M. de Rayneval, who desired to know the state of 
the negotiations with Oswald, and was told that some ques- 

* Shelburne' s Life, iii. , 281. 

f Shelburne to Oswald, October 21, 1782 : Shelburne's Life, iii., 283. 



58 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

.tions had arisen about the boundaries, and that a secretary- 
was coming with books and papers. On asking and being 
told what boundaries we claimed, he argued that the claim 
was ill-founded, and objected also to our claim to the fisher- 
ies. On Doctor Franklin's explaining their great importance 
to the Eastern States, he softened his manner and observed, 
" that it was natural for France to wish better to us than to 
England ; but as the fisheries were a great nursery for sea- 
men, we might suppose that England would be disinclined to 
admit others to share in it." 

This remark recalls one made by Lord St. Helens (the 
Mr. Fitzherbert of the negotiation), in memoranda on Jay's 
life addressed to Sir George Rose in 1838.* After referring 
to the British official discussions with France touching the 
French fisheries, Lord St. Helens added : " But in the course 
of these discussions M. de Vergennes never failed to insist on 
the expediency of a concert of measures between France and 
England for the purpose of excluding the American States 
from the fisheries, lest they should become a nursery for sea- 
men." 

The Arrival of Mr. Adams — Unanimous Action of 
THE Commission. 

Saturday, October 25th, was an eventful day in the his- 
tory of the negotiation, as Mr. Adams arrived from Holland, 
bringing to the work of the Commission his experience and 
ability, energy, and courage. " He had studied," says 
Trescott, " profoundly and philosophically the capacities of 
the country he represented, and had an enthusiastic convic- 
tion not only of its future power, but of the influence which 
it might exert in the present condition of political affairs." 
He came from the Hague, where he had negotiated a treaty 
with the Netherlands. 

He had been originally appointed the sole Commissioner 
to negotiate a peace, and when his habit of independent 

* Quoted in the New York Review, ix. , pp. 306, 307. From a copy furnished 
'to'the author, the late Dr. John McVickar, of Columbia College, by the Hon. 
William Jay. See also Flanders' Chief Justices, i., 343. 



The Peace Negotiatiojis of 1782 and 1783. 59 

thought and action dissatisfied the French Minister, and Con- 
gres^ had consented to add in succession Jay, Franklin, 
Laurens, and Jefiferson, he wrote to a friend who thought it 
might be disagreeable : " It is more honorable than before 
and much more easy. . . . The measure is right. It is 
more respectful to the powers of Europe concerned and more 
likely to give satisfaction in America." * 

On Monday, October 28th, Jay says in his diary, " Mr. 
Adams was with us three hours this morning. I mentioned 
to him the progress and present state of the negotiation 
with Britain, my conjectures of the views of France and 
Spain, and the part which it appeared to me advisable for us 
to act ; he concurred with me in sentiment on all these 
points." 

After the preliminary articles had been signed, Adams 
wrote of this interview with Jay: "Nothing that has hap- 
pened since the beginning of the controversy in 1761 , has ever 
struck me more forcibly, or affected me more intimately than 
that entire coincidence of principles and opinions between him 
and me." 

October 29th Oswald wrote to Shelburne : " Mr. Strachey 
arrived here yesterday. Introduced Strachey to Jay, and 
was joined by Adams, who is come from Holland. . . . We 
then went out to Doctor Franklin's. . . . To-morrow at 
eleven o'clock the three Commissioners have agreed to meet 
at my quarters to examine maps and papers, and thereafter 
are to dine together at Mr. Jay's. We are now at night again 
employed in that way so as to be the better prepared for 
them, at least as well as can be done from material of such 
indefinite instructions." 

Three days later Adams spent the evening with Doctor 
Franklin at Passy. 

"I told him," writes Adams, " without reserve my opin- 
ion of the policy of this Court, and of the principles, wisdom, 
and firmness with which Mr. Jay had conducted the negotia- 
tion in his sickness and my absence, and that I was deter- 
mined to support Mr. Jay to the utmost of my power in the 

* Adams, i. , 342. 



6o TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 

pursuit of the same system. The Doctor heard me patiently 
but said nothing. 

"The first conference we had afterwards with Mr. Oswald, 
in considering one point and another, Doctor Franklin turned 
to Mr. Jay and said, ' I am of your opinion, and will go on with 
these gentlemen in the business without consulting this Court.' 
He has accordingly met us in most of our conferences, and has 
gone on with us in entire harmony and unanimity through- 
out, and has been able and useful, both by his sagacity and 
his reputation, in the v/hole negotiation." * 

Mr. Adams, who in his absence had assisted by his sug- 
gestions in securing the second commission, thus signalized 
his arrival by removing the objections of Doctor Franklin, and 
securing the united action of the Commission in setting aside 
the instruction of Congress that the Commission should be 
governed by the opinions of France. 

Mr, Jay's elaborate despatch, t bringing the history of the 
negotiations to the arrival of Mr, Adams, closed with a care- 
ful review of the situation, and especially of the policy of 
the French Court, which is confirmed by their secret corres- 
pondence, 

"They are interested," he said, " in separating us from 
Great Britain, and on that point we may, I believe, depend 
upon them ; but it is not their interest that we should be- 
come a great and formidable people, and therefore they will 
not help us to become so," 

Mr, Adams, in his valuable diary, has recorded interest- 
ing particulars of the later negotiations, and now the letters 
of Mr. Oswald and Mr. Strachey, and the valuable sketch of 
the negotiation given by the biographer of Lord Shelburne, 
advise us as thoroughly of the views and impressions, the 
hopes and fears of the English negotiators, as the confidential 
correspondence of M. de Vergennes, and his agents, of the 
wishes and schemings of the French court to accomplish the 
policy of Spain at the cost of the Republic, Strachey wrote 
to Townsend on November 29th : " It appears as if we shall 
be able to gain something," On October 30th and the three 
* Adams, iii,, 336. t Dip. Corresp., viii., 129, 218. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 ajid 1783. 61 

following days formal interviews were held, and Oswald 
wrote to Townsend on November 5th : 

" On all the material points in question he (Strachey) has 
from day to day taken up the subject apart, and has enforced 
our pretensions by every argument that reason, justice or 
humanity could suggest, and even sometimes to the point of 
almost exciting those insinuations of menace which I had 
been so long accustomed to, as reported by me on several 
occasions, and to which we have nothing to oppose of reser- 
vation on our part, but an alternative which we did not think 
advisable on the present occasion to offer directly to their 
consideration and option." 

The American Commissioners, guarding their great inter- 
ests in the boundaries and the fisheries, made some minor con- 
cessions, Adams and Jay overruling the objection of Frank- 
lin to the recovery of debts contracted before the war; 
accepting for the drying of fish the unsettled coast of Nova 
Scotia in place of Newfoundland, and giving the British the 
choice of two lines on the Northeastern boundary.* On No- 
vember 6th and 9th Oswald wrote to Townsend : " Mr. Jay 
said he hoped we would not let this opportunity slip, but re- 
solve speedily to wind up the long dispute so as we might be 
again as one people. 

" That they had hitherto acted in the negotiation under 
instructions of the year 1779, when their affairs were not in 
quite so good a situation as at present, and had gone to the 
full stretch of them and farther. 

" But if we broke up now we might be assured of their 
receiving new instructions, and of a very different kind from 
the present ; in which, among other things, he made no 
doubt they would be directed to state all the depredation, 
plunder, and unnecessary destruction of property over all their 
country as charged against the British demands oi bona fide 
creditors. . . . That with respect to the British debts, 
he had conjointly with his colleague at all times declared that 
all that were contracted before the war must be duly paid ; yet 
if the States by our refusal of accommodation should be con- 

* A copy of the map with these lines is given in Shelburne's Life, iii., 294. 



62 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 a7id 17S3. 

tinued under their present expensive establishment, he would 
not answer for the same favorable determination hereafter." 

A cabinet paper, entitled " Preliminaries with America," 
bearing date November 5th, and appearing, from an en- 
dorsement in Lord Shelburne's hand, to have been approved 
by Mr. Townsend and Mr. Pitt, is interesting as seeming to 
suggest a possible appeal to France to compel the American 
negotiators to recognize the claims of the refugee loyalists. 
It says : 

". . . To order Mr. Oswald to sign whenever Mr. Fitz- 
herbert, Mr. Strachey and himself agree in holding it ex- 
pedient. Care must be taken to refer to Mr. Oswald's in- 
struction, that there may be no doubt as to his power to 
empower Mr. Fitzherbert to avail himself of France so far as 
he may judge prudent from circumstances. 

' " Mr. Fitzherbert's interposition will be useful, if for no 
other purpose than to let the Americans see the possibility 
of an appeal on our part." 

A second set of articles was agreed upon for submission to 
the British Cabinet, and the papers were forwarded with a 
marked map. Strachey wrote : " You will see by the treaty 
all that could be obtained ; the debts prior to 1775 appear to be 
safe." Mr. Strachey said with truth that the recovery of the 
property of the refugees had been " most obstinately fought 
for," and on November 4th Strachey addressed a letter to the 
American Commissioners, making a last appeal for " stipula- 
tion for the restitution, compensation, and amnesty above be- 
fore we proceed further in this negotiation." On November 
5th Mr. Strachey announced to them his intended departure 
for London on the same day, and repeated his former assur- 
ance that " a refusal on this point would be the great obstacle 
to a conclusive ratification of that peace which is meant as a 
solid, perfect, permanent reconciliation and reunion between 
Great Britain and America.* ' 

" . . . It affects equally, in my opinion, the honor and 
humanity of your own country and of ours. How far you 

* Am. Dip. Conesp., x. , pp. 98 and 99 ; the Articles, p. 88 et seq., and Os- 
wald's letter, p. 92. The reply of the Commissioners, November 5, 1782, p. 99. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 63 

will be justified in risking every favorite object of America 
by contending against those principles is for you to deter- 
mine. Independence and more than a reasonable possession 
of territory seem to be within your reach. Will you suffer 
them to be outweighed by the gratification of resentment 
against individuals ? I venture to assert that such a con- 
duct has no parallel in the history of civilized nations." 

The reply of the Commissioners, dated also November 
5th, after stating the impracticability of restoring the estates 
of refugees which had been confiscated by laws of particular 
States pertaining to their internal polity with which Congress 
had no authority to interfere, thus calmly and courteously, 
but with a significance which was appreciated at- London, re- 
sponded to the plain words and blunt suggestions of the Brit- 
ish negotiators : 

" As to your demand of compensation to those per- 
sons, we forbear enumerating our reasons for thinking 
them ill-founded. In the moment of conciliatory over- 
tures it would not be proper to call certain scenes into 
view over which a variety of circumstances should induce 
both parties at present to draw a veil. . . . We should 
be sorry if the absolute impossibility of our complying 
further with your proposition should induce Great Brit- 
ain to continue the war for the sake of those who caused 
and prolonged it. But if that should be the case, we hope 
that the utmost latitude will not again be given to its 
rigors. 

" Whatever may be the issue of this negotiation, be as- 
sured, sir, that we shall always acknowledge the liberal, 
manly, and candid manner in which you have conducted it, 
and that we shall remain, with the warmest sentiments of es- 
teem and regard, sir, your most obedient and very humble 
servants." 

On November 8th Oswald wrote to Strachey : " Mr. Jay 
sent to me yesterday for a copy of the proposed treaty. I 
compared it with him. . . . He was greatly attentive to 
all the particulars, and did not admit of the least alteration 
from the words of his own plan." After referring to three 



64 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 

corrections of this sort made by Mr. Jay, Mr. Oswald adds : 
" I would also beg leave to add that from this gentle- 
man's precision and attention to the identity of these copies 
in comparison with the original draft, I would advise that 
there should not be the least alteration, not a single word 
dift'erent from that draft. 

" . . , I did not expect to find Mr. Jay so uncom- 
monly stiff about the matter." 

The difficulties of Lord Shelburne with his Cabinet from 
the firmness of the American negotiators on the question of 
the loyalists, were enhanced by the doubts and fears of the 
King, who, as the moment approached when the ties between 
the Colonies and England were about to be formally severed, 
grew more and more restive,* and wrote to Shelburne of his 
" most frequent prayers to heaven to guide me so to act, that 
posterity may not lay the downfall of this once respectable 
empire at my door ; and that if ruin should attend the 
measures that may be adopted, I may not long survive 
them." Shelburne's associates in the Cabinet, Richmond and 
Keppel, were very bitter against Oswald, whom they de- 
clared was only an additional American negotiator. They 
proposed to recall him. But this Shelburne and Townsend re- 
fused to do, as they especially desired that Oswald should be 
in Paris to negotiate a commercial ti'eaty when the necessary 
acts of Parliament had been passed. The main question was 
what they would do in regard to the loyalists, who the public 
voice demanded in unmistakable terms should not be aban- 
doned : and on the other hand, says Lord Edmond Fitzmaur- 
ice,t " there was the risk that persistence might throw the 
Americans back into the arms of the French." Shelburne in- 
clined to the bolder course, notwithstanding the persuasions of 
Vaughan, who came again from Paris, and Strachey was in- 
structed to return and make one more effort. 

In the meanwhile Oswald wrote to Townsend, November 
15th, reporting a conversation with Jay and Adams separately 

* Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice : Shelburne's Life, iii., 297. 
f Shelburne's Life, iii. , 298. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 65 

about the loyalists, each returning the same answer, that they 
would not agree to any measure for the restoration of those 
who had been instrumental in encouraging the war, and 
" that if peace with Great Britain was not to be had on any 
other terms than their agreeing to these provisions, the war 
must go on, although it should be for seven years to come, 
and that neither they nor the Congress had any power in the 
matter. . . . Mr. Adams said that he had been sent iot 
last week to Versailles, and that M. de Vergennes had talked 
to him strongly in their favor." * 

On November 23d Vergennes wrote to Luzerne that 
the King was not obliged " to prolong the war in order 
to sustain the ambitious pretensions which the United States 
may form in reference to the fishery or the extent of bound- 
aries." t On November 25th the King was writing to Shel- 
burne urging him to confide in Vergennes his "ideas con- 
cerning America,"! and on November 29th Secretary 
Grantham wrote to Fitzherbert : " If you find . . . that 
there is a real dependency to be made upon the pacific dis- 
positions of France, you will not fail to avail yourself of 
a communication of them to Mr. Oswald, that he may be 
strengthened thereby in pressing the American Commission- 
ers to the conclusion of the peace upon safe and honorable 
terms." 



The Closing Negotiations. 

November 28th the negotiators met at Oswald's lodgings, 
and were joined by Mr. Laurens, who had been exchanged 
for Lord Cornwallis, and arrived in time to interline in the 
articles the only clause which detracted from their dignity — 

* Shelburne, despite the efforts of Vaughan, was not ready to surrender the 
claims of the loyalists. " It is no idea of interest," he wrote to Oswald, " which 
actuates us in regard to the refugees ; it is a higher principle." And he suggested 
that unless the American Commissioners yielded he would bring the whole matter 
before Parliament. Strachey was ordered to return to Paris, and his instructions 
bore date November 21st. 

f De Circourt, iii., 294. % Bancroft, x., 5S9. 

5 



(>6 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

that which prohibited the British troops from " carrying away 
any negroes or o\\\q.x property of the inhabitants." 

Mr. Oswald, by his instructions, was advised to sign when- 
ever Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Strachey, and himself agreed in 
thinking it expedient, and Mr. Fitzherbert's interposition 
was deemed useful, if for no other purpose than to let the 
Americans see the possibility of an appeal to France. And 
a note from Townsend to Oswald (Whitehall, November 19, 
1782) apprised him of the unanimous resolution of the Cabi- 
net to adhere to the treaty then proposed, and seemed to 
indicate a possible peril in the remark, " I do not choose to 
prognosticate the danger of the effects of the refusal of the 
Crown on that spirit of conciliation which has now for some 
time prevailed in this country, if it prevents the treaty being 
signed before the meeting of Parliament." 

At the first conference the American Commissioners were 
advised that the Ministry conceded the boundaries, although 
they deemed them too far extended, and Mr. Strachey ex-^ 
plained the changes in the article on the fisheries, and presented 
" the restitution of the property of the loyalists as the grand 
point on which a final settlement depended." Jay asked if 
the proposition submitted was the ultimatum of the Ministry, 
and Strachey reluctantly answered " no," and admitted, too, 
that Oswald had absolutely authority to conclude and sign. 
" We agreed," says Mr. Adams in his diary, " that these 
were good signs of sincerity." 

Townsend wrote to Oswald on November 22d : " The 
Parliament is postponed to December 5th next, to give time 
to receive a final answer from the powers with whom we are 
in negotiation." 

Shelburne himself had written : * " It is our determination 
that it shall be either war or peace before we meet the Par- 
liament, for I need not tell you that we shall have there to 
meet many opinions and passions." With the complications 
of the entire situation and the exigencies of the Ministry at 
home, our Commissioners wisely hastened to secure the 
vast advantages within their grasp, making the slight con- 
* Shelburne to Fitzherbert, October 21, 1782. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 6^ 

cessions which seemed necessary and could be properly 
yielded. 

The boundaries and the fisheries were the great points 
which interested America ; the recovery of British debts and 
some provision for the refugees were the points which con- 
cerned the British Ministry. 

On the question of the Northern and Eastern boundary, 
Mr. Adams was naturally strong ; on the question of British 
debts he led the way in adjusting that point to the satisfac- 
tion of England ; on the fisheries he exhibited great skill and 
energy in maintaining our rights, and although Congress had 
abandoned the fisheries as an ultimatum, the Commissioners, 
knowing that it had been done under French influence, stood 
firmly for the right, and the English yielded. "Such a vic- 
tory," writes Mr. C. F, Adams, " is not often recorded in the 
annals of diplomacy." * 



The Provisional Articles. 

A final agreement was come to November 29, 1782, when 
Fitzherbert, Oswald, and Strachey met Franklin, Laurens, 
and Jay at Jay's apartment in the Hotel d'Orleans, and 
passed the entire day in discussion on the fisheries and the 
Tories, in whose behalf the American Commissioners agreed 
to a clause of recommendation by Congress to the States, and 
another guaranteeing them against future confiscation, pros- 
ecution, or loss. 

The articles were ten in number. The first, an acknowl- 
edgment by his Britannic Majesty of the thirteen Colonies as 
free, sovereign, and independent States, and a relinquishment 
of all claims to the Government property and territorial 
rights. 

The second, an agreement upon the boundaries extending 
to the Mississippi and including the northwest territory north 
of the Ohio. 

The tJiird, securing to the United States the right to the 

* Adams' Works, i., p. 387. 



68 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 a7td 1783. 

Newfoundland fishery and elsewhere, and to dry their fish on 
Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador. 

T\\t fourth, for the payment of creditors on either side. 

The fifth, that Congress should recommend to the State 
Legislatures to restore the estates, rights, and properties of 
real British subjects, they refunding the bona fide prices paid 
since the confiscation, and a revision of all laws regarding the 
premises. 

The sixth, that no future confiscation or prosecutions 
should be made — persons confined on charges by reason of 
the war to be set at liberty. 

The seventh, that there should be a firm and perpetual 
peace between the countries, and providing for the with- 
drawal of the British troops, etc. 

The eighth, that the Mississippi River should be forever 
open to the citizens of both countries. 

The ninth, that any place or territory of either country 
conquered by the arms of the other before the arrival of the 
articles in America should be given up. 

The tenth, that the ratification of the treaty should be ex- 
changed within six months. 

A ^'separate article" defined the boundary line between 
the United States and West Florida, should Great Britain 
possess the latter province at the end of the war. 

The English Commissioners indulged no enthusiastic 
hopes that the articles would be warmly approved at home. 
Mr. Strachey wrote the same day: * "The fishery we 
have been obliged to alter considerably, but there could be 
no treaty at all without it, . . . Now, are we to be 
hanged or applauded for thus rescuing you from the Ameri- 
can war ? . . . I am half dead with perpetual anxiety. 
I shall not be at ease till I see how the great men receive it. 
If this is not as good a peace as was expected, I am confident 
it is the best that could have been made," 

The same night Oswald wrote : f "A very few hours ago 

* Strachey to Nepean, November 29, 1782, 

f Oswald to Shelburne — " Paris, November 29, 1782, eleven at night," 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 69 

we thought it impossible that any treaty could be made. 
We have, however, at last brought matters to a conclusion, 
so that we have agreed upon articles and are to meet to-mor- 
row for the purpose of signing. . . . The article of the 
fishery has been particularly difficult to settle, as we thought 
the instructions were rather limited. It is, however, beyond 
a doubt that there could have been no treaty at all if we had 
not adopted the article as it now stands. Mr. Fitzherbert 
was satisfied that it would not interfere with the French ne- 
gotiation, and we all three concurred in opinion that this ar- 
ticle, and all the others as in the enclosed paper, should be con- 
cluded upon. . . . We attempted to have the ninth article 
in more explicit terms, but could not contend farther than 
as it now stands without raising a suspicion of what we really 
meant, and it was evident that the American Commission 
had yet received no advices concerning Bermuda." 

On Saturday, November 30th, St. Andrew's Day, records 
Mr. Adams in his diary, " the Commissioners met first at 
Mr. Jay's, then at Mr. Oswald's, examined, compared ; 
then the treaties were signed, sealed, and delivered, and 
we all went out to Passy to dine with Doctor Franklin, Thus 
far has proceeded this great affair. The unravelling of the 
plot has been to me the most affecting and astonishing part 
of the whole piece."* 

' The Provisional Articles of Peace so signed were to be 
inserted in and to constitute the Treaty of Peace proposed 
to be concluded between the Crown of Great Britain and the 
United States, but it was declared that such treaty should 
not be concluded until terms of peace should be agreed upon 
between Great Britain and France, and his Britannic Majesty 
shall be ready to conclude such treaty accordingly.f 

* Adams, iii., p. 334. 

f Provisional Articles, Dip. Corres., x., p. 109. 



70 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 



Reception of the Articles in America. 

The articles were received with great satisfaction in Amer- 
ica, but the conduct of the negotiation was not unanimous- 
ly approved at Philadelphia. The Commissioners, Adams, 
Fianklin, Jay, and Laurens, in communicating the Provisional 
Articles, had said: "We knew this Court and Spain to be 
against our claims to the western country. . . , As we 
had reason to imagine that the articles respecting the boun- 
daries, the refugees, and fisheries did not correspond with 
the policy of this Court, we did not communicate the prelimi- 
naries to the Minister until after they were signed, and 
not even then the separate article. We hope that these con- 
siderations will excuse our having so far deviated from the 
spirit of our instructions." * Mr. R. R. Livingston, the Sec- 
retary, while approving their steadiness in not treating'without 
an express acknowledgment of independence, and approving 
the boundaries of the fisheries and acknowledging their,firm- 
ness, perseverance, and success, expressed pain at the dis- 
trust manifested in the conduct of the negotiation, and es- 
pecially in signing the articles without communicating them 
to the Court of Versailles, and in concealing the separate ar- 
ticle after its signature. f The task of framing a reply,:}: says 
Mr. C. F. Adams, was devolved upon Jay, and a brief ex- 
tract will give an idea of its tone. 

" We perfectly concur with you in the sentiment, sir, 
that ' honesty is the best policy.' But until it be shown that 
we have trespassed on the rights of any man or body of men, 
you must excuse our thinking that this remark, as applied 
to our proceedings, was unnecessary. 

" Should any explanations, either with France or Spain, 
become necessary on this subject, we hope and expect to 

* Dip. Corresp., x., pp. 1 18-120: The Commissioners to Livingston, Paris, 
December 14, 1782. 

f Dip. Corresp., x., pp. 129, 130: Livingston to the Commissioners, Philadel- 
phia, March 25, 1783. 

:t:Dip. Corresp., x., pp. 187-193, dated Passy, July 18, 1783. See also Jay to 
Livingston, dated Passy, July 19, 1783 (Jay's Life, i., 174). 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 71 

meet with no embarrassment. We shall neither amuse them 
nor perplex ourselves with flimsy excuses, but tell them 
plainly that it was not our duty to give them the informa- 
tion. We considered ourselves at liberty to withhold it, and 
we shall remind the French Minister that he has more reason 
to be pleased than displeased at our silence. Since we have 
assumed a place in the political firmament, let us move like a 
primary and not a secondary planet." 

Mr. Livingston, before writing to the Commissioners his 
letter of March 25th, had on the i8th of that month made a 
communication to Congress, recommending that he be au- 
thorized to communicate the "separate article" to the 
French Minister at Philadelphia. 

Four successive days, March 12th to 15th inclusive, had 
been employed by Congress in reading the despatches and 
preliminary articles, and hearing that the French Minister, 
M. Marbois, had said that the King had been surprised and 
displeased. When asked if he intended to complain to Con- 
gress, M. Marbois had answered that great powers never 
complained but they felt and remembered. Touching Mr. 
Livingston's propositions, Mr. Wolcott premised that Con- 
gress would never censure men who had obtained such terms 
for the country. 

In the debate which followed, Mr. Rutledge held that 
the Ministers had adhered religiously to the spirit and letter 
of our Treaty with France, that the separate article did 
not concern France, and that Spain had no claim to our good 
offices. Colonel Mercer, of Virginia, who threatened to pub- 
lish the articles and was called to order by the President, 
held that the Ministers had insulted Congress by sending 
their assertions without proof as reasons for violating their 
instructions, approved the conduct of the Count de Ver- 
gennes in promoting a treaty under the first Commission to 
Oswald, declared the conduct of the Ministers a tragedy to 
America and a comedy to the world, and that they proved 
that America had at once the follies of youth and the vices 
of age. 



72 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

He was followed by Messrs. Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Wil- 
son, Higgins, and Madison, The letter of the Secretary, 
with the despatches and propositions, were referred to a 
committee of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. 
Clark, and Mr. Hamilton, who on March 22d reported res- 
olutions of thanks to the Ministers, that the separate article 
be communicated to France, and that Congress wished that 
the articles had been communicated before signing. 

A further debate occurred on a motion to recommit the 
report, but no vote was had, it being late, " and a large pro- 
portion of members pre-determined against every measure 
which seemed in any way to blame the Ministers, and the 
Eastern delegates in general extremely jealous of the honor 
of Mr. Adams."* 

The next day, Sunday, intelligence was received of the 
signing of the preliminaries of peace on January 20th, the 
news being brought by a French cutter from Cadiz, de- 
spatched by the Count d'Estaing to notify vessels at sea, and 
engaged by Lafayette to convey the news to Congress. Con- 
gress took no further action in the matter. The Secretary 
wrote his views to the Commissioners, who replied with 
spirit; and Hamilton wrote to Jay.t " the peace, which ex- 
ceeds in the goodness of its terms the expectations of the 
most sanguine, does the highest honor to those who made it." 



^ Reception of the Articles by the French Court. 

From the day when the Commissioners, including Frank- 
lin, agreed to treat with Mr. Oswald without consulting the 
French Court, they seem to have guarded the privacy of 
their negotiations with more success than attended the efforts 
of the French Ministry to keep secret from the Americans 
the visit of Rayneval to Shelburne, which was promptly dis- 

* A sketch of the debates is given in Madison's Debates, vol. i., and they are 
quoted in the interesting twelfth chapter of the first volume of Rives' Life o^ 
Madison, p. 363 et seq. 

t July 25, 1783- 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 73 

covered by Jay and its unfriendly aim turned to our ad-, 
vantage by the mission of Vaughan. 

During the same month of September, when Rayneval 
was in London, playing into the hands of the English Min- 
isters and denouncing the Americam claims to the fishery 
and the Valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio, Luzerne was 
assuring Congress, whose amiable credulity seems to have 
been regarded as boundless, that "the King would most 
readily employ his good offices in support of the United 
States in all points relating to their prosperity." * The Pro- 
visional Articles slowly approached completion, without as it 
would seem arousing a single doubt at Versailles that the 
Americans had awakened to their danger : still less that they 
had taken their affairs into their own hands, and were rapidly 
becoming masters of the situation. 

On October 14, 1782, in a letter to Luzerne, Vergennes 
said : "It behooves us to leave them to their illusions, to do 
everything we can to make them fancy that we share them, 
and unostentatiously to defeat any attempts to which these 
illusions may carry them if our co-operation is required." 

In the same letter he assumed that the United States 
" had no right" to the lands which border on Lake Ontario, 
and that Mr. Jay's system was " un pareil delire : " an aber- 
ration undeserving of serious refutation ; and then came the 
remark that the American agents " have all the presump- 
tion of ignorance," with the addition, " but there is reason 
to expect that experience will ere long enlighten and im- 
prove them." f 

When a little later the copy of the Provisional Articles 
handed to him by Doctor Franklin enlightened his view of 
the practical statesmanship of the American Commissioners, 
he fraftkly wrote to Rayneval in England that the conces- 
sions granted by England exceeded all that he had believed 
possible, and Rayneval responded that the treaty seemed to 
him like a dream. The treaty, provisional though it was, ap- 
peared as a complete and final check to that part of the French 

* September 23, 1782. " 

f Vergennes to Luzerne, October 14, 1782 : De Circourt, iii., 288. 



74 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 

policy which concerned the position of the United States 
in the pending negotiations, and its future position as a na- 
tional power. It ended the schemes shared if not inspired 
by Spain for depriving the Americans of the western and 
northwestern territories and of the Newfoundland fisheries, 
' and of compensation to Spain for her services and losses, by 
securing her ascendancy on the Mississippi. It ended the 
game of playing into the hands of English Ministers against 
America Qn these points and on the loyalists, and so estab- 
lishing a claim to concessions in return. It ended all hope 
of establishing in America the balance of power principle 
which obtained in Europe ; enabling England and Spain to 
hold in check the New Republic ; and it presented that 
Republic triumphant in diplomacy as in war, magnificently 
endowed, and the future mistress of the Western Continent. 

As regards the disappointment to Spain, however severe, 
Vergennes perhaps felt it less sensibly, from the faCt that the 
Spanish Court, to whose narrow selfishness he had alluded 
with so much contempt, irritated by the failure of the special 
objects of Spanish ambition, and most of all by the mortify- 
ing failure of the attack upon Gibraltar) had been betrayed 
4nto ungenerous and unwarrantable insinuations against the 
French soldiers who had taken part in the siege, insinuations 
which Had aroused at Paris a natiorTal resentment.* 

The American Commissioners, in communicating the ar- 
ticles to Congress, t said : " The Count de Vergennes, on pe- 
rusing the articles, appeared surprised but not displeased at 
their being so favorable to, us." 

A few days later the Count, in communicating the articles 
to M. de Luzerne, remarked in a less contented tone toward 
the Commissioners, that " according to the instructions of 
Congress they ought to have dorte nothing without our par- 
ticipation ; " and as if the reserve of the American Commis- 
sioners might be attributed to some unwarranted interference 

* Lecky's History of England, iv., 283. 

f The Commissioners to R. R. Livingston, December 14, 1782 : Dip. Corres. , 
X., 120. 



Tlic Peace Negotiations of 1782 a}id 1783. 75 

with the American negotiations by the French Court, he 
added : " I have informed you that the King did not seek to 
influence the negotiations any further than his offices might 
be necessary to his friends." 

The secret correspondence of the Count with Montmorin 
at Madrid, and Gerard and Luzerne at Philadelphia, showing 
his persistent attempts in the interest of Spain, and in return 
for her joining in the war, to postpone the recognition of 
American independence until the general peace : to exclude 
the Americans from the Mississippi and the Gulf, to deprive 
them of the Newfoundland fisheries and the northwestern 
territory, and to subject them to the control of Spain and 
England, affords an interesting illustration of the Count's 
assurance, that the King's efforts to influence the negotiations 
were compelled by the necessities of his friends. 

France, as Mr. Lecky remarks,* was endeavoring as the 
principal member of a great coalition to make peace, and 
" she desio'ed that America should make a serious sacrifice of 
her prospects for the benefit of the other belligerents, and 
especially Spain." Occasional expressions in the Count's 
letters, indicate that his early appreciation of the Americans 
had not been increased by some of his dealings with them. 
Such an impression might well attend his practice, continued 
from one minister to another, in the use of donations, and by 
his remarkable success in forcing upon Congress, step by step, 
the instructions to their Commissioners, which as Marbois 
correctly described them made the King master of the terms 
of peace. And it would seem that he was not himself averse 
to curbing their ambition, restricting their limits, and con- 
forming their progress to the ideas of Europe. But what- 
ever apology Vergennes might find in the necessities of the 
King's friends, for the efforts of France to influence our ne- 
gotiations, whether in the attempt to induce us to treat as 
English colonists, or to persuade us to relinquish our west- 
ern boundaries by the conciliatory line urged in what pur- 
ported to be a personal note of Rayneval, or to persuade 
Shelburne to reject our claims, those efforts, whether in the 

* Lecky, iv., 283. 



'jS The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

interest of the King or the King's friends, gravely threatened 
the welfare of America, and demanded of our Commissioners 
that they should see that no harm came to the Republic. 
The skill with which those dangers had been avoided and 
the future greatness of the Republic secured was warmly ap- 
preciated by the great diplomatists of Europe. The day 
after the signing of the Provisional Articles Jay received the 
congratulations of the Count d'Aranda, whose personal friend- 
ship with mutual regard was unhindered by their diplomatic 
opposition ; and later of the Count de Montmorin, the French 
Ambassador at Madrid, whose part in the joint schemes of 
France and Spain appears by the secret correspondence. 
The complaint addressed by Vergennes to Franklin on the 
conclusion of the preliminary articles, in disregarding thfe' 
instructions of Congress, and without the participation of 
the King, was diplomatically met by the courtly response of 
Franklin admitting that "in not consulting you before they 
were signed we have been guilty of neglecting a point of 
bienseance.'" And Franklin afterward wrote to Livingston,* 
touching the Court and the Provisional Articles : "I do not 
see, however, that they have any right to complain of that 
transaction. Nothing was done to their prejudice, and none 
of the stipulations were to have force but by a subsequent 
act of their own. ... I long since satisfied Count de 
Vergennes about it." 

Two days after Vergennes had written to Luzerne — 
on December 21st — to complain of the signing, he wrote 
again to that minister that the King would make a loan to 
the United States of six millions of livres ($i ,i i i,i"i i) for 
the year 1783. This last fact has a significance beyond the 
amount of the loan, which, small as it was, France, impover- 
ished by the war, could ill afford to spare. It reminds us that 
the American Commissioners, while violating the instructions 
of Congress when they found that adherence to those in- 
structions would impair the honor, independence, and perma- 
nent prosperity of the Republic, and while thwarting .by 
legitimate means the secret and hostile policy of France and 

* Franklin to Livingston, July 22, 17S3 : Franklin's Works', xi. , 533. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 'jj 

Spain, preserved inviolate the national faith plighted to France 
by the treaty of alliance, maintained the respect and friend- 
ship of that Court, and placed the Republic in a position of 
national dignity and national strength where it was more 
than ever the interest of France to cherish the cordiality of 
their relations. 



The Effect of the Articles in Defeating the Hopes 

OF Spain. 

To no court of Europe could the Provisional Articles have 
been less acceptable than to the Court of Spain. They came 
as an unexpected blow from a power which Spain had treated 
with rudeness and contempt. They involved not simply the 
overthrow of her schemes against the Republic and her plans 
for her own advancement in America, but by a curious and 
unexpected contingency they destroyed her hopes, which 
seemed on the very point of being realized, for the recovery 
of Gibraltar. 

Nor could it have soothed the disappointment they awak- 
ened in Spain to remember that the American Minister, 
whom they had refused to receive, had been the chief of the 
negotiations in which they were vanquished, and that the 
treatment accorded him at Madrid had probably enabled him 
to divine and defeat the secret and unfriendly policy o'f 
France and Spain. 

We have long been familiar with Spain's ungracious treat- 
ment of the United States during their revolutionary struggle, 
with her excuses, delays, and delusive assurances ; and notably 
her unfriendly and shabby behavior in allowing the bills 
drawn by Congress upon Jay in reliance upon her friendship 
to be protested ; dishonoring the credit of the Republic for 
want of a paltry sum — less than twenty-five thousand pounds 
sterling.* This was permitted by her after she had given 

* See Jay's carefully drawn protest and statement offactsinhis letter to Livings- 
ton, April 28, 1782 : Dip. Corresp., viii., p. 83 et seq., and the remarks on this 
transaction of the French Ambassador, the Count de Montmorin, in his letter to 
the Count de Vergennes, dated Madrid, March 30, 1782 : de Circourt, iii., 326-7. 



78 The Peace Negotiatiojis of 1782 and 1783. 

the American Minister reason to believe that the necessary 
moneys would be advanced, and when, under the circum- 
stances, it was a discourtesy to France almost as great as 
to ourselves. 

Jay wrote from Spain : " The conduct of this Court bears 
few marks of wisdom. They have little money, less credit, 
and very moderate talents."* 

Cumberland, British Agent at Madrid, in 1781, suggested 
that other than political motives inspired the policy of King 
Charles, when he wrote that " there was a gloomy being, out 
of sight and inaccessible, whose command as confessor over 
the royal mind was absolute, and whose bigotry was disposed 
to represent everything in the darkest colors against a nation 
of heretics." f But without the secret correspondence of Ver- 
gennes and Montmorin we could hardly appreciate the ex- 
tent to which Spain was set against the independence of 
America from her dislike of our principles, her jealousy of 
our growing power and influence, and, in reference to her 
own colonies, from her di^ead of our ambition and our ex- 
ample. Nor could we, without these letters as quoted by 
Bancroft, or given more fully by de Circourt, at all appreciate 
the character and extent of the agreement by which France 
had secured the alliance of Spain in the pending war. We 
now read aright the efforts of Vergennes, Rayneval, and Lu- 
zerne to moderate the demands and expectations of Congress 
concerning the terms of the peace, and to induce them con- 
fidingly to leave to his Catholic Majesty the adjustment of 
the Mississippi and the western territory. 

On one occasion, after the scheme for depriving us of the 
boundaries, the Mississippi, and the fisheries had been agreed 
upon, the French Minister assured Congress that " the King 

* Jay to Franklin, February ii, 1782 : Dip. Corresp., viii., 64. 
f Cumberland the dramatist, whom Goldsmith describes in his poem " Re- 
taliation " as 

" The Terence of England, the mender of hearts," 

was sent by the British Ministry in 1780-81 to sound the Spanish Court with a 
view to negotiations. — Flanders' Chief Justices, i., 297. Cumb^land's Memoirs, 
193- " 



Tlie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 79 

accepted with pleasure the proofs which Congress have given 
him of their confidence when they entrusted to his care the 
interests of the United States ; that he would use his influ- 
ence and credit for the advantage of his allies whenever a 
negotiation should render their interests. a subject of discus- 
sion ; that if he did not obtain for every State all they wished, 
they must attribute the sacrifice he might be compelled to 
make of his inclination to the tyrannic rule of necessity." * 
That these bland assurances with their semblance of good faith 
carried some weight with members of Congress is clear from 
the remark of Mr. Madison, in speaking of the debate on the 
Provisional Articles in March, 1783, t that " upon the whole 
it was thought and observed by many that our Ministers, 
particularly Mr. Jay, instead of making allowances and af- 
fording facilities to France in her delicate situation between 
Spain and the United States, had joined with the enemy in 
taking advantage of it to increase her perplexity." "The 
delicate situation " of France, for which Jay and his associ- 
ates were to make allowances and afford facilities, is made 
clear by the terms of the bargain in which she secured the 
Spanish alliance. Vergennes had offered the King of Spain 
carte blanche to frame a treaty which the Ambassador of 
France should sign,:}: and Florida Blanca regarded the suc- 
cess of his schemes as certain, and expected to gain for him- 
self a reputation that should never die.§ 

His joy at being able to exercise power over France and 
make Vergennes adopt and execute his plans for the ad- 
vancement of Spain, and his vindictive policy toward Amer- 
ica, was blended with a confidence that France in her turn 
would bend the Republic to her will, restrict its boundaries 
and arrest its growth : and these anticipations may have en- 
couraged the contemptuous refusal of Spain to recognize the 
independence of the United States and her willingness to 
destroy its credit, and her small exhibition of international 

* November 23, 1781 : Jay's Life, i., 134. 

•j- Qfioted in Rives' Madison, i., p. '354. 

:}: Vergennes to Montmorin, December 24, 1778: Bancroft, x., 185, 186. 

§ Bancroft, x. , 185. 



8o TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

courtesy toward a nation whom the joint counsels of the 
Houses of Bourbon had destined to a position of dependency 
where it would be both helpless and harmless. Certain it is 
that Jay, during the two years he passed in Spain,* had an 
opportunity of observing the policy toward America of the 
Courts of Paris and Madrid. One of his biographers has said 
" his mind was vigorous, exact, logical. . . . Judgment 
discriminative, penetrating, was the characteristic of his un- 
derstanding," t and he learned, perhaps unconsciously, to 
read aright the traits and methods of Bourbon diplomacy, 
however veiled by the blandishments of Courts or marked by 
the secrecy and dexterity of French ^//^j'j-^. His letters from 
Spain show that he had already detected some features of 
that policy which he so accurately analyzed at Paris.' 

He had written from Spain : "There are many things that 
induce me to think that France does not, in fact, wish to see 
us treated as independent by other nations until after a peace, 
lest we should become less manageable in proportion as our 
dependence upon her shall diminish." % That idea became a 
conviction when Vergennes not only advised them to treat 
under Oswald's full Commission, which described them as 
colonies, but advised Fitzherbert that that Commission would 
answer : an advice intended to influence against us the British 
Government. Then Jay quietly told the Minister that " we 
neither could nor would treat with any nation in the world 
on any other than an equal footing." § 

Then came Jay's direct and most successful appeal to 
Shelburne through Vaughan : the new Commission to treat 
with " the United States of America : " the united resolve of the 
American Commissioners to proceed without consulting the 
French Court, as a power of equal dignity and independence : 
inspiring the British Cabinet with confidence and respect, 
and so convincing their judgment as to the true policy to 
be pursued toward America, that the plans of France and 

* From January 22, 1780, to June, 1782. 

f Mr. Henry Flanders : Lives of the Chief Justices, i., 429. 

IJay to Livingston, Madrid, April 28, 1782: Dip. Corr., viii., 69. 

§ Jay to Governeur Morris: Jay's Life, ii. , 106. 



TJic Peace Negotiations of lySz and 1783. 81 

Spain for arresting its progress were quietly swept away 
forever. 

When Rayneval in London spoke to Lord Shelburne, as 
he admits somewhat reproachfully, of the precipitancy of their 
dealings with the Americans, and attempted to take advan- 
tage of the opportunity to express some remarks on the em- 
barrassments to Spain from the article which gave the 
Americans the navigation of the Mississippi, Lord Shel- 
burne replied in a lively tone, that " all that concerned 
Spain mattered little to him ; that this power deserved cour- 
tesy only as being his Majesty's ally, but that he would take 
no step in its favor." * 

But Spain, in making the Spanish alliance, had had one 
other object apart from the permanent reduction and humilia- 
tion of the Americans, and that was the recovery of Gibral- 
tar, to which France had been compelled to pledge herself,, 
and Florida Blanca wrote to Montmorin, "without Gibraltar 
I will never consent to a peace." f 

Gibraltar would have been won by Spain in the peace ne- 
gotiations but for the signing, in advance, of the Provisional 
Articles. The wise and watchful diplomacy of the American 
Commissioners secured their signature at the auspicious and 
essential moment. "We must have signed," said Adams, + 
" or lost the peace. The peace depended on a day. If we 
had not signed the Ministry would have changed," and no 
such terms could have been had from their successors. 

Mr. Lecky says : " The separate signature appears to have 
had one important effect upon European affairs. The cession 
of Gibraltar to the Spaniards had for some time been seri- 
ously considered in the Cabinet, and Shelburne himself Avas 
disposed to agree to it. After a long deliberation the Cab- 
inet had actually resolved to exchange Gibraltar for Gauda- 

* M. Gerard de Rayneval a M. le Comte de Vergennes, Londres, 25 Decem- 
bre, 1782 : " Mais mylord Shelburne m'a repondu avec vivacite que cela lui etait 
indifferent; que peu lui importait tout ce qui pouvait concerner I'Espagne," etc. 
De Circourt, iii., 52. 

f Montmorin to Vergennes, January 12, 1779 : Bancroft, x., 186. 

X Adams, viii., 88. 

6 



82 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 aiid 1783. 

loupe, when the news of the accomplished peace with Amer- 
ica (meaning the Provisional Articles), induced them to 
reconsider their determination." * 



Effect of the Articles in England. 

On December 5th Parliament met, and instead of a gen- 
eral peace but one provisional pacification could be an- 
nounced. The King said in his message that he had found 
it indispensable to an entire and cordial reconciliation with 
the colonies to declare them free and independent States, 
and alluded to the Articles agreed upon to take effect, when- 
ever terms of peace should be finally settled with the Court 
of France. He added : "In thus admitting their separation 
from the Crown of these kingdoms, I have sacrificed every 
consideration of my own to the wishes and opinions of my 
people. I make it my humble and earnest prayer to Al- 
mighty God that Great Britain may not feel the evils which 
might result from so great a dismemberment of the empire ; 
and that America may be free from those calamities, which 
have formerly proved in the mother country how essential 
the monarchy is to the enjoyment of constitutional lib- 
erty. Religion, language, interest, affection, may, and I hope 
will yet prove a bond of permanent union between the two 
countries ; to this end neither attention nor disposition on my 
part shall be wanting." 

Attacks upon the recognition of American independence 
came from the two sections of the opposition which~ after- 
ward coalesced; with bitter speeches from ,L*ord Stormont, 
Burke, and Fox ; and Pitt and Shelburne rather weakened 

* Lecky's History, iv., 284; Shelburne's Life, iii., 305, 306. M. de Rayne- 
val, writing to the Count de Vergennes, December 25, 1782, says : " Vous ne de- 
manderez peut-etre, Monseigneur comment il est possible de combiner avec ce que je 
viens de dire la conduite de mylord Shelburne, relativement aux equivalents. Je vous 
ai donne plus haut, et dans plusieurs de mes depeches, la clef de cette conduite. 
Celle des plenipotentiaires Americains y a contribue essentiellement, et mylord 
Grantham, comme mylord Shelburne, en a prevu les effets. La malheureuse 
nouvelle de la signature qu' ils ont faite a notre insu a donne lieu a I'extension des 
equivalents demandes pour Gibraltar." 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 83 

their position by a difference of view, Pitt stating that the 
article of independence was irrevocable though the treaty- 
should be abortive, and Shelburne holding that this was un- 
doubtedly a mistake, for that independence was alone granted 
for the sake of peace. With better success than has always 
attended our senatorial rule of secrecy, all attempts to obtain 
a copy of the Provisional Articles were defeated. 

Rayneval and a son of Vergennes remained in England as 
the guests of Shelburne, and during their stay made the ac- 
quaintance of Jeremy Bentham, "who criticised them both 
severely."' * Mr. Fitzherbert continued in Paris his negotia- 
tions with the Count de Vergennes. * 

On January 20, 1783, the preliminary articles of peace were 
signed at Paris between Great Britain and France and Great 
Britain and Spain, and were followed by a proclamation of 
the cessation of arms between Great Britain and the United 
States. Adains and Franklin were present, and with Fitzher- 
bert signed the declaration. From that day the Provisional 
Articles took effect.f 

Apart from the difficulties of his foreign policy, Shelburne 
had raised up many enemies by his view of parliamentary re- 
form, and his measures for correcting abuses in the civil ser- 
vice ; and when on February nth Pitt, with the permission 
of the King, invited Fox to join the ministry of Shelburne, 
Fox coldly declined, choosing, as Bancroft remarks, a des- 
perate alliance with those whose conduct he had pretended 
to detest, and whose principles it was in later years his re- 
deeming glory to have opposed.:]: 

The debate on the address upon the peace took place 
February 17, 1783, Lord Pembroke and Lord Carmarthen 
being th-e' proposer and seconder in the Lords, and Mr,-; 
Thomas Pitt and Mr. Wilberforce in the Commons. The' 
amendment was cleverly drawn, engaging Parliament to con- 
firm the peace, but asking time to consider and virtually de- 

* .Shelburne's Life, iii., 306, 307, referring to Vergennes to Shelburne, Decem- 
ber, 1782, January, 1783, and Bentham, x., 125, 126. 

■f-Dip. Corr., x., 122, 123 ; Bancroft's Const. Hist., i., 48. 
:j: Bancroft's Const. Hist., i., 49, 50. 



84 TJi^ Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

dining to approve. The supporters of the amendment were 
Lords Townsend, Stormont, Sackville, Walsingham, Keppel, 
and Loughborough. Against them were the Duke of Graf- 
ton, Lords Grantham, Howe, Shelburne, and the Chancellor. 
After a debate which extended to an early hour in the morn- 
ing, and an able speech from Shelburne, the Government tri- 
umphed by a vote of 72 to 59, a majority of 13.* 

In the House of Commons the amendment was carried by 
224 to 208, and the coalition triumphed. Pitt, in the course 
of a remarkable speech, said : " I repeat then that it is not 
the treaty, it is the Earl of Shelburne alone whom the mov- 
ers of the question are desirous to wound. This is the object 
which has raised this storm of factions ; this is the aim of the 
unnatural coalition to which I have alluded." f 

On February 22d a vote censuring the terms of peace 
was passed by 207 to 190, and on the 24th Shelburne re- 
signed. While the King was looking for a minister, Pitt 
with the concurrence of Shelburne, decided to push on the 
bill which proposed to regulate the commercial intercourse 
with the United States. " The measure," says Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice,:]: "was one of obvious urgency, and was framed 
with the liberal principles which had actuated Jay and Os- 
wald in their conversation on the subject at Paris. It re- 
lieved the commerce between the United States and England 
of the burden of the navigation acts. The introduction of it, 
however, was the signal of an opposition from the Whigs, nor 
was it able to make any material progress." .On April 2d, 
Pitt "with his usual great discretion" having declined the 
premiership, there was formed the coalition ministry, with 
the Duke of Portland as First Lord of the Treasury and the 
old opponents. Lord North and Mr. Fox, Secretaries of 
State. Mr. Green, in his admirable history, pronounced this 
the most unscrupulous coalition known in English history.§ 
Lord Mahon, with equal contempt, said that " from a new 

* Shelburne's Life, iii., 346. 

f Ibid., 367 ; and Mr. Lecky's History of England, iv., says that in this state- 
ment Pitt was felt to have expressed the truth. 

\ Ibid. , 370. § Green's History of England, p. 760. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 85 

and strange coalition an ill-formed and rickety government 
struggled into life." * Wilberforce described the coalition as 
partaking of the vices of both its parents, the corruption of 
the one and the violence of the other. f 

Under the coalition ministry the efforts of the American 
Commissioners to place the further commercial intercourse 
of the United States and Great Britain on a safer and per- 
manent footing by definitive treaty, were rendered fruitless by 
the dilatory and fluctuating councils of the coalition Cabinet, 
which on December 19th was superseded by the cabinet of 
Pitt.:}: 

Mr. Oswald was recalled soon after the Provisional Ar- 
ticles were signed. In the spring Mr. David Hartley was 
appointed to succeed him ; and the negotiation between 
the American Commissioners and this gentleman terminated 
in August, 1783, in an agreement to adopt, as they stood, the 
Preliminary Articles. 

The Definitive Treaty. 

The preliminary articles were embodied in a definite 
treaty, and signed by Adams, Franklin, and Jay on the part 
of the United States, and David Hartley on behalf of Great 
^Britain, on September 3, 1783. They were signed at Paris, 
and not at Versailles, as first proposed, Mr. Hartley's in- 
structions confining him to Paris, and they were ratified by 
Great Britain on April 9, 1786. 

. We have traced to their successful conclusion the prog- 
ress of the peace negotiations which secured to the United 
States their independence, with the boundaries and fisheries, 
a vast extent of territories, and large commercial advantages. 
The Americans were saved from all danger or apprehension 
from powerful neighbors, saved from the necessity of seeking 
foreign alliances to secure their safety, left free to reorganize 
and perfect the national government by the formation of our 
national constitution, which was framed with a wisdom that 

* Lord Mahon's History of England, vii., 207. 

f Lecky, iv., 297. | Life of Jay, i., 170. 



86 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

commanded the'admiration of the world, and to exercise in the 
coming European contests the strict and impartial neutrality 
which reflected so great honor on the government of Wash- 
ington. The influence of the treaty was at once felt in 
Europe.^and as Mr. Trescott remarks in his admirable study 
of the Diplomacy of the Constitution, the spirit, the firmness, 
and judgment with which the negotiations were conducted, 
and the character of the treaty itself, were unquestionable ad- 
vantages of the new government. 

The Americans became independent not only of England 
but of the world: they were not entangled with the policy of 
France, they were not forced to compromise their western in- 
terests to conciliate Spain. 

This success was achieved by the united action of the 
Commissioners, and that was due to a common devotion to 
the interests of their country. 

Jay wrote to Secretary Livingston from Paris, December 
12, 1782 : " It gives me pleasure to inform you that perfect 
unanimity has hitherto prevailed among your Commissioners 
here ; and I do not recollect that since we began to negotiate 
with Mr. Oswald there has been the least division or opposi- 
tion between us. Mr, Adams was particularly useful respect- 
ing the eastern boundary, and Doctor Franklin's firmness and 
exertions on the subject of the Tories did us much service. 

" I enclose herewith a copy of a letter he wrote about 
that matter to Mr. Oswald. It had much weight, and is writ- 
ten with a degree of acuteness and spirit seldom to be met 
with in persons of his age,"* 

The unity of action thus obtained, as Mr. C. F. Adams 
remarks, did not fail of its effect upon the British agents, and 
he adds, that upon every point on which there was a proba- 
bility of dispute, the American Commissioners were prepared 
to reason far more vigorously than their opponents, and in 
no case did they manifest more of tact and talent than in 
maintaining their own independence without furnishing the 
least opening for complaint of want of faith to their ally, 
* Dip. Cor., viii., pp. 214, 215. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 87 



The Policy of Vergennes. 

The object of this review of the peace negotiations, by the 
light newly afforded by the secret correspondence disclosing 
the character and extent of the plot for the spoliation of 
America by France and Spain, has been rather to recall 
the historic facts now established beyond a doubt, and to do 
justice to the American Commissioners, who have been un- 
justly treated through a misrepresentation of the truth, than 
to discuss the policy or the faith of the eminent chief of the 
French Government, whose conduct during the war had 
earned for him the regard and gratitude of the American peo- 
ple. To many, despite the proofs which have been accumulat- 
ing during the last half century to the correctness of the views 
entertained by Jay and Adams of the policy of France, the 
disclosure by the letters of Vergennes and his agents, of the 
secret conspiracy of the two great powers who fought in our 
war of independence to deprive us of its just fruits, will come 
like a revelation. Whatever bears upon it will be carefully con- 
sidered. The publication by our Government will be demanded 
of all the documents gathered or to be gathered from the 
archives of Europe. Students of history here and abroad 
will subject the correspondence to severe analysis, and it 
may be that Vergennes will find apologists and defenders in 
the future as in the past : and this time on the ground which 
he himself assumed — that he had never abandoned the virtual 
independence of the United States to which he was pledged, 
however strongly urged by Spain, and that, as he insisted, 
nothing in the treaty of alliance with us compelled him to 
recognize or assist our claims to the fisheries or the bounda- 
ries. But there will remain the fact that in seeking to defeat 
those claims he exhibited toward the United States a want of 
frankness and a diplomatic finesse which, had it deceived our 
Commissioners to the extent that it deceived Congress, or to 
the extent that it has imposed on the credulity of even 
American historians during the past century, would have 
involved a loss of national dignity, territory, and power, and 



88 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 

would have reduced us to a pitiable condition of weakness 
and humiliation. The letters both of Vergennes and of his 
agents show their constant care to keep the Americans in the 
dark as to their real designs, and a consciousness that their 
relations would be strained should those designs be dis- 
covered, and that they would never be forgiven. 

The first appearance of Vergennes in the difficulties be- 
tween England and her American colonies, as the story is 
told by the historian Lecky,* was early in 1776, some months 
before our Declaration of Independence. In the beginning of 
that year Vergennes prepared a memorial on American affairs 
which was laid before the King, and by the King submitted to 
Turgot, who in April, 1776, presented his own views of the 
question. Vergennes' memorial while deprecating a war, 
tended to urge upon the Government a more directly aggres- 
sive policy. He held the civil war beginning in America ad- 
vantageous to both France and Spain as likely to exhaust both 
the victors and the vanquished; that " the continuance of the 
war for at least one year was desirable for the two crowns," and 
" to that end the British Ministry should be maintained in the 
persuasion that France and Spain were pacific, so that it may 
not fear to embark in an active costly campaign, while on the 
other hand the courage of the Americans should be kept up 
by secret favors and vague hopes which will prevent accom- 
modation." To' carry out this policy the Ministers must " dex- 
terously tranquillize the English Ministry as to the intentions 
of France" and Spain," while secretly assisting the insurgents 
with military stores and money, t and they must at the same 
time strengthen their own forces with a view to war. Mr. 
Lecky remarks that to judge the real character of this advice 
it should be remembered that England was then at perfect 
peace with France, and had given no provocation or pretext 
for hostility ; that the American colonies had not yet declared 

* Lecky, iv., pp. 42, 43, 44. ' 

\ Turgot, supported by Maurepas and Malesherbes, recommended a different 
and more pacific policy, but that of Verrennes prevailed, and assistance was 
given in arms, clothes, cannon, and stores in 1776, besides the money sent by 
Beaumarchais, the author of "The Barber of Seville" and a confidential agent 
of Vergennes. Dip. Corres., i., p. 131. 



The Peace Negotiations of 17^2 and ij^^. 89 

their independence ; that the quarrel was purely domestic, 
and that no regard for their principles or their interests en- 
tered into the motion of action declared by Vergennes. 

The policy recommended in this memorial closely re- 
sembles that developed in the secret correspondence now 
brought to light, where the policy was so closely identical that 
the same phrase might have been used, that to carry it out 
the Ministers must " dexterously tranquillize the American 
Congress as to the intentions of France and Spain." 

Mr. C. F. Adams, speaking of the disingenuousness and 
unscrupulous deception of the French system, and methods of 
French diplomacy during the latter years of Louis XV., re- 
marks that " the effect of such a system upon the ambassadors 
of France at Foreign Courts could only be to school them in 
the practice of compounding duplicity. ... It was to 
confirm deception as the rule and to uphold truth only as the 
exception required for the exclusive benefit of the monarch 
himsfelf. . . . Thirty years of experience in a school of 
policy thus purely French had resulted in making de Ver- 
gennes one of the most skilful of her diplomatists."* 

The American Commissioners seem to have viewed the 
policy of France with a judicial fairness softened by a remem- 
brance of her efificient and friendly services in the past, but 
with a due sense of what was due to their own country, and 
their language in reference to the unfriendly policy of France 
is singularly gentle in view of her actual designs against the 
dignity and power of the Republic. They said in their letter 
of July 18, 1783, t in response to Livingston's remarks dis- 
approving of their course : " It would give us great pain if 
anything we have written or now write respecting this Court 
should be construed to impeach the friendship of the King 
and nation for us; we also believe that the minister is our 
friend, and is disposed so far to do us good ofifices as may 
correspond with, and be dictated by his system of policy for 
promoting the power, riches, and glory of France. God for- 
bid that we should ever sacriftce our faith, our gratitude, and 
our honor to any considerations of convenience ; and may 
* Adams, i., 299, 309. >^ f Dip. Corres., x., 191. 



go T/ic Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

He also forbid that we should ever be unmindful of the dig- 
nity and independent spirit which should always characterize 
a free and generous people." 

European Estimate of America. 

The papers and correspondence relating to America, in 
the French Archives, so far as France and Spain were con- 
cerned, do not confirm the view which has been sometimes 
entertained, even to our own day, of an extreme indifference 
on the part of European statesmen of the last century to the 
rise and growth of the American Republic. In 1788 Patrick 
Henry said, in reply to an opponent, in the Virginia Con- 
vention, when the ratification of the National Constitution 
was being debated : " Give me leave to say that Europe is 
too much engaged about subjects of greater magnitude to at- 
tend to us. On that great theatre of the world, the little Amer- 
ican matters vanish." But Marshall mentions in his life of 
Washington, that when Genet came. to us as Minister from 
the French Republic, he submitted to our Government 
official documents, disclosing the unfriendly views which had 
been entertained by Vergennes and Montmorin toward the 
United States, manifesting in plain terms the solicitude of 
France and Spain to exclude the United States from the 
Mississippi, their jealousy of the growing power of our 
country, and the wish of France, expressed while the question 
was pending, that the Constitution might not be adopted, as 
it suited France that the United States should remain in their 
present state ; because if they should acquire the consistency 
of which they were susceptible, they would soon acquire a 
force or a power which they would be very ready to abuse." 

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, in speaking of John Adams' 
estimate at an earlier date of Vergennes' policy, and the fact 
that the American cause was everywhere made subordinate 
to continental politics, remarked that perhaps his impres- 
sions at some moments carried him even farther, and led 
him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and 
depress America. " In this," remarks Mr. Charles Francis 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 91 

Adams, " he fell into the natural mistake of exaggerating the 
importance of his own country. In the great game of Na- 
tions which was now playing at Paris, under the practised 
eye of France's chief, the United States probably held a rela- 
tive position in his mind not higher than that of a pawn or 
probably a knight on a chess-table." 

While admitting the partial correctness of this view, we 
cannot forget that the colonies of differing nationalities from 
Canada to the Gulf, with their local rivalries and disputes, and 
their forced participation in the constant wars of the Euro- 
pean powers to which they respectively belonged, had made 
the boundaries, the character and the resources of the colo- 
nies a matter of constant interest to the home Governments. 
From the secret correspondence now brought to light, as 
well as from our own records, it would seem clear that the 
ablest statesmen of France and Spain, if of no other countries, 
had studied the probable future of America with a singular 
intentness and far-reaching intelligence. If they looked upon 
her as a pawn, it was as a pawn which, unles^ carefully 
watched and checked, was all but certain to become a queen. 

The Count de Vergennes, in a letter dated October 14, 
1782, to the Chevalier de la Luzerne at Philadelphia, ex- 
pressed with cynical frankness his contempt for American 
views as measured by the European standard of opinion. He 
said : " But the American agents do not shine by the sound- 
ness of their views, or the adaptation thereof to the political 
condition of Europe; they have all the presumption of 
ignorance." 

Memoir on the Peace Negotiations from the French 

Archives. 

Some extracts from a memoir in the Circourt papers, taken 
from the French archives, and which Mr. Bancroft writes me * 

* From Mr. Bancroft's note, signed "Geo. Bancroft, ii Dec, 1882, set. 
82 y. 2 m. 8 d." " The papers referred to by Mr. Jay in his letter of December 18, 
1882, were both selected from th.e French archives, by myself. They are classi- 
fied among those papers relating to Angleterre. They were both certainly pre- 
pared in the French Department of Foreign Affairs. The kings of France and 



92 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

was certainly prepared in the French Department of Foreign 
Affairs, are interesting and instructive as illustrating the 
policy of restricting the limits, resources, and actual inde- 
pendence of the United States disclosed in the secret corre- 
spondence of France, as coinciding with the desire of Spain, 
expressed to England when she proffered mediation, that the 
ambition of the Colonies " should be checked, and tied down 
to fixed limits through the union of the three nations." * 

It may also recall the remark of Jay to Washington : " It 
is very evident to me that the increasing power of America 
is a serious object of jealousy to France and Spain as well as 
Britain. " f 

Mr. Bancroft, in quoting the remark, adds in a note : " Mr. 
Sparks has written on the margin in pencil, ' Mr. Jay is a 
man of suspicions.' " 

This remark, not apparently intended for publication, 
would seem to indicate that Mr. Sparks knew nothing of the 
secret correspondence of Vergennes disclosing his policy and 
designs in regard to the boundaries, the fisheries, and the 
Mississippi. And the question becomes the more interesting 
how he was deceived into the belief that the letters shown 

Spain being of the same family, and being engaged in the same war, needed to 
respect each other ; these documents ^how the interest taken by France in the 
wishes of Spain. The one .without date, but supposed to belong to the middle of 
1782, relates especially to the need of restraining the United States boundaries, 
a subject on which Spain was keenly alive. You cai> judge as well as I whether 
the paper was not so planned as to be able to be submitted to the perusal of the 
Spanish Ambassador at the Court of Louis XVI." 

Before receiving this note from Mr. Bancroft I was inclined to t'hink that the 
memoir might more probably have come from the Spanish Ambassador, as the 
French Court would hardly call the Americans "insurgents ; " and M. de Circourt 
' in a note (Circourt, iii., p. 38) suggests that the memoir, written by one not an 
expert in the French language, but well informed as to the interests of the time 
when he lived, reproduced the thoughts of the Count d'Aranda ; although he adds 
that the nature of the thoughts and the tenor of the political tendencies are the 
same with those of the letters of the Comte de Mercy. Mr. Bancroft's opinion, 
however, based on an examination of the original document and a thorough 
knowledge of the French policy as exhibited in the Vergennes correspondence, is 
of the highest authority. 

* Bancroft's Hist., x., p. 165. 

f Dated Paris, April 6, 1783; quoted in Bancroft's Const. Hist., i., 307. 



Tlie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 93 

him at the French Office of Foreign Affairs were, as he de- 
clares, " the entire correspondence of the Count de Vergennes 
during the whole war with the French Minister in this coun- 
try, developing the policy and designs of the French Court 
in regard to the war and the objects to be attained by the 
peace," if all the significant letters quoted by Bancroft and 
Circourt had been carefully eliminated. 

The memoir relates to the principal objects to be consid- 
ered in the negotiations for peace, of a date between May 30 
and June 15, 1782, and presents a view of European policy 
that exhibits with great clearness the care with which the 
American question had been.studied by European diplomatists 
with reference to European views and interests : with which 
they were anxious to convince the Court of St. James that the 
interests of Great Britain were in this case identical. After 
stating tnat they are to witness the rise in the midst of Europe, 
of a new power which is to become in America a state similar 
to that which gave it birth, and that the future treaty of peace 
would make it a rival of England, independent de jure, for 
" such was of necessity the will of France, for that was the 
most fatal blow she could inflict upon her ambitious and 
troublesome rival ; " the question was asked whether France 
had " foreseen the extent of the power which the United 
States may eventually acquire," and declared that " what at 
the present moment appears of the greatest importance is to 
regulate t,he territorial extent which must be given to this 
power on 'the vast continent of North America, and what its 
boundaries shall be. . . . The interest of Europe in gen- 
eral, and pf the entire world, demands that the power of the 
insurgents should have well-known and clearly defined bound- 
aries. It would be too dangerous to leave to this power 
at the moment of its birth a domain of undetermined extent, 
in a new land very thinly peopled as yet, but which can be- 
come populous in a very short time." This idea, the danger 
of enabling the American leaders to extend their revolutions 
from America beyond their continent, the migratory spirit of 
the English people, stimulated by the hope of more assured 



94 TJic Peace Negotiations of 1782 ajid^ 1783. 

liberties in the new state, would decide numbers of English 
families to leave their homes and settle amidst the insurgents, 
and this new wound would not be the least prejudicial to 
England; "the rest of Europe, also, should guard against 
emigration." The excellence of the American soil, which the 
war had made known, was made to present an argument for 
forestalling the evil of emigration against which each power 
should take precautionary measures, by not leaving too much 
land to the American colonists. " To neglect this important 
point," says the memoir, " were a capital mistake, for which 
repentance would promptly follow." 

The unhappy consequences were then pointed out, which 
would result from the insurgents being allowed to spread too 
far to the eastward and seize the fisheries on the eastern shore, 
or on the north to the excellent land on the lakes and the St. 
Lawrence, where they might seize the fur trade : or to ad- 
vance along the Ohio and the Mississippi to the silver mines 
of Mexico. It was therefore of paramount importance to 
surround the new power, at the moment when it was to be 
framed and consolidated, with nations capable of mutually 
supporting each other against their enterprises. 

It was held to be clear that there must be an entire ces- 
sion of Florida to the Spaniards, and that Spain must not 
disturb the domains of England : and the treaty of peace in 
recognizing the independence of the colonies should first of 
all hold them to their original limits, " so that the new Re- 
public," in the language of the memoir, " may never be able 
to extend beyond them, neither by conquest, nor by associa- 
tion between the American Colonies. The ^boundaries of 
their continent must be detailed and circumscribed with the 
greatest exactness, and all the belligerent powers must bind 
themselves to prevent any transgression of them. It is as 
much in the interest of England as in that of Spain, France, 
and Holland to stop them by force at the first infraction of 
the limits and the first attempt toward extending beyond 
them." The extracts given by De Circourt, after further elab- 
orating these views, close with the suggestion that the insur- 
gents, being no longer Englishmen, should not be allowed to 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 95 

aggrandize themselves by the fisheries at England's expense, 
and that "it is therefore obviously in England's interest, to 
have the French as partners at Newfoundland in preference to 
the insurgents." 

These extracts enable us to understand the drift of M. 
Vergennes' complaint, that the views entertained by Ameri- 
can statesmen in regard to the proper boundaries and re- 
sources of the new Republic were ill adapted to suit the poli- 
tical views of Europe — views which were based on a jealousy 
of our future power and a fear of our influence and example 
upon dissatisfied colonies. 

Mr. Bancroft refers to the opposition of the Prince Mont- 
barey to the alliance of France with the insurgents, as fraught 
with danger in 'sustaining a revolt against established author- 
ity: and to the doubts of the first Minister, Maurepas, and 
the remonstrances of the Minister of War and the interior 
sentiment of the King himself, when the traditional antago- 
nism to England forced the French into an alliance with " 
America.''^ 

Mr. Bancroft also quotes Raynal, who had renounced the 
Jesuit cloister, as remarking that " the philosophers like the 
statesmen of France would not have the United States be- 
come too great ; they rather desire to preserve for England 
so much strength in North America that the two powers 
might watch, restrain, and balance each other," 

M. Flassan speaks of the disapproval at Court of the posi- 
tion of the King as the encourager of rebels, f and a despatch to 
King Frederic II., dated April 25, 1782, from M. de Sandoz 
Rollin,! relates an incident at a sitting at Versailles, presided 
over by the King, which indicated impatience at the annual 
expenditures for America and Holland, in his remark :, 
" Very dear to keep people from whom we can expect neither 
fealty nor compensation ! " 

* Bancroft, x., p. 42. f Flassan : Diplomatic Franjoise, vi., 402. 

:}; Circourt, iii., p. 159. 



g6 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 



The American Bearing of the French and Spanish 

Alliance. 

The event which most defined the policy of France to- 
ward America was the treaty signed at Madrid, April 12, 
1779, by which the King of France entered into an alli- 
ance offensive and defensive with his uncle, the King of 
Spain, by which Spain agreed to engage in the war against 
Great Britain, with a stipulation that no peace should be 
concluded until Gibraltar was returned to Spain, An inter- 
esting sketch of the negotiations which preceded this treaty, 
and of the sacrifice by Vergennes of American interests in order 
to secure the alliance, is^ given by Bancroft, with references to 
original authorities.* About a montlvbefore the signing, Ver- 
gennes wrote to Montmorin in a tone which showed at once 
his distrust of Spain and his indifference to the interests of 
his American allies. " How can he ask us to bind ourselves 
to everything that flatters the ambition of Spain, while he 
may make the secret reserve never to take part in the war, 
but in so far as the dangers are remote and the advantages 
certain ? In one word, to reap without having sown ? . . . 
I cry out less at his repugnance to guarantee American inde- 
pendence. Nothing is gratuitous on the part of Spain ; we 
knew from herself that she wants suitable concessions from 
the Americans ; to this we assuredly make no opposition.'' f 

In two points it threatened the interests of the United 
States. 

1. As regards the fisheries, France agreed that if she 
could drive the British from Newfoundland, its fisheries were 
'to be shared only with Spain. 

2. From the United States, Spain was left free to exact 
as the price of her friendship, a renunciation of every part of 
the basin of the St. Lawrence and the Lakes, of the naviga- 

* Bancroft's History, x. , chapter viii., p. i8i. 

f Vergennes to Montmorin, March 19, 1779, quoted in Bancroft, x., 190. This 
letter is not included among those given by De Circourt. 



TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 97 

tion of the Mississippi, and of all the land between that river 
and the AUeghanies.* 

Here again we see that all that would have been left to 
the United States, would have been the narrow strip along the 
Atlantic. 

Mr. Bancroft makes one suggestion of no slight interest 
when he says : * ' This convention of France with Spain modi- 
fied the treaty between France and the United States. The 
latter were not bound to continue the war till Gibraltar should 
be taken ; still les^till Spain should have carried out her views 
hostile to their interests. They gained the right to make peace 
whenever Great Britain would recognize their independence. "f 

The original correspondence quoted and referred to by 
Bancroft, and in part printed by De Circourt, is of great im- 
portance as showing that the boundaries and the fisheries 
claimed by America, and which they confidently hoped would 
be secured for them by the Court of France, were a part of 
the price claimed by Spain and acceded to by Vergennes for 
the Spanish alliance in the war ; and as showing, further, that 
after he had thus secured the treaty with Spain, he held him- 
self bound by his engagements with that power to acquiesce in 
and assist her hostile policy toward America in every point, 
save that of the actual independence which France had guar- 
anteed, and which Vergennes held it was not essential that 
England should acknowledge. This disclosure of his bar- 
gaining with Spain assists us to understand the instructions to 
his diplomatic agents at Philadelphia, explaining and enforc- 
ing the inimical policy of France. 

When in 1779 Gerry asked Congress to declare the com- 
mon right to the fisheries, the resolution was opposed by the 
friends of France as sure to alienate Spain, and M. Gerard 
remarked : " There would seem to be a wish to break the con- 
nection of France with Spain ; but I think I can say that if 
the Americans should have the audacity to force the King of 
France to choose between the two alliances, his decision 
would not be in favor of the United States." \ 

* Bancroft, x., p. 191. f Ibid., 191, 192. 

X Gerard to Vergennes, July 14, 1779, quoted by Bancroft, x., 219. 

7 



98 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

The correspondence of M. Vergennes with his agents 
shows that the poHcy announced to them did not always cor- 
respond with the assurances given by him to Congress. 

On September 16, 1779, Washington admitted to a con- 
ference at the headquarters at West Point, M. de la Luzerne, 
the Minister of France, who had arrived at Boston August 
2d, and had not yet been publicly introduced to Congress. 
General Hamilton acted as interpreter and made report of the 
conference on September i8th.* From the report it appeared 
that " he concluded the conference with stating that in Boston 
several gentlemen of influence, some of them members of Con- 
gress, had conversed with him on the subject of an expedition 
against Canada and Nova Scotia ; that his Christian Majesty 
had a sincere and disinterested desire to see those two prov- 
inces annexed to the American Confederacy, and would be 
disposed to promote a plan for this purpose, but that he would 
undertake nothing of the kind unless the plan was previously 
approved by the general." 

The following passages, taken from the French letters in 
M. de Circourt's volume, show that his Christian Majesty had 
for a year or more been under an engagement to Spain to 
retain Canada and Nova Scotia in the hands of England, for 
the purpose of making the Americans " feel the need of 
sureties, allies, and protectors." 

Vergennes, while assuring Montmorin, October 17, 1778, f 
that France could not consent to the English retaining New 
York or any part of the thirteen provinces without violating 
his engagements that they should be independent, expressed 
a readiness to guarantee to England Canada and Nova Scotia. 

On October 30, 1778, Vergennes wrote:}: that France de- 
manded independence only for the thirteen States, without 
comprising among them any of the other English possessions 
which had taken no part in the insurrection. 

" We do not wish," he said, " far from it, that the new 
Republic should remain the only mistress of all that immense 
continent." 

* Dip. Corres. , x. , 361. f Circourt, iii., 307. 

I Ibid., 310. 



Tlic Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783, 99 

On November 2, 1778,* M. Vergennes suggested to Mont- 
morin that with Canada and Nova Scotia guaranteed to Eng- 
land, and with Spain in possession of the part of Western 
Florida which suits her, " a restraint will be put on the Am- 
ericans greater than is needful to prevent them from becoming 
enterprising and troublesome neighbors," and he concluded 
with an expression of his poor opinion of their firmness, their 
talents, views, and patriotism. 

October 14, 1782, Vergennes expressed to the Count de la 
Luzerne, t his unchanged view against the conquest of Canada, 
and added " that this our way of thinking must be an impene- 
trable secret to the Americans. It would be in their eyes a 
crime which they would never forgive us. It behooves us to 
leave them to their illusions, to do everything that we can 
to make them fancy that we share them, and unostentatiously to 
defeat any attempts to which these illusions might carry them, 
if our co-operation is required." 

After these instructive extracts, there seems a certain con- 
sistency in the instructions to the French Minister at Phila- 
delphia, to impress upon the United States what they owe 
to the King for graciously surrendering to them his legitimate 
right to Canada, with " the single view of favoring the United 
States and avoiding everything that might in the least disa- 
greeably affect them." Such disinterested conduct, continued 
the chief Minister of France, should serve as an example and 
incentive to the United States, and keep them from displaying 
jealousy toward France should the fortune of war procure for 
her the slight advantages of extending her fisheries. 

So, too, with the advice to the Americans : " If they wish 
to behave wisely or even decently, to trustingly expose their 
wishes to the Catholic King without touching on the question 
of right, and leave the rest to the verdict which his Majesty's 
magnanimity may dictate." 

The Count's own idea of the magnanimity of the King of 
Spain, to which he urged the Americans trustingly to submit 
their western boundary, is frankly expressed in other places, 
and on January 22, 1781, he writes to Montmorin : 

* Circourt, iii., 311. f Ibid., 288. 



lOO The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

" We never lose sight of the fact that Spain will strive to 
set her own interests before everything else ; that she will 
want to make all the other conditions of peace subordinate to 
them ; and that she will the less give any attention to those 
of the Americans : that she also sees their independence 
with deep reluctance {avec doulew)." 

Some of the instructions of Vergennes to his agents at 
Philadelphia published by Circourt* are elaborate discus- 
sions against the American claims, and exhibit in their rea- 
soning more ingenuity than good faith. 

One, for instance, addressed to M. de la Luzerne, says : 
" With regard to the navigation on the Mississippi, it is 
pretty nearly proved that the Americans have no claim to it, 
since at the moment when the revolution broke out the limits 
of the thirteen States did not reach to the river, and it would 
be absurd for them to claim the rights of England, of a 
power whose rule they have abjured." 

Again, writing to de la Luzerne, he remarked in trans- 
mitting the king's views and that of his council :t "It results 
from this that the fishing along the coast of Newfoundland, 
New Scotland and its dependencies, Canada, etc. , belongs ex- 
clusively to the English, and that the Americans have abso- 
lutely no claim thereto." :|: 

This position was sustained by the argument, first that 
the fisheries belonged to Great Britain, and that it was as 
subjects of that crown that the Americans enjoyed it, and 
that in breaking the community between them, they and 
I^ngland relinquished all advantages they derived from the 
union ; but secondly, that if they had a previous right to the 
fisheries, they had virtually renounced it by the ninth article 
of their commercial treaty between France and the United 
States. § 

* De Circourt, iii., 275. f Versailles, July 13, 1779, Circ, iii., 266. 

X " II resulte de la que la peche sur les cotes de Terre-Neuve, de la nouvelle 
Ecosse et ses dependances, du Canada, etc. , appartient exclusivement aux Anglais ; 
que les Americains n' ont absolument rien a y pretendre," etc. Vergennes to 
Luzerne, September 25, 1779. De Circourt, iii., 276. 

§ M. de Vergennes' language on this point is as follows : " L' Article 9 dit qu' 
ils ne pecheront point les havres, baies, criques, rades, cotes et places que le 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. loi 

Of the lands north of the Ohio, Vergennes wrote to 
Luzerne on October*i4, 1782, pending the peace negotiations : 
"These lands," those bordering on Lake Ontario, " either 
belong to the savages or are a dependence of Canada. In 
neither case have the United States a right to them. But I 
am aware of the extravagant pretensions current in America- 
According to the Congress, the Charters emanating from the 
British Crown extend the dominions of America from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific. Such is the system proposed by 
Mr. Jay on the basis of his negotiations with Spain. Such 
an insane illusion {iin pareil delire) is undeserving of serious 
refutation. Yet a confidential note has been placed in Mr. 
Jay's hands, in which note it is pretty well demonstrated that 
the boundaries of the United States south of the Ohio stop 
at the mountains following the water-shed, and that all that 
skirts that mountain, and particularly the lakes, has formerly 
been a part of Canada. All this, however, is meant for your 
eye alone." * 

The note here referred to is that of Mr. Rayneval, dated 
September 6, 1782, f professing to give only his "personal 
ideas," but which Jay rightly regarded as the official views 
of Vergennes. It was addressed to Jay as the Minister au- 
thorized to treat with Spain, urging him not to offend the 
Spanish Minister by declining to treat with him till he pro- 
duced his power, and sending a memoir on the claims of 
Spain, and the right of the States, which would have reduced 
our national territory to a narrow strip along the Atlantic, 
cutting off nearly the whole of the States of Alabama, Mis- 
sissippi, parts of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the whole of 
the northwestern territory north of the Ohio, including the 
States of Ohio and Michigan, Indiana and Illinois, and Wis- 
consin, up to the 'eastern borders of Iowa and Minnesota. 
This line, reducing thus our territory to one-half of what we 
claimed, M. Rayneval tendered as a reasonable conciliation. 

roi possede ou possedera a I'avenir. Or il est possible que sa Majeste fasse la 
conquete de Terre-Neuve et de Cap-Breton ; dont les Americains ne pourraient 
point pecher sur les cotes de ces deux iles," etc. Circourt, iii., 278. 

* Circourt, iii., 288. f Dip. Cor., viii., 155. ■■ 



102 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

Of this note Jay said in his letter to Livingston : " The 
perusal of this memoir convinced me : First, that this Court 
would, at a peace, oppose our extension to the Mississippi ; 
second, that they would oppose our claims to the free naviga- 
tion of that river ; third, that they would probably support 
the British claims to all the country above the thirty-first de- 
gree of latitude, and certainly to all the country north of the 
Ohio ; fourth, that in case we should not agree to divide with 
Spain in the manner proposed, that then this Court would aid 
Spain in negotiating with Britain for the territory she wanted, 
and would agree that the residue should remain to Britain. 

" In my opinion it was not to be believed that the first 
and confidential secretary of the Count de Vergennes would, 
without his knowledge and consent, declare such sentiments 
and offer such propositions, and that too in writing. I there- 
fore considered M. Rayneval as speaking the sentiments of 
the Minister, and I confess they alarmed me, especially as 
they seemed naturally to make a part of that system of pol- 
icy which I believed induced him rather to postpone the 
acknowledgment of our independence by Britain to the con- 
clusions of a general peace, than aid us in procuring it at 
present." * 

The letters of M. de Vergennes show an instruction to 
Luzerne to depict to the Americans " the priceless advan- 
tages which their close alliance with France has already pro- 
cured and will further insure them, and in the enjoyment of 
which France alone can maintain them." 



Vergennes' Donations to American Authors. 

This sort of teaching, and the idea that whatever con- 
cessions might be granted them by England could only be 
secured through the influence of France, served as a basis for 
a suggestion on the part of the Minister of France that the 
Commissioners of Peace should be instructed by Congress to 
be guided absolutely by the Minister of France. To impress 

* Dip. Cor., viii., i6o, i6i. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 dnd 1783. 103 

this view upon Cangress and the people, the Government of 
France deemed it proper to supply their agent at Philadel- 
phia with money with which to influence the American 
press. 

Vergennes in the same letter to Luzerne* says: "His 
Majesty further empowers you to continue the donations {les 
donatifs) which M. Gerard has given or promised to various 
American authors, and of which he will surely have handed 
you a list." t 

A note by M. de Circourt to this passage says : " ' Tem- 
porary pecuniary assistance.' This delicate subject has been 
even in my time the subject of criticisms and controversies 
into which we need not enter." 

The list of American authors thus assisted by Messrs. 
Gerard and de la Luzerne by " donatifs," and " Secours tem- 
poraires en argent," if preserved among the once confidential 
papers now open to inspection, should not be overlooked by 
the agents of our National Government in Paris, who may be 
charged to gather all useful materials for a national history 
that are to be found in the archives of France. 

The Instruction of Congress. 

The history of the scheme to induce Congress to give to 
its Commissioners an instruction which made the King of 
France the arbiter of our destiny, combined with that of the 
unsuccessful efforts in Congress to retreat from that humiliat- 
ing position, is one which no American can read with pride. 

That error of Congress occurred when, as Mr. C. F. Adams 
has remarked, the tone of Congress had declined,:}: and when, 

* September 25, 1779: Circourt, iii., 275. 

f Pernaps a fact of this significance should be given in the original text, which 
reads as follows : *' Sa Majeste vous authorise en outre a continner les donatifs que 
M. Gerard a donnes ou promis a differents auteurs Americains, et dont ce der- 
nier vous aura surement remis la note." Circourt, iii., 283. 

X "The tone of Congress," says Mr. C. F. Adams, "had gradually become 
lowered. The people were suffering from exhaustion by the war, especially in the 
Southern States. ... At the instigation of M. de la Luzerne, the words 
directing their Ministers 'to use their own judgment and prudence in securing 



104 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

according to Bancroft, t one of the members, Sullivan, was in 
the pay of France. That error was redeemed by Commis- 
sioners who saw clearly the perils to which Congress was blind, 
and who broke their instructions as unsuited to the situation 
and dangerous to the honor and interests of the country. 

But the question remains, How came Congress to yield to 
the blandishments of the French Minister, and to intrust the 
future strength and glory of the United States, the just fruits 
of their war with Great Britain, to the will of the King of 
France, knowing as they did his close relations and family 
alliance with his uncle of Spain — a power persistently and 
bitterly opposed to us ? 

Why did not Congress see that the instruction which sub- 
jected the Commissioners to French control, and made the 
King the master of the terms of peace, was an abdication of 
national sovereignty, stripping them of all power and dignity 
as the representatives of an independent nation, and a breach 
of faith to the American people ? 

Bancroft in part only explains the mystery when he says : 
** The necessity of appeals to France for aid promoted obse- 
quiousness to its wishes. He that accepts subsidies binds 
his own hands and consents to play a secondary part.":|: 

There were men in Congress and in the army perfectly 
ready to accept aid from France as our ally in the war, but 
not to surrender to her in return the right to protect the 
national honor. Another explanation is attempted by Mr. 
Madison, in his account of the adoption of the instructions by 

the interests of the United States,' were erased, and the words ' ultimately to 
govern themselves by the advice and opinion of the French minister,' were intro- 
duced as amendments. The decision showed the influence of Massachusetts to be 
on the wane. Even New Hampshire, under the guidance of John Sullivan, de- 
serted her. . . . The attitude of Virginia was no longer what it had been. 

. , The pressure of the war was upon her, and she consented to the greatest 
humiliation of the national pride recorded in the nation's annals. Even those 
members who voted for it felt ashamed, and repeatedly attempted to expunge it 
afterward ; but the record, because once made, was permitted to remain by those 
who offered nothing to excuse it." * 

f Bancroft's Hist., x., 452. % Ibid., 212. 

* Adam's Works, i., p. 341. 



TIic Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 105 

which the negotiations were submitted to the counsel of 
France,* when he said : 

" It was added that, as it was expected nothing would be 
yielded by Great Britain which was not extorted by the ad- 
dress of France in managing the mediation, and as it was 
the intention of Congress that their Minister should not op- 
pose a peace recommended by them and approved by 
France, it would be good policy to make the declaration to 
France, and by such a mark of confidence to render her 
friendship the more responsible for the issue." 

It appears from the journal of Congress, that Luzerne ad- 
vised the committee of Congress that when negotiations were 
entered into, "the King would most readily employ his 
good offices in support of the United States in all points re- 
lating to their prosperity," and a committee repeating these 
words reported that " Congress placed the utmost confidence 
in his Majesty's assurances." 

The adoption by Congress of the instructions to their 
Commissioners persistently dictated by the Minister of 
France was not simply, as Mr. Madison admitted, t a national 
humiliation— a sacrifice of the national dignity, as was said, 
to national policy — but it was, in fact, a sacrifice of the na- 
tional interests as well as of the national dignity. Whatever 
temporary identity of natiojial interest there might have been 
between the United States and France during the war, upon 
the single point of American independence from the English 
crown — the Americans desiring it for one reason and France 
for another^there could be no permanent identity of interest 
between them jn regard to the future of America as an inde- 
pendent power, but rather that decided and permanent dif- 
ference, which would naturally result from the antagonism of 
their principles, and the variance of their conditions and gen- 
eral policy. 

When Vergennes said it was far from their desire that 
the Republic should be tlie sole mistress of this vast conti- 

* Rives' Madison, i., 334, quoting Madison's Debates, i., 240, 243. 
t The Thompson papers, Collections of the N. Y. Hist. Soc. for 1878, pp. 96 
and 97. 



io6 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and I'J^'i,. 

nent, he spoke the truth ; and when, to secure the aid of 
Spain, he agreed to acquiesce in her schemes for abridging 
the territory and resources which would give us national' 
dignity and national strength, and to surround us with an- 
tagonistic powers combined to prevent our extension and tO' 
subject us to their control, he adopted a course not at all in 
disaccord with the dynastic interests, the family compacts, 
and the balance of power system which made part of the 
policy of France. 

Congress made the further mistake of believing the assur- 
ances of Luzerne, that France was not only ready to do all in- 
her power to secure and advance the prosperity of America, 
but that she alone could induce England to grant us the 
terms we desired, and that without her great assistance in the 
negotiation we would be helpless. 

France, on the contrary, occupied a position toward Eng- 
land, in reference to the colonial dispute, which made it a 
matter of pride and self-respect with high-spirited English- 
men, to repel the smallest interference on the part of France 
in the final negotiations with America. 

When Austria and Russia proffered their mediation,* in 
1781, the Court of London declined it with the remark: 
" On every occasion in which there has been a question of 
negotiation since the commencement of the war with France, 
the King has constantly declared that he could never admit 
in any manner whatsoever, nor under any form, that there 
should be any interference between foreign powers and his 
rebellious subjects." It was the " scornful refusal by England 
of any mediation in which the revolted colonies should be 
included, which," in the words of Shelburne's biographer, 
"had finally alienated her from the Continental powers and 
left her bereft of every friend and ally." t 

If that was the feeling toward powers which had been 
neutral, why should it not have been still stronger against all 
dictation or interference touching the terms of peace, by the 

* Dip. Corr., xi., p. 42. f Shelburne's Life, iii., 166. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 107 

power which had espoused the cause of the Colonies, and 
assisted in the estabHshment of their independence. 

This fact Vergennes seemed, in part at least, to recognize 
and accept, when he disclaimed all intention to interfere with 
the separate character of the American negotiation, and when 
he instructed Rayneval to declare that he had no authority to 
treat of American questions, unless indeed in the suggestion 
to postpone the discussion of the boundaries, and that was 
suggested simply on the plea of avoiding delay.* 



Vergennes and Lecky on the American Articles. 

The surprise of Vergennes at the terms obtained by our 
Commissioners by rejecting his counsel and acting as the 
representatives of an independent people, was shown by the 
letter to Rayneval, already alluded to, that the English had 
bought a peace rather than made one : that indeed, the con- 
cessions as well in regard to the boundaries, the fisheries, and 
the loyalists, exceeded all that he could have believed pos- 
sible." t 

While the great diplomatist of France placed on record a 
hundred years ago that involuntary tribute to the sound policy, 
the masterly management and the marvellous success of the 
American negotiators; the latest of the English historians, 
who has studied the subject of the general peace by all the 
light afforded by the secret correspondence published by Ban- 
croft and Circourt, thus pronounces his impartial judgment. 

Speaking of the policy of France, Mr. Lecky says : "If 

* The Instruction pour le Sieur Gerard de Rayneval, signed " Louis, par le 
roi, Xavierde Vergennes," dated November 15, 1782, said : *' II tiichera d'engager 
le ministere britannique a renvoyer au traite definitif ou a des commissaires les 
discussions des limites qui arretent la negociation entre les commissaires anglais et 
americains" (De Circourt, iii., 41, 42). 

f Vergennes to Rayneval, Versailles, December 4, 1782: " Vous y remar- 
querezque les Anglais achetent la paix plutot qu'ils ne la font. Leurs concessions, 
en effet, tant pour les limites que pour les pecheries et les loyalistes, excedent tout 
ce que j'avais cru possible. Quel est le motif qui a pu amener une facilite que 
I'on pourrait interpreter par une espece d'abandon?" M. de Vergennes a M. 
de Rayneval, Versailles, 4 Decembre 1782. De Circourt, iii., p. SO- 



io8 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

Vergennes' policy had been carried out it seems clear that he 
would have established a claim for concessions from England 
by supporting her against America on the questions of Canada 
and the Canadian border and the Newfoundland fishery, and 
that he would have partially compensated Spain for her fail- 
ure before Gibraltar by obtaining for her a complete ascen- 
dancy on the Mississippi. The success of such a policy would 
have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay 
and Adams defeated it. Franklin very reluctantly acquiesced 
in the secret signature. Livingston, writing from America, 
strongly blamed it, and expressed his conviction that the sus- 
picions were unfounded. But the act was done. And if it 
can be justified by success, that justification at least is not 
wanting. . . . It is impossible," continues Lecky, " not 
to be struck with the skill, hardihood, and good fortune that 
marked the American negotiation. Everything the United 
States could, with any shadow of plausibility demand from 
England they obtained, and much of what they obtained was 
granted them in opposition of the two great powers by whose 
assistance they had triumphed. The conquests of France were 
much more than counterbalanced by the financial ruin which 
impelled her with giant steps to revolution. The acquisition 
of Minorca and Florida by Spain was dearly purchased by 
the establishment of an example which before long deprived 
her of her own colonies. Holland received an almost fatal 
blow by the losses she incurred during the war. England 
emerged from the struggle with a diminished empire and a 
vastly augmented debt, and her ablest statesmen believed 
and said that the days of her greatness were over. But 
America, though she had been reduced by the war to almost 
the lowest stage of impoverishment and impotence, gained at 
the peace almost everything that she desired, and started with 
every promise of future greatness upon the mighty career that 
was before her." * 

* History of England in the Eighteenth Century, by William Edward Hart- 
pole Lecky, vol. iv., p. 284. New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1883. A volume 
whose admirable history, both of the war and the peace negotiations, especially 
commend it to American readers. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 109 



The Scheme of the American Government for Gath- 
ering Material for the National History. 

The injustice so long done to the American Commission- 
ers, the fictions asserted and believed through the adop- 
tion as historic facts of assertions and theories, have taught 
us, by a sharp lesson never to be forgotten, the necessity of 
supplementing our own records of the times of the Revo- 
lution with the confidential records of European diplomacy. 
Among the memorable acts of President Hayes' administra- 
tion was the scheme inaugurated by Mr. Evarts, as Secretary 
of State, for securing from the archives of every State in 
Europe, whatever they might contain deserving a place among 
the materials for our national history. 

' The work which this State, under the auspicious influence 
of this Society, has done for New York by the able hands of 
Brodhead and O'Callaghan, in gathering our colonial records 
from England, France, and Holland, President Hayes and 
his Cabinet proposed to do for the nation in regard to the 
peace negotiations. Under President Garfield and Secre- 
tary Blaine, it made satisfactory progress in the obtaining of 
the ready and courteous consent of European governments. 
Let us hope that under President Arthur and Secretary Fre- 
linghuysen it will be brought with all the aid that may be 
required from Congress, to a successful completion. No 
work could be regarded with more of interest and respect, 
not simply by the intelligent people of America, but by his- 
toric students of other lands. 

If there is no special objection to such a step, might not oc- 
casional reports from the State Department of the progress of 
the work at the various Courts which have consented to the 
plan, apart from their interest for the American people, have 
a certain advantage in bringing to the Government the ad- 
vice and assistance of historical students ? And is it not 
possible that a large share of the labor of such a Guest in 
Europe may be spared by an inquiry as to the wealth in MSS. 
copied from European archives in our own libraries ? That 



no The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

of Mr. Bancroft, for instance, would furnish a mass of his- 
toric papers selected and copied under his own supervision, 
the regathering of which abroad might cost months, if not 
years of the labor of experts, and possibly, since the discus- 
sion of the unfriendly policy of France and Spain disclosed 
by the secret correspondence, the copying of important docu- 
ments may be occasionally restricted. 

The national importance of the confidential correspond- 
ence already published can hardly be overrated. If Jay, 
when Oswald's first commission was approved by Vergennes, 
had assented to the view of his venerable and cautious col- 
league — that they were bound by the instruction of Con- 
gress, an instruction which declared, " You are to make the 
most candid and confidential communication upon all sub- 
jects to the Minister of our generous ally the King of France ; 
to undertake nothing in the negotiation for peace or truce 
without their knowledge and concurrence ; and ultimately, 
to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion"* — it is 
now clear, from the development of the French policy, and 
the obligations of the King to Spain to do what he could 
to enforce^ that policy, that the consequences to the United 
States would have been most humiliating and disastrous. 

After the lapse of a century we can review with the im- 
partial eye of history the whole transaction, where the Amer- 
ican Commissioners, f occupying their modest apartments 
amid the splendors of the French capital, encountered the most 
accomplished of the trained diplomatists of Europe ; discov- 
ered by their intelligence and defeated by their courage and 
wisdom, the plans which had been so long and so carefully 
elaborated for the reduction of America to narrow limits and 
a subordinate position, hemmed in and controlled by a com- 
bination of the powers of Europe. We can compare even 
without the aid of a map the magnificent territory secured to 
us by the peace, and that allotted to us by the " conciliation 

* Dip. Cor., X., p. 76. 

f Mr. Laurens joined them only on the last day before the signing of the 
Provisional Articles. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. iii 

line," proffered by Vergennes through Rayneval, and enforced 
by Vergennes in his secret correspondence, a line which would 
have cut off our great Northwest Territory, with part of Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee, and nearly the whole of Alabama and 
Mississippi, excluding us alike from the Lakes, the Gulf, and 
the Mississippi. The narrow limits assigned for us were to be 
"detailed and circumscribed," so reads the French memoir, 
■"with the greatest exactness, and all the belligerent powers 
must bind themselves to prevent any transgression of them." 
England, Spain, France, and Holland were to unite " to stop 
us by force at the first infraction of these limits, and the first 
attempt toward extending beyond them." 

The historic facts now disclosed show the completeness 
of the success of the American Commissioners in suddenly 
reversing the position of subserviency, in which they were 
placed by their instructions — in declining to treat as colonies 
or plantations, assuming a position of sovereign dignity and in- 
dependence, and compelling its recognition — quietly separat- 
ing their counsels from the unfriendly and disingenuous policy 
of France, appealing directly and successfully to the better 
judgment and truest interest of England, and thus overthrow- 
ing the hostile schemes so carefully elaborated at Madrid, at 
Paris, at Philadelphia, to make the United States a feeble 
power, easily controlled by the European States, and sud- 
denly startling the world by the Provisional Articles which 
were to secure its dignity and its greatness at once and for- 
ever. 

It was natural that Vergennes, that famous master of 
European diplomacy, who had pronounced the American 
views an insane delusion, on seeing those views recognized 
by England and reduced to practice, should declare to his 
confidential secretary his amazement, with the frank declara- 
tion that the terms exceeded anything he could have believed 
possible. 

The later tribute of Mr. Lecky, so striking in its expres- 
sions, has been paid after the learned author had read the 
grave disclosures of the French correspondence. But some 
of the ablest diplomatic writers of America, before those 



112 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 



proofs had been disclosed of the correct judgment of the com- 
missioners, and when still influenced, perhaps insensibly, by 
the common belief that Jay and Adams had been unduly 
suspicious and had perhaps exaggerated a little the unfriend- 
liness of the French policy, have nevertheless been profoundly 
struck with the " uncommon address" and extraordinary skill 
with which the negotiation was managed from the first day to 
the last, evolving from individual differences the highest wis- 
dom and united action, and accomplishing results which Ver- 
gennes had deemed impossible, with the quiet tact, the calm 
courage, and the lofty faith, which fitly mark the concluding 
act of the War of the Revolution. 

Touching the work thus accomplished, unitedly and with 
perfect harmony, it has been attempted to fix upon the Com- 
missioner, on whom rested the chief responsibility, charges 
of groundless suspicion, of blundering disobedience to instruc- 
tions, of national discourtesy, and even bad faith. Such have 
been the allegations or insinuations against Jay from the publi- 
cation of Dr. Sparks' note * in the official volumes of the " Dip- 

* While the refutation of Dr. Sparks' statement touching the character of the 
correspondence of Vergennes and his agents is complete, and the correspondence 
shows that the mind of Jay in its reading of their policy was not weak and sus- 
picious, but rather, as Prescott says, "eminently calm and judicious," * there 
would seem to be room for the personal friends and representatives of Dr. Sparks 
to explain, should his papers throw light upon the subject, how he came to be 
deceived, and by whom he was persuaded that the papers shown him as the 
complete correspondence of Vergennes with his agents, contained none of the 
numerous letters now published, which exhibit their hostility to the American 
claims and the methods resorted to to defeat them. 

It is true that Mr. Sparks, in editing his '' Life and Writings of Washington," 
seemed to exhibit an uncommon and rather extravagant idea of the rightful 
powers of an editor, when he assumed to makeJji the text of " Washington's 
Writings," without notice to the reader, alterations which he claimed to be 
" verbal or grammatical," but which by others were regarded as "an unwar- 
rantable liberty with the text, altering, omitting, and adding, as might suit his 
caprice, and that for the purpose of conforming the work to his own standard 
of taste." These were liberties which induced Lord Mahon to remark, although 
Dr. Sparks denied the justice of the criticism, that he had ' ' tampered with the 

* Prescott's Diplomacy of the Constitution : An Historical Study, pp. 122, 123. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 113 

lomatic Correspondence " to the present year, and in obedience 
to the request of this venerable Society, when they said, 
" We trust you will not be reluctant to render this service to 
history in setting forth the fair record of so great a son of 
New York in connection with so great an event," I have 
presented this narrative of historic facts, including some of 
profound importance, from the confidential records from 
London and Paris. 

After the publication of these records, of which occasion- 
ally we have only extracts, and also of those which the other 
governments of Europe consented to furnish from their ar- 
chives at the request of Garfield — and their publication with 
translations should not be delayed lest the favorable oppor- 
tunity be lost — the history of the peace negotiations will be 
expanded, in volume and in interest ; but we may rest as- 
sured that nothing will appear to throw doubt upon the cor- 
respondence of Vergennes, for whose authenticity we have 
the voucher of Mr. Bancroft, and which discloses the charac- 
ter and reasons of the policy of France. 

There may, perhaps, be properly recalled here the testi- 
mony of Franklin to the advantage brought to the negotia- 
tion by Adams and Jay, and the generous tribute borne by 
Adams in his diary to the youngest of the negotiators — for 
the age of Jay at this time was thirty-seven, that of Adams 
forty-seven, and that of Franklin seventy-six. 

',' I have not," said Adams, " attempted in these notes to 
do justice to the arguments of my colleagues, all of whom 
were throughout the whole business very attentive and very 

truth of history." * But in this case the question has become one not of opinion, 
but of simple fact.f 

* Dr. Sparks' reply lo Lord Mahon, pages'5, 6. 

t The statement of Dr. Sparks, in his" Life of Franklin (vol. i., p. 456)," was as follows,: 
" The violation of the instructions by the American Commissioners in concluding and signing their 
treaty without the concurrence of the French Government was the moreJjUnjustifiable [on account 
of the fidelity with which the French Minister adhered to the spirit of those instructions with 
reference to the United States, in negotiating their treaty with England." 

In a note to page 452 Mr. Sparks said : " Indeed, there is no fact in history which is now 
more susceptible of complete demonstration than that the suspicions of the American Commis- 
sioners on this occasion were utterly without foundation ; that the French Ministry, so far from 
interfering or meddling with the negotiation, kept wholly aloof from it. . . . The direct proofs 
of these facts are abundant ; whereas the suspicions of the Commissioners are sustained by no 
other evidence than that of circumstances, inferences, conjectures, and deceptive appearances." 



114 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 aiid 1783. 

able, especially Mr. Jay, to whom the French, if they knew 
as much of his negotiations as they do of mine, would very 
justly give the title with which they have inconsiderately 
decorated me, that of ' Le Washington de la Negociation,' 
a very flattering compliment indeed, to which I have not a 
right, but sincerely think it belongs to Mr. Jay." 

Not less pronounced was the testimony of Lord St. Hel- 
ens, the Mr. Fitzherbert of the negotiations, who was made by 
his Government the adviser of Mr. Oswald,* and who knew 
from first to last its secret history, both at Paris and in Lon- 
don. This gentleman wrote to Sir George Rose, in 1838, in re- 
turning the two volumes of "Jay's Life and Writings: " "These 
memoirs are indeed highly deserving of further attention on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and as you justly foresaw, particu- 
larly interesting to myself from my intimate acquaintance 
and political intercourse with Mr. Jay when we were respect- 
ively employed at Paris in 1782 ; and I can safely add my 
testimony to the numerous proofs afforded by these memoirs 
that it was not only chiefly, but solely through his means 
that the negotiations of that period between England and 
America were brought to a successful conclusion." f A mar- 

* Fitzherbert to Shelburne, August 17, 1782, speaking of Oswald : "Our de- 
partments, though nominally distinct and separate, are in fact most connected 
and interwoven with each other. . . . The extensive and almost universal 
knowledge he is possessed of," etc. 

f Mr. Heniy Flanders, by whom this passage is given (Flanders' Chief Jus- 
tices, i., p. 351) from MS. furnished him by my father, remarks in a note : " Lord 
St. Helens doubtless attributed the favorable conclusion of the treaty to Jay's 
inflexible detei-mination to proceed separately in the negotiation, and not con- 
jointly with the French." 

Mr. Madison, who had voted for the Congressional instructions to the Com- 
missioners and who warmly disapproved of their violation, in writing to Secretary 
Edmund Randolph, thus sententiously, in the words of his biographer, "summed 
up the parts of the different actors " (Ma.rch 18, 1783 : Madison's Debates, i., 518 ; 
Rives' Madison, i., 362) : " In this business Jay has taken the lead and proceeded 
to a length of which you can form little idea. Adams has followed with cordial- 
ity. Franklin has been dragged into it, Laurens in a separate letter professes a 
violent suspicion of Great Britain and good-will and confidence toward France." 

Mr. Parton, in his Life of Franklin (ii. , p. 488), says: "In truth, Mr. Jay's 
determination was such that there was no choice left to Franklin but to with- 
draw from the Commission or let him have his way. ' Would you break your 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 115 

ginal note of Lord St. Helens on the French question and 
the Marbois letter said: "The sequel of this narrative, which 
is perfectly true throughout, will show that this important 
disclosure of the machinations of France led to the immediate 
conclusion of the Provisional Treaty," etc. Another marginal 
note * on the propositions of France, by Rayneval, for enlarg- 
ing the limits of the French fisheries, remarks that "in the 
course of their discussion M. de Vergennes never failed to 
insist on the expediency of a concert of measures between 
France and England for the purpose of excluding the Ameri- 
can States from these fisheries lest they should become a nur- 
sery for seamen, "t What Vergennes and Rayneval thought 
of the Provisional Articles, which so completely overthrew the 
plans they had pursued with such secrecy, dexterity, and 
confidence, we already kno\v from their remarkable letters; 
and there is a remark about Jay in a letter to Luzerne % 
which, following as it does the secret correspondence dis- 
closing the combination and the schemes of the two great 
powers which Jay, while acting singly and alone, had de- 
tected and .defeated, is a tribute not to be overlooked. Allud- 
ing to a report that Doctor Franklin had asked to be recalled, 
M. de Vergennes wishes Congress may reject the demand, at 
least for the present, " for it would be impossible to give Mr. 
Franklin a successor so wise and ^so conciliating as himself. 
Besides, I should be afraid lest they should leave us Mr. Jay ; 
and this is the man with whom I should like least to treat of 
affairs." 

Mr. Trescott, in his thoughtful and philosophical paper 
on the subject, remarked that in the proud circle of famous 

instructions?' Franklin asked him one day. 'Yes,' replied Jay, taking his pipe 
from his mouth, 'as I break this pipe;' and so saying threw the fragments into 
the fire." Mr. Parton quotes as authority for this anecdote, Diplomacy of the 
United States, i., 121. ' 

* To Jay's Life, i., 149. 

f The New York Review for October, 1841, p. 307, says that " to Jay in chief 
belonged the merit of saving the fisheries is clear," and quotes John Adams as 
writing to Jay from the Hague, April 2, 1786 : *' You have erected a monument 
to your memory in every New England heart ; " and Hamilton to Jay, July 25, 
1783: " The New England people talk of making you an annual fish offering." 

X Vergennes to Luzerne, July 21, 1783. 



ii6 The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

warriors and great civilians which illustrates the history of the 
United States, none should stand in brighter light than the di- 
plomatists of the Revolution, and in a single paragraph he allud- 
ed in turn to each of the negotiators of the Treaty of Peace. 

" The very variety of their characters adapted itself to 
their necessities, and if the deferential wisdom of Franklin 
smoothed the difficulties of the French treaty, the energetic 
activity of Adams conquered the obstacles to the alliance with 
Holland, and the conduct of the .negotiation with England 
was guided by the inflexible firmness of Jay." 

The comparison drawn by Lecky of the results of the 
general pacification to France, Spain, and the United States 
enforces the remark of Segur, applicable alike to politics and 
diplomacy, that " the true dexterity is a courageous good 
faith, and character saves men from the dangers on which 
subtlety makes shipwreck." Never was diplomacy more 
subtle than that of France and Spain toward America and 
her too trustful- Congress ; never was true dexterity and 
courageous good faith more marked than in the breaking of 
the Congressional instructions, and the refusal to negotiate ex- 
cepting on an equal footing as a free and independent power. 
Nor is it without significance that the signing of the articles 
which gave us all of which Spain sought to deprive us, lost 
to Spain her coveted Gibraltar. 

Looking at the restricted role which France and Spain 
proposed that we should play, and then at the boundaries 
which the confidence reposed in us by Shelburne and his 
cabinet assisted us to secure, perhaps no finer illustration can 
be found in history of the truth of the saying of the late Lord 
Clarendon, that " the one special art required in diplomacy 
is to be perfectly honest, truthful, and straightforward." 

The Part Borne by Shelburne. 

As the concluding act in the long connection between 
England and the thirteen colonies, and one looking not 
simply to an end of strife, but to mutual interests and a well- 
founded and permanent friendship, it was a treaty worthy of 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 117 

both countries, and entitles the name of Shelburne to the 
lasting regard of the two peoples. 

Shelburne, happily, escaped the treatment awarded to 
Jay and Adams by some of the writers who perhaps uncon- 
sciously have misrepresented facts, caricaturing the peace 
negotiations : with a jumble of the characters, a reversal of 
the parts, and so complete an ignoring of all duty to the 
honor and interests of America, that Jay has been reproached 
with having disregarded the advice and wishes of France, and 
having declined to concede the demands of Spain, while 
Adams has been accused " of aiding and abetting " Jay in 
disappointing the plans of these powers. Still but moderate 
justice was awarded to Shelburne in the Parliamentary de- 
bates on the Provisional Articles, by the captious orators of 
the coalition, including men as notable as Burke and Sheri- 
dan. Burke, in a tone little in accord with that which marked 
his immortal speech on " Conciliation with America," de- 
clared that the Articles were so degrading as to merit obliter- 
ation, if it were possible to effect it, out of the history of 
England ; while Sheridan declared that the treaty relinquished 
everything that was glorious and great in the country. 

The chief charge against Shelburne, that of abandoning 
the American loyalists, was unjust; as he pressed their claim 
to the utmost, threatening to continue the war if it was not 
yielded, until he found that neither the Commissioners nor Con- 
gress had the power to guarantee it. The further charge of 
sacrificing the interests of England by conceding^ too exten- 
sive boundaries is unsustained by the verdict of impartial his- 
tory. The world recognizes at last the far-sighted and en- 
Hghtened statesmanship that attempted at the peace to atone 
in part for the mistaken policy of the war ; that declined to listen 
to the narrow policy of France and Spain for keeping our 
Republic in a condition of dependency on Europe, and, stimu- 
lated perhaps by the clear motive of that policy, granted the 
boundaries and the fisheries with a generosity which puz- 
zled Vergennes and seemed like a dream to Rayneval, but 
which was wisely exercised to increase the stability and pros- 
perity of the Republic, to make it thoroughly independent 



ii8 TJie Peace Negotiations of 1782 atid 1783. 

of the powers of Europe, and to promote a lasting recon- 
ciliation and friendship between America and England. 

It has been said by the late historian, Mr. Green : " Eng- 
land is only a small part of the outcome of English history. 
Its greater issues lie not within the narrow limits of the 
mother island, but in the destinies of nations yet to be. The 
struggles of her patriots, the wisdom of her statesmen, the 
steady love of liberty and law in her people at large, were 
shaping in the past of our little island the future of mankind. 
At the time, however, this work first became visible in the 
severance of America, the wisdom of English statesmen 
seemed at the lowest ebb." 

Few of them, while mourning the independence of the 
thirteen colonies with their familiar names and historic mem- 
ories as an irreparable loss, and declaring, as did some of their 
greatest men, that the glory of England was extinguished 
forever — few of them remembered that England had been 
conquered by the love of liberty and constitutional right which 
her American children had inherited from herself, and that 
with the recognition of the independence of the American 
Republic began the proud career of En"gland as the Mother 
of States. 

The policy of Shelburne in rejecting the overtures of 
France and Spain and looking to the friendship of America 
was a policy worthy of the minister on whom it devolved to 
end the war of the Revolution : a policy which recalls the ad- 
vice given long before by Tucker the Dean of Gloucester, 
and Adam Smith, to let the colonies depart to form their 
own destinies, England retaining only the right, like other 
nations, of connecting herself with them by treaties of com- 
merce or of alliance.* "^ 

Americans may well remember with honor Shelburne, 
Oswald, and Fitzherbert: Townsend, Pitt, and Grantham : and 
Englishmen, as they read the history of the Peace, may thank 
God that the British Cabinet rejected the advice of France 
and Spain, and gave a fair hearing and a just confidence to 
the American Commissioners. 

* Tucker's Political Tracts, quoted by Lecky, i., 423. 



The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 119 

I need scarcely remind you that the Marquis of Lansdowne, 
our new neighbor in Canada, the successor of Lord Lome as 
Governor-General, is the grandson of the Shelburne who re- 
posed so just a confidence in the American Commissioners ; 
and when his Excellency shall favor us with a visit, he will 
find that Americans have not forgotten the honorable part 
borne by his illustrious ancestor in the peace negotiations. 

Looking to the colonial union of England and America in 
the past, and to their international relations in the future, 
it may be a matter of common pride that no disappointment 
or humiliation marred the dignity with which the United 
States took their place in the old and venerable circle of 
nations. The Republic entered, in the words of Trescott, 
" Calmly as conscious of right, resolutely as conscious of 
strength, gravely as conscious of duty," 

It may not be amiss to allude in closing to the fact that 
Jay bore explicit testimony''- to Franklin's fidelity to the 
American claims to the fisheries and the boundaries ; that 
their friendship was not disturbed by their difference of view 
touching the designs of France or their own duties as Com- 
missioners, and that Jay was appointed by Franklin one of the 
executors of his will,. 

The friendship also of Jay and Adams continued to the 
close of their lives ; and their occasional correspondence, 
sometimes!, evoked by historical misstatements touching the 
events in which they had been engaged, was marked by the 
warmest feeling of regard. " The sight of your handwriting 
and your name," wrote Adams to Jay, from Quincy, March 
6, 1821, " is to me a cordial for low spirits." 

To us who, looking back over the century, have traced the 

♦Jay to Franklin, Passy, September ii, 1783: Jay's Life and Writings, 
ii,, 126. Mr. Benjamin Vaughan, in a letter to the late Peter Augustus Jay, dated 
January 7, 1830, said : " When at your father's, about twelve years ago, I asked 
him in the presence of President Kirkland, my cousin Mr. Robert Hallowell Gardi- 
ner, of Maine, and my son Petty, whether Doctor Franklin had ever given him reason 
to doubt of his sincerity in the negotiation, and he answered with almost a con- 
vulsive promptness, ' Oh, no ! ' This, I think, proves that they finally thought 
pretty much alike." — MS, belonging to Miss E. C, Jay. 



I20 TJic Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. 

outline of the peace negotiations and marked the dangers 
that were discovered and avoided, those negotiations, as read 
by the light of the records of all the players in that game of 
nations, will more than ever occupy a chief place among the 
picturesque and heroic incidents of the Revolution which for 
seven years have been rehearsed before us. 

As illuminated by the skilful pens of Vergennes and 
Montmorin, Gerard, Luzerne, and Rayneval, the story grows 
in interest as it exhibits on the one hand, in this chapter 
of diplomacy, the ^\xh\\Q. finesse of European Courts, and on 
the other that early American spirit, with its cool courage, 
its self-reliance, its fearless reflection, its sturdy faith, and 
practical energy which in our centennial year was so ad- 
mirably developed before this Society. 

While the generations of that day have passed with children 
and grandchildren into the spirit-land, that early American 
spirit, thank God, still lives. It lives to remind us that the 
imperial Republic which they founded is in our keeping to- 
day, and that we may gather from their example courage, 
firmness, and faith for the solution of every problem at home 
or abroad that shall threaten the honor or the welfare of our 
country. 

NOTE. 

The length of the Address compelled some omissions in its delivery. The 
map opposite, " showing the boundaries of the United States, Canada, and the 
Spanish Possessions according to the proposals of the Court of France," is copied 
from one given by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice in his "Life of William, Earl of 
Shoburne, afterward first Marquis of Lansdowne, with Extracts from his Papers 
and l^rrespondence " (Vol. IIL, pp. 170. London: Macmillan & Co. 1876). 
The ^^undary line fixed by the Provisional Articles and the Definitive Treaty 
has been added in the copy. It shows the additional territory obtained beyond 
that awarded us by the French proposals, which shut us out from the Mississippi 
and the , Gulf : including nearly the whole of the States of Alabama and Missis- 
sippi, the greater parts of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the whole of what was 
known as the " Northwestern Territory," north of the Ohio, embracing the 
States of Ohio, Michigan, ^Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota, 
together with the navigation of the Mississippi. Spain, disappointed in her plans, 
re-ceded to France, in 1800, the vast territory of Louisiana, which in 1803 we 
purchased from Napoleon for fifteen millions of dollars. 



/ 




APPENDIX A. 



DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE 
Between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty. 

In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity. 

It having pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the hearts of 
the most serene and most potent Prince George the Third, by the 
Grace of God King of Great-Britain, France and Ireland, Defender 
of the Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunebourg, Arch-Treasurer 
and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, «&c., and of the 
United States of America, to forget all past misunderstandings 
and differences that have unhappily interrupted the good correspond- 
ence and friendship which they mutually wish to restore ; and to es- 
tabUsh such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the 
two countries, upon the ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual 
convenience, as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace 
and harmony : And having for this desirable end, already laid the 
foundation of peace and reconciliation, by the provisional articles, 
signed at Paris, on the thirtieth of November, one thousand seven 
hundred and eighty-two, by the commissioners empowered on each 
part, which articles were agreed to be inserted in, and to constitute 
the treaty of peace proposed to be concluded between the crown of 
Great-Britain and the said United States, but which treaty was not 
to be concluded until terms of peace should be agreed upon between 
Great-Britain and France, and his Britannic Majesty should be ready 
to conclude such treaty accordingly ; and the treaty between Great- 
Britain and France, having since been concluded, his Britannic Maj- 
esty and the United States of America, in order to carry into full ef- 
fect the provisional articles abovementioned, according to the tenor 
thereof, have constituted and appointed, that is to say. His Britan- 
nic Majesty on his part, David Hartley, Esquire, Member of the 
Parliament of Great-Britain ; and the said United States on their 



122 Appendix. 

part, John Adams, Esquire, late a Commissioner of the United States 
of America at the Court of Versailles, late Delegate in Congress from 
the state of Massachusetts, and Chief Justice of the said state, and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of the said United States to their High 
Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands ; Ben- 
jamin Franklin, Esquire, late Delegate in Congress from the 
state of Pennsylvania, President of the Convention of the said state, 
and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America at 
the Court of Versailles ; John Jay, Esquire, late President of Con- 
gress, and Chief Justice of the state of New York, and Minister 
Plenipotentiary from the said United States at the Court of Madrid, 
to be the Plenipotentiaries for the concluding and signing the pres- 
ent definitive treaty ; who after having reciprocally communicated 
their respective full powers, have agreed upon and confirmed the fol- 
lowing articles. 

Article I. 

His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. 
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence 
Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-CaroUna, and 
Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States ; that he treats 
with them as such \ and for himself, his heirs and successors, relin- 
quishes all claims to the government, propriety and territorial rights 
of the same, and every part thereof. 

Article II. 

And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the subject 
of the boundaries of the said United States, may be prevented, it is 
hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their 
boundaries, viz. From the north-west angle of Nova-Scotia, viz. that 
angle which is formed by a line, drawn due north from the source of 
St. Croix river to the Highlands ; along the said Highlands which 
divide those rivers, that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, 
from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean, to the northwestern- 
most head of Connecticut river, thence down along the middle of 
that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude ; from thence, 
by a line due west on said latitude, until it strikes the river Iro- 
quois or Cataraquy ; thence along the middle of said river into 



Appendix. 123 

lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the 
communication by water between that lake and lake Erie ; 
thence along the middle of said communication into lake Erie, 
through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water-commu- 
nication between that lake and lake Huron ; thence along the mid- 
dle of said water-communication into the lake Huron ; thence 
through the middle of said lake to the water-communication between 
that lake and lake Superior ; thence through lake Superior north- 
ward of the isles Royal and Phelipeaux, to the Long I>ake ; thence 
through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water-communication 
between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the 
Woods ; thence through the said lake to the most northwestern point 
thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Missis- 
ippi ; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river 
Missisippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the thirty- 
first degree of north latitude. South by a line to be drawn due east 
from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 
thirty-one degrees north of the Equator, to the middle of the river 
Apalachicola or Catahouche ; thence along the middle thereof to its 
junction with the Flint river ; thence straight to the head of St. Mary's 
river; and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's river to 
the Atlantic ocean. East by a line to be drawn along the mid- 
dle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to 
its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid High- 
lands which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic ocean, from 
those which fall into the river St. Lawrence ; comprehending all isl- 
ands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United 
States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points 
where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova-Scotia on the one 
part, and East-Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay 
of Fundy and the Atlantic ocean ; excepting such islands as now 
are, or heretofore have been within the limits of the said province of 
Nova-Scotia. 

Article HI. 

It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue 
to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand 
Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland ; also in the 
gulph of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea, where the 



124 Appendix. 

inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish ; and 
also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to 
take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as 
British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that 
island) ; and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of his 
Britannic Majesty's dominions in America ; and that the American 
fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unset- 
tled bays, harbours and creeks of Nova-Scotia, Magdalen islands, 
and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled ; but so 
soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be 
lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, 
without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, 
proprietors or possessors of the ground. 

Article IV. 

It is agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet with no law- 
ful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of 
all bona fide debts heretofore contracted. 

Article V. 

It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to 
the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution 
of all estates, rights and properties, which have been confiscated, be- 
longing to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights and 
properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of his 
Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said 
United States. And that persons of any other description shall have 
free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the thirteen United 
States, and therein to remain twelve months, unmolested in their en- 
deavours to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and 
properties, as may have been confiscated ; and that Congress shall 
also earnestly recommend to the several states a reconsideration and 
revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so as to render 
the said laws or acts perfectly consistent, not only with justice and 
equity, but with that spirit of conciliation, which on the return of 
the blessings of peace should universally prevail. And that Con- 
gress shall also earnestly recommend to the several states, that the 
estates, rights and properties of such last mentioned persons, shall 
be restored to them, they refunding to any persons who may be now 



Appendix. 125 

in possession, the bona fide price (where any has been given) which 
such persons may have paid on purchasing any of the said lands, 
rights, or properties, since the confiscation. And it is agreed, that 
all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by 
debts, marriage settlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful 
impediment in the prosecution of their just rights. 

Article VI, 

That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prose- 
cutions commenced against any person or persons for, or by reason 
of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war ; and 
that no person shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or dam- 
age, either in his person, liberty or property ; and that those who 
may be in confinement on such charges, at the time of the ratifica- 
tion of the treaty in America, shall be immediately set at liberty, and 
the prosecutions so commenced be discontinued. 

Article VII. 

There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Britannic 
Majesty and the said States, and between the subjects of the one and 
•the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and 
land, shall from henceforth cease : all prisoners on both sides shall 
be set at liberty, and his Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient 
speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any ne- 
groes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his 
armies, garrisons and fleets from the said United States, and from 
every post, place and harbour within the same ; leaving in all fortifi- 
cations the American artillery that may be therein ; and shall also 
order and cause all archives, records, deeds and papers, belonging 
to any of the said states, or their citizens, which in the course of the 
war may have fallen into the hands of his officers, to be forthwith re- 
stored and delivered to the proper states and persons to whom they 
belong. 

Article VIII. 

The navigation of the river Missisippi, from its source to the ocean, 
shall for ever remain free and open to the subjects of Great-Britain, 
and the citizens of the United States. 



1 26 Appendix. 

Article IX. 

In case it should so happen that any place or territory belonging 
to Great-Britain or to the United States, should have been conquered 
by the arms of either from the other, before the arrival of the said pro- 
visional articles in America, it is agreed, that the same shall be re- 
stored without difficulty, and without requiring any compensation. 

Article X. 

The solemn ratifications of the present treaty, expedited in good 
and due form, shall be exchanged between the contracting parties, 
in the space of six months, or sooner if possible, to be computed 
from the day of the signature of the present treaty. In witness 
whereof, we the undersigned, their Ministers Plenipotentiary, have 
in their name and in virtue of our full powers, signed with our hands 
the present definitive treaty, and caused the seals of our arms to be 
affixed thereto. 

Done at Paris, this third day of September, in the year of our 
Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. 

D. HARTLEY, (l.s.) 
JOHN ADAMS, (l.s.) 
B. FRANKLIN, (l.s.) 
JOHN JAY, (l.s.) 



APPENDIX B. 



THE VIEWS OF WASHINGTON AND HIS CAB- 
INET ON THE POLICY OF FRANCE IN THE 
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

Among the notable incidents that marked the administration and 
tested the temper and tact of Washington were the exhibitions of 
what Mr. Gibbs described as " the audacious insolence of Genet and 
the studied impertinence of his successor." The almost incredible 
note of M. Adet, the French Minister, which compelled on our 
part a frank review of the policy of France toward America, ap- 
peared during the Presidential canvass, and John Adams wrote 
(December 12, 1796) : " Adet's note has had some effect in Penn- 
sylvania and proved a terror to some Quakers, and that is all the ill 
effect it has had. Even the Southern States appear to resent it." * 

It threatened the wrath of the French Directory if the American 
people did not pursue a course in accord with the wishes of 
France, f and some idea of its tone and charges, which could not 
be allowed to pass unnoticed, may be obtained from the note of its 
contents given in the index to the first volume of our " State Papers 
on Foreign Relations," which reads : "Reproaches, allegations against 
the United States of duplicity, weakness, partiality, insensibility to 
the claims of justice and honor, in the disregarding of their neutral 
obligations, . . . violating treaty stipulations," etc. 

Hamilton's advice was explicit. He wrote to Washington : J 
" Let a full reply to M. Adet's last communication be made, con- 
taining a particular review of our conduct and motives from the 
commencement of the Revolution. Let this be sent to Mr. Pinckney 
to be imparted to the Directory, and let a copy of it, with other 
auxiliary statements of fact if necessary, be sent to the House of 

* Adams' Works, i., 495. 

f Gibbs' Memories of the Federal Administration, etc., 380. 

X Hamilton to Washington, November 19, 1796 : Hamilton's Works, i., 177. 



128 Appendix. 

Representatives. . . . The crisis is immensely important to 
the glory of the President and the interests of the country." 

Washington said : * " . . . The French Government are dis- 
posed to play a high game. If other proof were wanting, the time 
ana indelicate jnode and style of the present attack on the execu- 
tion exhibited in this labored performance, which is as unjust as it is 
voluminous, would leave no doubt as to the primary object it had in 
view." 

Hamilton wrote to Wolcott : f "I thank you for the note sending 
me Adet's letter. The present is, in my opinion, as critical a situation 
as our Government has been in, requiring all its prudence, all its 
wisdom, all its moderation, all its firmness." 

Washington's letter to Pinckney (January 4, 1797), while the des- 
patch was in progress, exhibits the strongest anxiety that it should be 
unexceptionable and unanswerable, for the reason that " if there be 
the least ground for it, we shall be charged with unfairness and an in- 
tention to impose on or to mislead the public judgment. Hence, and 
from a desire that the statement may be full, fair, calm, and argu- 
mentative, without asperity or anything more irritating than the nar- 
rative of facts which express unbounded charges and assertions does 
itself produce, I have wished that the letter to Mr. Pinckney may be 
reviewed over and over again. Much depends on it as relates to 
ourselves and in the eyes of the world, whatever may be the effect as 
respects the governing power of France." 

Among the charges, which were not only theatrical and untrue, 
but which were presented with an uncommon disregard of diplomatic 
propriety, was one of ingratitude. It complained that while " tender 
tears had trickled from every eye " when the American flag was un- 
furled in the French Senate, the American Government had " for- 
gotten the services France had rendered " and had " thrown aside 
the duty of gratitude, as if ingratitude was a fundamental duty." 

Of the letter of Pickering, Hamilton wrote to Washington \ ap- 
proving the matter but criticising the style : " I have read with at- 
tention Mr. Pickering's letter. It is in the main a substantial and 
satisfactory paper. It will in all probability do considerable good 
in enlightening public opinion at home. It wants, however, that 
management of expression and suavity in mode which a man more 

* Washington to Hamilton, Philadelphia, November 21, 1796. 
f November 22, 1796. 
X January 22, 1797. 



Appendix. I2q 

used to diplomatic communication could have given it and which 
would have been happy if united with other merits." 

Before the letter reached Mr. Pinckney that minister had been 
ordered by the Directory to leave Paris,* and Mr. Pinckney wrote 
to the Secretary from the Hague, June 28, 1797: " Your letter to 
me of January i6th has been read not only by the members of the 
Legislature in France, but also by most of the officers of the Gov- 
ernment. M. Segur, who writes sometimes in our favor wishes the 
case of gratitude had been treated more moderately ; but it was ab- 
solutely necessary to answer the continual charges of ingratitude and 
perfidy, nor do I conceive it could have been done with greater 
mildness. To the thousand copies I directed originally to be dis- 
tributed I have added five hundred more, as many of our consuls in 
the ports of France are writing for them, saying they have had a 
wonderful effect upon the minds of many persons both in and out of 
office who neither knew the facts nor were aware of the arguments 
used." f 



WASHINGTON'S REVIEW OF THE FRENCH POL- 
ICY IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

(American State Papers, vol. i., pp. 559, 576.) 

Fourth Congress. No. 118. Second Session. 

Prance. 
k 

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS JANUARY 1 9, 1 797. 

United States, January 19, 1797. 
Gentlemen of the Senate and of the House of Representatives : 

At the opening of the present session of Congress I mentioned 
that some circumstances of an unwelcome nature had lately occurred 
in relation to France ; that our trade had suffered and was suffering 
extensive injuries in the West Indies from the cruisers and agents of 
the French Republic ; and that communications had been received 
from its minister here which indicated danger of a further disturbance 
of our commerce by its authority, and that were, in other respects, 
far from agreeable ; but that I reserved for a special message a more 

* On December 28, 1796 : King to Hamilton, February 6, 1797. 
•)• Trescott's American Diplomatic History, i8o. 

9 



1 30 Appendix. 

particular communication on this interesting subject. This com- 
munication I now make. 

The complaints of the French Minister embraced most of the 
transactions of our Government in relation to France from an early 
period of the present war, which, therefore, it was necessary care- 
fully to review. A collection has been formed of letters and papers 
relating to those transactions, which I now lay before you, with a 
letter to Mr. Pinckney, our minister at Paris, containing an exami- 
nation of the notes of the French Minister and such information as I 
thought might be useful to Mr. Pinckney in any further representa- 
tions he might find necessary to be made to the French Govern- 
ment. The immediate object of his mission was to make to that 
Government such explanations of the principles and conduct of our 
own as by manifesting our good faith might remove all jealousy and 
discontent, and maintain that harmony and good understanding with 
the French Republic which it has been my constant solicitude to 
preserve. A government which required only a knowledge of the 
truth to justify its measures could not but be anxious to have this 
fully and frankly displayed. G. Washington. 



EXTRACTS FROM THE LETTER OF SECRETARY 
PICKERING TO MR. PINCKNEY, MINISTER AT 
PARIS, DATED JANUARY 19, 1797, 

hi Review of a Letter Addressed to Mr. Pickering by M. Adef, the 
French Minister to the United States. 

Will the ministers of the French Republic never cease to re- 
proach us with " ingratitude ? " If, indeed, " France wrought," as well 
as "guaranteed," the independence of the United States, as M. 
Adet asserts, "at a time when she might, at the price of that very 
independence, have granted them less liberal conditions," our obli- 
gations are greater than we have hitherto imagined. But it is time 
that these claims to our gratitude were investigated and their extent 
ascertained. We have citizens yet alive who were actors and wit- 
nesses of the declaration of our independence, and of the efforts to 
maintain it, with their effects, prior to our treaty with France. But 
laying no stress on our own recollection or consciousness, we will 
resort to the testimony of France herself. 

France, by her minister, Marquis de Noailles, having, in the 



Appendix. i^l 

declaration of March 13, 1778, which I have already quoted, an- 
nounced to the Court of London the treaty of friendship and com- 
merce she had formed with the United States, and that to maintain 
the commerce of his subjects with them, which was the object of that 
treaty, his Most Christian Majesty had "taken eventual measures in 
concert with the United States of North America," that Court pub- 
lished a justificative memorial, to vindicate to the world the war she 
had determined to wage against P'rance. In the "Observations" of 
the Court of France on this British memorial we find the following 
declarations on the part of France : "While the ambassador of Eng- 
land put the King's patience to the strongest proofs, and while the 
Court of London was constantly repeating denials of justice to his 
Majesty's subjects, at the same time that the British officers con- 
tinued to desolate them on the sea, an event came to pass in Amer- 
ica which essentially changed the face of things, in that quarter of 
the world. This event was the defeat of the army under General 
Burgoyne. The news of this unexpected disaster, which arrived in 
Europe in November, 1777, astonished the British Ministers, and 
must have more sensibly aff"ected them, as it overthrew the plan they 
had made for the reduction of the colonies." * The " Observations " 
then suggest that this great event induced, in' the British Cabinet, the 
idea of conciliation with America, and of a coalition against the 
Crown of France in revenge for the supposed aid rendered by her 
to the United States, and to gratify "their most dear and constant 
wish — that of humbling France." "It was natural for the British 
Ministry, unable to subdue her colonies, to seek to be reconciled to 
them and to engage them to espouse her resentment. They mio-ht 
so much the more flatter themselves that they should succeed herein, 
as the proceedings of France with regard to American priv^ateers, 
and especially the dislike the King had at all times manifested to 
any engagement with the Congress, must have given disgust and dis- 
satisfaction to their deputies, and induced them, notwithstanding 
their well-known aversion, to seek, even in England, the safety of 
their country when they failed to find it in France." f 

" The King, well informed of the plan of the Court of London, 
and of the preparations which were the consequence of it, perceived 
that no more time was to be lost if he would prevent the designs of 
his enemies. His Majesty determined, therefore, to take into con- 
sideration, at length, the overtures of the Congress." | 

♦Observations, p. 60. f Ibid., p. 64. . ;]: Ibid., p. 66. 



132 Appendix. 

" The Commissioners from the United States proposed to the 
King a treaty of amity and commerce, and an alliance offensive and 
defensive by which his Majesty should engage not only to acknowl- 
edge simply and purely the independence of the United States, but 
also to guarantee and defend it by force of arms. The King or- 
dered an answer to be given that he could indeed look upon the in- 
dependence of the United States as existing, but that it did not be- 
long to him to acknowledge it, because he had not any right to 
judge of it ; neither could he guarantee it, as he did not intend 
to enter into a war for its support. His Majesty, in consequence, 
refused an offensive alHance, and confined himself to the treaty of 
amity and commerce. But as it was more than probable that the 
Court of London had formed the design of attacking France, his 
Majesty thought he ought to enter into an alliance with the United 
States eventual and purely defensive. The stipulations contained in 
this second treaty are, in substance, that if P'rance should be at- 
tacked by the Court of London before the cessation of hostilities be- 
tween that Court and its colonies, then the King and the United 
States should mutually assist each other against the common enemy; 
that the King should guarantee the independence and sovereignty of 
the United States ; and that he should not lay down his arms till it 
should be acknowledged by Great Britain."* 

Thus it is manifest that the United States were to be left still to 
fight their own battles, unless Great Britain should choose to in- 
crease the number of her enemies by attacking France, in which it 
would be as truly the interest of France as of the United States to 
make it a common cause. 

" This last treaty remained secret because it was not in force at 
the time of concluding it ; but that of commerce was notified at the 
Court of London March 13, 1778." f The first words of the notifi- 
cation are these : " The United States of North America, who are in 
full possession of independence," etc. The whole paragraph has 
been already quoted. The notification further expressed that 
" the King being determined to protect effectually the lawful com- 
merce of his subjects and to maintain the dignity of his flag, his 
Majesty has in consequence taken eventual measures in concert 
with the United States of North America." The Court of London 
chose to consider this notification as a declaration of war, of which 
they accuse the King as being the author, and represent him as the 
* Observations, p. 67. f Ibid., p. 82. 



Appendix. . 133 

violator of laws divine and human, etc., etc. "The act, however, 
which has drawn upon the King such odious imputations has for its 
foundation two incontestable truths : The first, that at the period 
of February 6, 1778, the Americans had the public possession of 
their independence ; the second, that the King had the right to look 
upon this independence as existing without being obliged to exam- 
ine the legality of it, and that no law forbade him to form connec- 
tions with the Americans." 

The " Observations," then reciting that the fruitless attempts of 
the colonies to obtain redress from their mother country in the mode 
of supplication had induced them to league together to maintain their 
privileges sword in hand, and soon after to publish the solemn act 
whereby they declared themselves independent, say: "This act, 
which is of July 4, 1776, induced the Court of London to give 
way to her resentment. She displayed her power to chastise the 
Americans and to reduce them by conquest. But what has been 
the fruit of these efforts ? Have they not served to demonstrate to 
America, to all Europe, and to the Court of London herself, her im- 
potence and the impossibility of her ever hereafter bringing the 
Americans again under her yoke ?" * That she had given this dem- 
onstration to America is evident by the manner in which Congress 
received the conciliatory bills, hastily sent from the Court of London 
to America and communicated by Lord and General Howe. Con- 
gress were then uninformed of the treaties which their Commissioners 
had lately concluded at Paris. Yet, confident in the strength and 
spirit of their country, and of the inability of Britain to subdue it, 
they resolved, unanimously,! to reject these overtures for peace and 
conciliation and to hold no conference or treaty with any Commis- 
sioners on the part of Great Britain unless as a preliminary they 
withdrew their fleets and armies or in positive terms acknowledged 
the independence of these States. 

Again: "It is sufficient for the justification of his Majesty that 
the colonies, which form a nation considerable as well for the num- 
ber of their inhabitants as for the extent of their dominion, have 
established their independence, not only by a solemn declaration but 
also in fact, and that they have supported it against the efforts of 
their mother country. Such was in effect the situation of the 
United States when the King began to negotiate with them. His 
Majesty had full liberty of considering them as independent or as 

* Observations, p. 73. t Journals of Congress, April 52, 1778. 



1 34 Appendix. 

the subjects of Britain. He chose the first part because his safety, 
the interest of his people, invariable policy, and above all the secret 
projects of the Court of London imperiously laid him under the ne- 
cessity." * 

The secret projects here referred to were those of reconciliation 
on terms which might satisfy the United States and produce a re- 
union and coalition for the purpose of falling upon France. To 
avoid the risk of this combined attack, to avoid greater danger in 
future by preventing the possibility of uniting again the great por- 
tions of the British Empire, separated in fact, and thus essentially to 
diminish its power, were the avowed inducements with the Court 
of France to consider the United States as independent. Having 
stated these things, they ask " if there is a sovereign who, in the 
same situation with his Majesty, would not have imitated his 
/ example ? " f 

Again : *' He [the King of France] had the right to con- 
sider as independent the confederate inhabitants of an immense con- 
tinent who presented themselves to him with this character ; es- 
pecially after their ancient sovereign had demonstrated, by efforts as 
continual as painful, the impossibility of bringing them back to 
obedience." \ 

" To complete the justification of his Majesty, nothing remains 
but to examine whether what are called reasons of state could have 
determined his Majesty to connect himself with the Americans. To 
treat this question with all the clearness of which it is susceptible, 
the political interests of France must be viewed under two different 
relations : the first respects the other powers of Europe ; the second 
respects Great Britain." § 

" In treating with the Americans after they became independent, 
the King exercised the right inherent in his sovereignty, with no 
other view than to put an end to the predominant power which 
. England abused in every quarter of the globe." The " Observations " 
then suggest that by this conduct the King has essentially watched 
over the interest of all the sovereigns of Europe, " by contributing 
to restrain a power which has always carried to excess the abuse of 
her resources." | 

The Court of London having charged the King of France with 
ambition and the project of demolishing the power of England by 

* Observations, p. 77. f Ibid., p. 78. % Ibid., p. 82. 

§ Ibid., p. 88. II Ibid., p. 89. 



Appendix. 1 3 5 

his engagements with the Americans, the "Observations" declare that 
*' nothing more will be discovered in them [his engagements with 
the United States], on the most accurate scrutiny, than a diminution 
of this power — a diminution which England has herself provoked by 
a conduct the most unjust and most irregular, and which the tran- 
quillity and happiness of Europe have for a long time required." * 

"The most vigilant and consummate prudence could not devise 
adequate precautions against the enterprises of such a power ; so 
that the only means of being secured^from it was to seize the op- 
portunity of diminishing it." f 

" It may then be truly said that on examination of the conduct 
of the King it was not only just and lawful, but even necessary, as 
well for the individual interest of France as for that of all Europe." J 
I will trouble you with but one more extract from the justifica- 
tory" Observations " of the Court of France. " To deceive the other 
nations with regard to the real motives which have directed the con- 
duct of the King, the British Ministry maintain that he entered into 
treaty with the Americans not because he feared the secret views 
of Great Britain, but because he foresaw that the Americans, de- 
feated, discouraged, without support, and without resources, were 
about to return to their mother country, and that there was not a 
moment to be lost in reanimating and confirming them in their op- 
position. It was, without doubt, for the sake of this assertion that 
the British Ministry have thought it beneath the dignity of their 
sovereign to search for the period at which France formed connec- 
tions with the United States. It might with greater truth be said 
that this research did not coincide with their plan of defence. The 
King is willing to spare the British Ministry a task so disagreeable 
and embarrassing by observing for them that the conversations 
which led to the treaties of February 6, 1778, were considerably 
posterior to the capitulation of General Burgoyne. Now, it is no- 
torious that this event elevated the courage and the hopes of the 
Americans as much as it dejected the British nation, and principally 
the Court of London. If, then, the King has listened to the propo- 
sitions of Congress after this period, so disastrous to the British, it 
has not been, and could not have been, for any other reason but 
because he thought, with the United States, that their independence 
was thenceforward irrevocable." § 

In these extracts from the " Observations " of the Court of France 
* Observations, p. 90. f Ibid., p. 91. % Ibid., p. 92. § Ibid., pp. 95, 96. 






136 Appendix. 

we see an open avowal of her motives for entering into treaties with 
the United States during our Revolution. But do such motives 
afford any strong claims to our gratitude ? She rejoiced at the pros- 
pect of a final separation of the thirteen colonies from Great Britain ; 
she saw them erected, by their solemn Declaration, into independent 
States ; but during near three years of our contest she continued 
waiting for some fortunate event that should insure stability and 
ultimate success to our enterprise. This event took place in the 
capture of a whole British army. Then " the King listened to the 
propositions of Congress because he thought, with the United States, 
that their independence was irrevocable." He then treated with 
the Americans, " with no other view than to put an end to the pre- 
dominant power which England exercised in every quarter of the 
globe." " A diminution of this power [says the King] the tran- 
quillity and happiness of Europe have for a long time required." 
"The only means of being secured from it was to seize the oppor- 
tunity of diminishing it ; " and he did seize it, "because his safety, 
the interest of his people, invariable policy, and, above all, the 
secret projects of the Court of London, imperiously laid him under 
the necessity." 

After these repeated declarations on the part of 'France that her 
only view in contracting engagements with the United States was 
to diminish the British power, and thereby promote the safety and 
interest of her own people and the tranquillity of Europe, very un- 
expected, indeed, are the modern claims of boundless and perpetual 
gratitude. Nevertheless, animated, as we always have been, with 
sincere desires to maintain those useful and friendly connections 
with France which had their foundation in our Revolution, we 
should have remained silent on these claims had not the frequency 
and manner in which they have been urged compelled their discus- 
sion. We are not now disposed to question the importance of the 
aid we actually derived from France in the War of our Revolution, 
nor to retract the grateful acknowledgments that all America has, 
from that time, offered to that nation. We were in the habit of ex- 
pressing our gratitude to her for the benefits which we received, 
although they resulted from her exertions to advance her own inter- 
est and secure her own safety. But if those benefits had been ren- 
dered from pure benevolence, from disinterested good-will to us, 
and we had been remiss in acknowledging them, is it the part of 
generosity, of magnanimity, constantly to upbraid the receivers of 



Appendix, 137 

their favors with ingratitude ? Do not such reproaches cancel the 
obHgation? But if for favors, apparently generous, substantial re- 
turns are demanded, the supposed liberal act degenerates and be- 
comes a mercenary bargain. 

If such only are the motives for our gratitude toward France, at 
the commencement of her political and commercial connections with 
us, in the midst of our war with Great Britain, what more can we 
discover at the conclusion of that war ? Let us examine. 

In 1 781, with the assistance of a French army by land and a 
powerful fleet by sea, a second British army was captured. This 
event made even the British Government despair of bringing the 
United States again under her subjection. The Ministry was changed, 
and the Parliament passed an act to authorize the King to make 
peace. In the summer of 1782 an agent on the part of Great Britain 
repaired to Paris to negotiate with the Commissioners of the United 
States. For some time Doctor Franklin and Mr. Jay were alone 
at Paris. The commission to Mr. Oswald (the British negotiator) 
authorized him to treat of and conclude a peace or truce with any 
Commissioner or Commissioners named or to be named by the colo- 
nies or plantations of New Hampshire, etc. (naming the thirteen), or 
with any of them separately, with parts of them, or with any persons 
whatsoever. Mr. Ja:y was not satisfied with this commission to Mr. 
Oswald ; the independence of the thirteen States was nowhere in- 
timated. Agreeably to their instructions from Congress to take ad- 
vice of the Court of France, the Commissioners communicated Mr. 
Oswald's commission to the Prime Minister, the Count de Vergennes. 
The Count expressed his opinion that the commission was sufficient ; 
that it was such a one as we might have expected it would be ; that 
"an acknowledgment of our independence, instead of preceding, 
must in the natural course of things be the effect of the treaty." 
This opinion the Count continued from time to time to repeat. In 
short, " it was evident the Count did not wish to see our indepen- 
dence acknowledged by Britain until they had made all their uses of 
us." Mr. Jay still continued unmoved. He conferred with Mr. Os- 
wald, and " urged, in the strongest terms, the great impropriety and 
consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating with Great 
Britain on any other than an equal footing ; and told him plainly 
that he (Mr. Jay) would have no concern in any negotiation in which 
we were not considered as an independent people." 

It was on this occasion that Mr. Oswald communicated to Mr. 



138 Appendix. 

Jay this article of his instructions : " In case you find the American 
Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms short of inde- 
pendence, you are to declare to them that you have our authority to 
make that cession ; our ardent wish for peace disposing us to pur- 
chase it at the price of acceding to the complete independence of 
the thirteen colonies." 

The British Ministry approved of this communication, but still 
were for treating with us as colonies and making an acknowledgment 
of our independence only an article of the treaty. Mr. Jay's discern- 
ment discovered the source of the backwardness at this time in the 
British Court to admit our independence previous to the negotiating 
of the treaty, and mentioned it, with his reasons, to Mr. Oswald ; 
who, far from contradicting Mr. Jay's inference, told him a fact 
which confirmed his opinion that it originated in the Court of France 
and was communicated to that of London by the British Commis- 
sioner then in Basis to treat of peace, between France and Great 
Britain. Mr. Jay then explained to Mr. Oswald what he supposed 
to be the natural policy of the French Court, and showed him that 
" it was the interest of Britain to render us as independent on France 
as we we're resolved to be on Britain." Mr. Oswald was convinced. 
Mr. Jay reminded him of the several resolutions of Congress, passed 
at different periods, not to treat with British Commissioners on any 
other footing than that of absolute independence ; and proposed to 
give to him in writing what he had before expressed in conversation 
— his determination not to treat but on the footing of equality. 
Mr. Oswald preferred having it in writing. Mr. Jay prepared the 
draft of a letter, to be signed by him and Doctor Franklin, express- 
ing their determination not to treat but on terms of equality as an 
independent nation, and exhibiting the reasons of this determina- 
tion. Doctor Franklin thought the letter "rather too positive, 
and therefore rather imprudent ; for that in case Britain should 
remain firm, and future circumstances should^ compel us to submit 
to their mode of treating, we should do it with an ill grace after 
such a decided and peremptory refusal. Besides, the Doctor 
seemed much perplexed and fettered by the instructions from Con- 
gress to be guided by the advice of the French Court. Neither 
of these considerations affected Mr. Jay : for as to the first, he could 
not conceive of any event which would render it proper, and there- 
fore possible for America to treat in any other character than as 
an independent nation ; and as to the second, he could not believe 



Appendix. 1 39 

that> Congress intended they should follow any advice which might 
be repugnant to their dignity and interest." 

> Doctor Franklin's doubts prevented this letter being signed. 
Mr. Oswald was disappointed, and desired to see the draft. He saw 
it and requested a copy of it. After taking time for consideration, 
Mr. Jay complied with the request. " For though unsigned, it would 
convey to the British Ministry the sentiments and opinions he wished 
to impress ; and if, finally, they should not be content to treat with 
us as independent, they were not yet ripe for peace or treaty with us. 
Besides, he could not be persuaded that Great Britain, after what the 
House of Commons had declared, after various other acts of that 
Government manifesting the intention to acknowledge it, would 
persist in refusing to admit our independence, provided they really 
believed that we had firmly resolved not to treat on more humble 
terms." 

"With the copy of_this draft Mr. Jay gave Mr. Oswald copies 
of the various resolutions of Congress which evinced their adherence 
to their independence. These papers Mr. Oswald sent by express 
to London, and warmly recommended the issuing a new commis- 
sion, to remove all further delay." 

Mr. Jay having afterward ascertained that the Count de Ver- 
gennes had sent a confidential agent to London — but whose journey 
was intended to have been a secret — for purposes evidently hostile 
to the interests of the United States, determined immediately to 
counteract the project by an agent on whom he could rely, to make 
to the Court of London such representations as he thought the oc- 
casion demanded. He succeeded, and in about two weeks Mr, 
Oswald received a new commission, in the form for which Mr. Jay 
had contended. 

Mr. Jay remarked that agreeably to the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence the United States, as free and independent, had full power to 
levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, etc. ; that by the act 
of confederation the. style of the confederacy was declared to be the 
United States of America, and by that act Congress were vested 
with the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace 
and war, and of entering into treaties and alliances ; that being of 
right and in fact free and independent States, their representatives 
in Congress granted a commission to certain gentlemen, of whom 
Doctor Franklin and he were two, in their name to confer, treat, and 
conclude with ambassadors or commissioners vested with equal 



140 Appendix. 

powers relating to the re-establishing of peace, etc. But the first 
commission to Mr. Oswald was not equivalent ; the United States 
were not named in it, nor their Commissioners, who consequently 
were not the persons with whom Mr. Oswald was authorized to 
treat. And if the Commissioners had consented to treat with Mr, 
Oswald under stfch a commission, what would have been the condi- 
tion of the people of the United States in the interval between the 
commencement of the negotiation and the conclusion of peace ? 
They would have been, not independent citizens, but, by our ac- 
knowledgment, British subjects! Mr. Jay would not consent to 
this degradation after we had maintained our independence six 
years, after we had established it in fact, and after Congress had, by 
firm and repeated resolutions, refused to treat with Great Britain un- 
less as a preliminary she withdrew her fleets and armies, or else in 
positive and express terms acknowledged the independence of the 
United States. At the same time Congress manifested their readi- 
ness to assent to such terms of peace as might consist with the 
honor of independent nations, but the honor of an independent 
nation forbade their treating in a subordinate capacity. Even the 
dignity of France, who four years before treated with us as an in- 
dependent nation, required that we should not degrade ourselves 
when going to treat with her enemy. And why, then, should her 
ministers desire us to do it ? especially when the treaty of defensive 
alliance declared that " the essential and direct end of it was to main- 
tain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute 
and unUmited, of the United States, as well in matters of govern- 
ment as of commerce." There were several reasons. The two 
parties, France and the United States, engaged not to lay down 
their arms until the independence of the United States should be 
attained. The explicit acknowledgment of their independence by 
Great Britain would show that for the essential and direct object of 
the alliance there was no necessity of continuing the war. But since 
making this treaty of alliance with the United States, France had 
formed other connections with whose views we had no concern, and 
for whose sake we were not bound to postpone the offered peace. 
We have seen the explicit avowal of the King of France that he 
entered into a treaty with the United States with a view to promote 
the safety and interest of his kingdom and subjects by diminishing the 
power of England ; but in doing this and eventually facilitating our in- 
dependence of Great Britain, il became apparent that there would be 



Appendix. 141 

no objection to our dependence on France, particularly in " leaving 
the King master of the terms of the treaty of peace," and to keep us 
thus far dependent was manifestly the object of certain measures of 
the French Court calculated to deprive the United States of an 
immense western territory, of the navigation of the Mississippi, 
and of the fisheries except on our own coast. 

A combination of facts and circumstances leave no doubt of the 
intentions of the French Court as to the objects above mentioned. 
I cannot undertake the lengthy detail, and will only just mention, in 
regard to territory, what was proposed and urged by . one whose 
official station rendered it impossible to believe that he was express- 
ing only his own sentiments, or that he was not acting by the direction 
of the French Court. He proposed what he called a conciliatory 
line between the United States and Spain. This was to begin at 
the division of East and West Florida, and run thence to Fort 
Toulouse on the River Alabama, thence by different courses to the 
Cumberland River and down the Cumberland to the Ohio. It was 
insisted that the United States could have no pretensions westward 
of this line ; that "as to the course and navigation of the Missis- 
sippi, they followed the property, and would belong, therefore, to the 
nation to which the two banks belonged. The United States could 
have no pretensions, not being masters of either border of the river ;" 
and that " as to what respects the lands situated to the northward 
of the Ohio, there was reason to presume that Spain could form no 
pretensions thereto. Their fate must be regulated with the Court 
of London." It is certain that, originally, Spain made no preten- 
sions to any lands eastward of the Mississippi to the northward of 
the Floridas ; and it is clear that the idea of her finally making the 
claim was suggested by the Court of France. 

We are now prepared to understand the declarations made in 
the instructions to citizen Genet, Minister Plenipotentiary from 
the French Republic to the United States. These instructions are 
dated January 4, 1793, and were published in December of that 
year, in Philadelphia, by M. Genet, in vindication of his extraordi- 
nary measures which had induced our Government to desire his recall. 
In these instructions we find the following passages : " The Execu- 
tive Council has called for the instructions given to citizen Genet's 
predecessors in America, and has seen in them, with indignation, that 
at the very time the good people of America expressed Jtheir grati- 
tude to us in the most feeling manner, and gave us every proof of 



142 Appendix. 

their friendship, Vergennes and Montmorin thought that it was right 
for France to hinder the United States of taking that political sta- 
bility of which they were capable, because they would soon acquire 
a strength which it was probable they would be eager to abuse." 
" The same Machiavelian principle influenced the operations of the 
war for independence ; the same duplicity reigned over the negotia- 
tions for peace." 

We see, then, that in forming connection with us in 1778, the 
Court of France, the actual organ of the nation, had no regard to 
the interest of the United States, but that their real object was, by 
seizing the occasion of dismembering the British Empire, to diminish 
the power of a formidable rival, and that when, after we had carried 
on a distressing war for seven years, the great object for which we 
had contended — independence — was within our reach, that Court 
endeavored to postpone the acknowledgment of it by Great Britain, 
and eventually to deprive us of its fairest fruits — a just extent of 
territory, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the fishery. 

Such being the motives and conduct of France, what inspired 
our truly grateful sentiments toward that nation ? The ardent affec- 
tion, the sincere friendship of Americans for Frenchmen ? We 
were engaged in a common cause against Great Britain. We re- 
ceived loans of money, we were aided by troops and ships in attack- 
ing and conquering the common enemy in the bosom of our country ; 
and this association in war produced acquaintances and personal 
friendships. And experiencing these benefits we gave way to our 
feelings without inquiring into the motives from which they were 
rendered. 

But why are we so often reminded of the debt of gratitude ? Is 
it really because more than gratitude — because compensation is ex- 
pected to cancel it? If compensation is the object, the treaty of 
alliance has absolved the claim. 

" The contracting parties declare that, being resolved to fulfil 
each on its own part the clauses and conditions of the present treaty 
of alliance, according to its own power and circumstances, there 
shall be no after-claim of compensation on one side or the other, 
whatever may be the event of the war." 

I am here naturally led to notice M. Adet's charge, already 
mentioned, that we have not offered to France the succors which 
friendship might have given without compromising the Govern- 
ment. 



Appetidix. 143 

If M. Adet had specified the kind of succors which might thus 
have been offered, we could better judge the correctness of his as- 
sertion. 

But is it true that we have rendered no succors to France? 
■ Read the following passages in the Secretary of State's letter of 
August 16, 1793, to Mr. Morris: "We recollect with satisfaction 
that in the course of two years, by unceasing exertions, we paid up 
seven years' arrearages and instalments of our debt to France, which 
the inefficacy of our first form of government had suffered to be ac- 
cumulating; that pressing on still to the entire fulfilment of our en- 
gagement, we have facilitated to M. Genet the effect of the instal- 
ments of the present year, to enable him to send relief to his 
fellow-citizens in France threatened with famine ; that in the first 
moment of the insurrection which threatened the colony of St. 
Domingo we stepped forward to their relief with arms and money, 
taking freely on ourselves the risk of an unauthorized aid Avhen 
delay would have been denial ; that we have given the exclusive 
admission to sell here the prizes made by France on her enemies 
in the present war, though unstipulated in our treaties and unfounded 
in her own practice or in that of other nations, as we believe." 

To this detail I have to add that of all tiie loans and supplies 
received from France in the American war, amounting to nearly 
fifty-three millions of livres, the United States, under their late Gov- 
ernment, had been enabled to pay not two millions and a half of 
livres ; that the present Government, after paying up the arrearages 
and instalments mentioned by Mr. Jefferson, has been continually 
anticipating the subsequent instalments, until, in the year 1795, the 
whole of our debt to France was discharged by anticipating the pay- 
ments of eleven millions and a half of livres, no part of which 
would have become due until September 2, 1796, and then only one 
million and a half; the residue at subsequent periods, the last not 
until the year 1802. 



APPENDIX C. 



EXTRACTS (TRANSLATED) FROM CONFIDENTIAL 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS IN THE 
FRENCH ARCHIVES.* 

The Count de Vergennes to Count de Montmorin. 
r (De Circourt, iii., 310.) 

Versailles, October 30, 1778. 

We demand independence only for the thirteen States of Amer- 
ica which have formed a Union, without comprising among them 
any of the other English possessions which have taken no part in 
the insurrection. 

We do not wish — far from it — that the new Republic should re- 
main the only mistress* of all that immense continent. As it would 
in that case be self-sufficient, the other nations would soon have to 
yield to it, because being able to do without them it would most 
certainly impose on them very hard laws. 

The predominating spirit of this Republic is, to my thinking, a 
mercantile one. It is best so, for that will make it the less danger- 
ous to its neighbors. 

According to M. Gerard's reports, a long time, ages even, will 
be needed before this new Republic can attain such a compactness 
as may enable it to play a part in the affairs of the outer world. 
Nevertheless, it is important that the English should remain masters 
of Canada and Nova Scotia ; they will keep alive the jealousy of 
this nation, which might otherwise turn somewhere else, and will 
make it feel the need of sureties, allies, and protectors. 

* The original documents, in French (pages 15 and 16), from which these ex- 
tracts are translated were copied for Mr. Bancroft from the French archives 
at Paris, and given by Mr. Bancroft to the Count Adolphe de Circourt, by whom 
they were published in the third volume of his work, entitled " Histoire de 
I'action commune de La France et de L'Amerique pour L'Independance des 
Etats Unis," etc. Paris; F. Vieweg, Rue Richelieu, 67. 1876. 



Appendix. 145 

(Page 311.) 

Versailles, November 2, 1778. 
. But you may assure him [the minister of the King of 
Spain] that it is not on our part he will meet with difficulties with 
regard to the preservation and guaranteeing of Canada and Nova 
Scotia to England. 

If these two vast provinces remain in England's power, and 
Spain gets back the part of Western Florida which suits her, a 
restraint will be put on the Americans greater than is needful to 
prevent them from becoming enterprising and troublesome neigh- 
bors. . . . 

I begin not to have so high an opinion of their firmness, because 
that which I had of their talents, views, and patriotism is weakened 
as I become better informed. 

(Page 314.) 

Versailles, November 27, 1778. 

. . . It is very strange that people persist in looking on the 
Americans as more dangerous neighbors than the English. .' . 

Their Republic, unless they correct its failings — a thing which ap- 
pears to me very difficult on account of the diversity and even con- 
tradictoriness of the interests concerned — will never be anything but 
a feeble body, capable of very little exertion. 

Had the English displayed more activity, this seeming Colossus 
would now be more submissive than it has ever been before. 

Heaven grant such may not be the end still ! I confess I have 
but little confidence in the energy of the United States. 

(Page 319.) 

Versailles, January 22, 1781. 
. We never lose sight of the fact that Spain will strive to set 
her own interests before everything else ; that she will want to make 
all the other conditions of peace subordinate to them ; and that she 
will the less give any attention to those of the Americans, that she 
sees their independence with deep reluctance (" avec douleur "). 

(Page 320.) 

Versailles, April 12, 1781. 
I have long had the conviction that Count de Florida Blanca 
entertains erroneous principles with regard to America, that he is 
secretly hostile to the independence of the United States, and that 
10 



146 Appendix. 

he will thwart us as much as will be in his power when this matter 
will have to be treated of with Great Britain. . . 

. I will confide to you, sir, that the King, moved by the 
extreme distress of the Americans, has just granted the Congress a 
gift of six millions, and has consented to the surety for a loan of ten 
millions which is to be raised on their behalf in Holland. 

I leave it to your discretion whether you will or will not tell 
M. de Florida Blanca of this resolve. It might perhaps have the 
effect of making him less parsimonious in his dealings with Mr. Jay. 

If you speak of it to him, pray make him feel that if we carry on 
the war for the Americans we do so for the common cause ; that 
consequently it is for the interest of both crowns to enable them to 
carry it on effectually. But I am much afraid you will preach in the 
desert. 



Extract from a Despatch of M. Gerard to Count 
DE Vergennes. 

(Page 260.) 

Philadelphia, December 22, 1778. 
. A few days ago I gave a dinner to the President * for his 
inauguration. After the dinner he outstayed the other guests, with 
several members of Congress and M. de Mirales.f , . 

I have abstained from speaking about the exclusive ac- 
quisition of the Mississippi along its entire course, on which subject 
I have reported already, for this matter must be handled with secrecy 
and dexterity. The considerations on which I have also reported, as 
well as the extreme need in which the Congress stands of assistance 
to pay its debts, will operate powerfully on that body, more particu- 
larly on the States north of Virginia, which will be very glad to prevent 
undertakings of which they would share only the burdens ; but should 
the project come to light prematurely, the owners of the Illinois lands 
and of two immense settlements projected and begun on the Ohio 
would spare nothing to put obstacles in its way, and they would have 
many means of forming a powerful party. 

. . . In all my talks with the President I have found him a 

* Mr. Jay, President /r(7 tempore of the Congress, elected December 10, 1778 ; 
lappointed to Spain September 27, 1779 ; sailed October 20, 1779. 
\ Confidential agent of Spain. 



Appendix. 147 

man . of enlightened mind, exempt from prejudice of any sort, and 
capable of lofty views. He shows himself sincerely attached to the 
alliance and hostile to England. 

He delights in the idea that this triumvirate, as he calls it, be- 
tween France, Spain, and America will defy the forces of the entire 
world. He discusses things openly and honestly, and willingly yields 
to sound argument. I am much mistaken, or we shall have occa- 
sion to regret it should his Presidency prove as short-lived as it ap- 
pears likely to be. ... 



Extract from a Despatch of M. Gerard to Count 
DE Vergennes. 

(Page 264.) 

Philadelphia, January 28, 1779. 

. . . With regard to this object, Monseigneur, I must tell 
you that my insinuations concerning Florida and the Mississippi 
have produced much impression. 

. . . The greater number inclines favorably toward my in- 
sinuations, a few wished to find a middle course, and others think the 
preservation of the right of navigation of the Mississippi absolutely 
indispensable. The two latter classes take their standing on the in- 
terests of the population settled on the Ohio, toward the Illinois 
River, in the lands of the Natchez, in Eastern Florida. They say 
they cannot abandon their countrymen, who have formed themselves 
into a national body and ask to be admitted into the American Con- 
federacy. I replied that in a matter of such paramount importance 
they should not be stopped by personal considerations and mere 
questions of propriety before having examined whether it was for the 
general interests of the Republic. 



Extract from the Count de Vergennes to M. de 
LA Luzerne, who succeeded M. Gerard as Min- 
ister to the United States. 

(Page 266.) 

Versailles, July 18, 1779. 
. . . It is nevertheless possible that- the Congress should not 
have roused itself from its habitual torpor and should have made no 
offensive disposition for this campaign. The King charges you in 



148 Appendix. 

this case to lay before that assembly the great evils which must 
result from such conduct. . . . 

, Spain having now become associated in our war and 
defending — at least indirectly — the American cause, although she has 
not entered into any explanations on the subject nor taken any en- 
gagement toward the United States, the King thinks it will be for 
the interest of the Congress, as well as a matter of duty, to regulate 
at once, in a manner satisfactory to that power, the various points 
which concern it. I know of three such : 

The first regards the boundaries of the United States toward the 
West ; the second relates to the navigation of the Mississippi ; the 
third to the two Floridas. 

With regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, it is 
pretty nearly proved that the Americans have no claim to it, since 
at the moment when the Revolution broke out the limits of the thir- 
teen States did not reach to the river, and it would be absurd for 
them to claim the rights of England — i.e., of a power whose rule 
they have abjured. 

It behooves the Congress, therefore, to be categorically explicit 
on this point, and to declare that the United States put forward no 
pretensions on that score — i.e., regarding the Mississippi — and will 
be content to request the gracious countenance of the King of 
Spain as far as his interest will permit him to grant to them. This 
matter has already been treated by M. de Rayneval, and I judge 
from his reports that the Congress was not far from adopting our 
views. 

. . . As to the Floridas, they do not belong by any title to 
the United States. 

Such, sir, is our view of the three points which concern 
the Court of Madrid. That Court, I know, shares it. . . , 

. . . You will, perhaps, be spoken to about a peace subsidy. 
Such assistance would assuredly help the Congress to free itself from 
embarrassment, and an excellent impression might be produced by 
giving even now a promise to that effect. But it is impossible the 
King should take such an engagement, because not only are his ex- 
penses excessive, but he cannot foretell the end of them, nor, conse- 
quently, the extent of the debts which the war will have forced him 
to incur. Perhaps, however, it would be imprudent to take all hope 
from the Americans, nor is it his Majesty's intention to do so. The 



Appejidix. 149 

King thinks, on the contrary, that should you be sounded on the 
subject you might, as though speaking for yourself only, give them 
a glimpse of hope that he may grant them some succor should the 
condition of his own affairs allow him to follow the impulse of his 
affection toward the United States. You will feel yourself that this 
disposition of the King's must be presented with as much circumspec- 
tion as dexterity, in order that the Americans may not take it for a 
formal engagement nor complain should it not be carried into ef- 
fect. . . . 

. . . I do not need to tell you, sir, that this matter [the truce 
proposed by Spain] should be presented with all possible caution, so 
that it may not be supposed to enter at present our views or our 
plans for pacification. 



Count de Vergennes to M. de la Luzerne. 

(Page 275.) 

Versailles, September 25, 1779. 

. . . According to M. Gerard's report, no member of that 
assembly has dared openly to opine in favor of a continuation of the 
war ; but the party which has formed itself under the leadership of 
Messrs. Lee and Adams seeks to prolong it in an indirect way, by 
raising difficulties regarding the conditions of peace. This party has 
principally laid hold of two items, the fisheries and the territories 
situated along the banks of the Mississippi. It pretends, first, that 
the right of fishing belongs to the Eastern States ; that England 
must recognize and France guarantee it. Second, that the land 
lying toward the Mississippi belongs to the United States, and that 
their right to free navigation along that river cannot be contested.* 

As it is important to elucidate these two points and to rectify the 
ideas of a great number of delegates concerning them. I shall not 
lose an instant, sir, in transmitting to you the King's view of the sub- 
ject and that of his Council. 

. . . There can, therefore, be no question of disputing the 
Americans' right of fishing out in the open sea, and it would be idle 
to discuss this position. 

* Previous to the peace of 1763 France considered herself the sovereign of the 
entire Mississippi basin. She adjudged to Canada the north of that immense re- 
gion to the Ohio and the south to Louisiana. 



I50 Appendix. 

No so the fishing along the coast ; it belongs by right to the 
owner ot that coast, and he is at liberty to exclude from it whomso- 
ever he thinks fit. It results from this that the fishing along the 
coast of Newfoundland, New Scotland and its dependencies, Canada, 
etc., belongs exclusively to the English ; that the Americans have 
absolutely no claim thereto, and that, if we do enjoy it in certain 
places, it is not in virtue of a common right, but of treaties which 
have expressly reserved us the privilege. 

It is essential to remark that the fisheries belong and 
have always belonged to the Crown of Great Britain, and that it was 
as subjects of that Crown the Americans enjoyed it. Consequently, 
from the moment when they shook off the English yoke and declared 
themselves independent, they broke the community which existed 
between them and the metropolis and voluntarily relinquished all the 
advantages which they derived from that community, just as they 
despoiled England of all the advantages she derived from their union 
with her. 

It should, therefore, be well established that from the moment 
when the colonies published their Declaration of Independence, they 
have ceased to own a share in the fisheries because they have for- 
feited by their own act the qualification which entitled them to such 
a share ; that consequently they can oppose to the Court of London 
neither title nor actual possession. From this truth another results, 
viz.: that the Americans having no right to the fishing, we can give 
them no guarantee on that head. . . . 

, . . From all that I have just said result the following posi- 
tions : 

1. That the King's guarantee actually bears only on the indepen- 
dence of the United States. 

2. That this guarantee only eventually bears on their possessions, 
whatever these may be. 

3. That the United States have no actual right to the fisheries. 

4. That the King has not contracted, either explicitly or impli- 
citly, the obligation of letting them have a share in the same. 

5. That they can claim such share only in so far as they may 
secure it by force of arms and by the future truce or treaty of peace. 

The second point on which the enemies of peace have striven to 
hamiJer the deliberations of the Congress is the land that lies toward 
the Mississippi, and which we have ceded to the English by our last 
treaty of peace. ... 



Appendix. 1 5 1 

Referring to the project of a truce which had been proposed by 
Spain in the supposition that by this means further bloodshed might 
be avoided, M. de Vergennes said : " . . . However improbable 
it may appear, it would be infinitely better, both for America and 
ourselves, to sign a truce rather than continue a ruinous war with 
uncertain success. The history of several European Republics will 
supply you with ample means for convincing unprejudiced Ameri- 
cans that by virtually \de fait] maintaining their independence, it 
will in reality be as firmly established as though England had recog- 
nized it by a formal and definite treaty, thanks to the guarantees by 
which it would be supported." * 

It will probably be objected to you, sir, that by procuring only 
a truce for America France would not fulfil the obligations imposed 
on it by the alliance. But in order to destroy this objection, it will 
doubtless be sufficient for you to recall the very terms of the treaty 
to which I have referred in the beginning of the present despatch. 
By Article II. the King binds himself to guarantee the indepen- 
dence of the United States. In what way is not expressed. 

It is not said that the independence must be recognized by Eng- 
land. All that the King is bound to do is to insure it formally or 
tacitly by the treaty which will put an end to the war, and to guaran- 
tee the United States against all harm. This latter point is foreseen 
by the treaty itself, and is the object of the war which his Majesty is 
carrying on against England ; the other will be achieved by a truce 
supported by such measures as may insure and perpetuate its effects, 
and such a truce would fully come up to the obligation expressed in 
Article VIII. of the treaty of alliance. . 

. . . If provoked to speak, you will abstain from official dec- 
larations. You will present your view as personal to yourself, lest, 
should you speak in the King's name, they might suspect us of an 
intention to stop at a truce, whence would result new debates and 
distrust, which it the more behooves us to avoid as the King's pro- 
ject, as well as that of the King of Spain, is to end the war only by 
a definite treaty. . . 

. . . His Majesty further empowers you to continue the dona- 

* M. de Vergennes here alludes to the truce concluded in 1609 between the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Archdukes who ruled Belgium. This 
truce, which recognized the provinces' independence de facto, preceded by thirty- 
nine years the recognition de jure by the Crown of Spain. — Editor's note in Cir- 
court's third volume. 



152 Appendix, 

tions which M. Gerard has given or promised to various American 
authors, and of which he will surely have handed you a list.* 

It appears that, when the Americans will be their own masters, 
the general confederacy will have much difficulty in maintaining 
itself, and that it may very possibly be superseded by separate con- 
federacies. If such a revolution really takes place it will weaken the 
United States, which has not nor ever will have anything like real 
respectable strength except by their union. But it is entirely their 
own business to consider these things ; we have neither the right 
nor any interest to draw their attention thereunto. I say " no in- 
terest," because it is no profit to us to see Northern America play 
the part of a power and be able to cause uneasiness to her neigh- 
bors. All that we wish with regard to the United States is that they 
may be independent and peaceable ; this latter point might become 
doubtful, sooner or later, should their political condition ever allow 
them to become ambitious. . . . 

. . . The possibility of a dissolution of the general confed- 
eracy, and consequently of the suppression of the Congress, makes us 
think that nothing could be more in conformity to our political in- 
terest than that each State should ratify the treaties concluded with 
France by a separate act, because in this manner each State will 
be bound to us separately, whatever may be the fate of the general 
confederacy. So you will please, sir, to hold the Americans to this 
system by your insinuations and induce them to carry it out. 

Post-scriptum. — I enclose the King's answer to the letter in 
which the Congress has asked his Majesty for his own portrait and 
that of the Queen. 



Extracts from an Undated Memoir, written be- 
tween May 30 AND June 15, 1782.1 

(Pages 30-34. ) 

It appears we are to witness the rise out of the midst of Europe 
of a new power which is to become in America a State similar to 
those which gave it birth. The united colonies do not possess any 
of those metals, those precious wares and products which give such 

* Temporary pecuniary assistance. This delicate subject has been even in our 
time the subject of criticism and controversies into which we need not enter. — 
Editor's note, Circourt, iii. 

f See Mr. Bancroft's views on the origin of this memoir, note pp. 91-92, ante. 



Appendix. 153 

advantages to the other American colonies. It is not through gold 
or silver mines, nor through those products which the Old World can 
yield that the new power will become noteworthy. By these pro- 
ducts it is placed on a level with Europe. It is to the cultivation of 
land, to the industry of the inhabitants, to the vigor of its commerce 
it will owe its wealth. 

The die is cast ; England must regard the new power as her 
.equal — nay, as her rival, independent de facto ; the future treaty of 
peace will make it independent de jure — such is the will of France. 
Such was of necessity the will of France, for that was the most fatal 
blow she could inflict on her ambitious and troublesome rival. But 
has France foreseen the extent of the power which the United States 
may eventually acquire ? This question, though doubtless present 
to Count de Vergennes' mind, is not what must occupy it just now. 
What at the present moment appears of greatest importance is to 
regulate the territorial extent which must be given to this power on 
the vast continent of North America, and what its boundaries shall 
be. Nature seems to have drawn them to the north and south by 
the chain of the Appalachian Mountains* and the sea. It remains 
to determine what they shall be to the east and west. The ques- 
tion is a very important one, and in order to prove this we will take 
the liberty of giving our ideas some development. 

The interest of Europe in general and of the entire world de- 
mands that the power of the insurgents should have well-known and 
clearly defined boundaries. It would be too dangerous to leave to 
this power, at the moment of its birth, a domain of undetermined ex- 
tent in a new land, very thinly peopled as yet, but which can become 
- populous in a very short time. This would amount to enabling its 
leaders not only to produce the greatest revolutions in that part of 
the globe, but to extend these revolutions beyond their continent. It 
may be looked on as certain that the new States' population will in- 
crease quickly and considerably. The discontent which actually 
prevails among the English nation, its migratory spirit, the hope of 
finding more assured liberties in a new State, amidst people whom a 
desire to enlarge their trade has urged to such great efforts, the cer- 
tainty of peaceably enjoying there the fruits of labor and industry — 
all these things will decide numbers of English families to leave their 
homes and settle amidst the insurgents, and this new wound will not 
be the least felt or least prejudicial to England. The rest of Europe 
* So the French writers of that day called the Alleghanies. 



1 54 Appendix. 

should also guard against emigration. Before the beginning of the 
present war people hardly knew the excellence of the soil of North 
America ; but now everybody is informed of it. 

Each power, therefore, should take precautionary measures against 
emigration. In order as much as possible to forestall this evil, it 
behooves not to leave too much land to the American colonies, so 
as not to give them the means of receiving too many new subjects. 
To neglect this important point were a capital mistake, on which 
repentance would promptly follow. 

Moreover, should the insurgents be suffered to spread too far 
eastward, they would soon be enabled to seize on all the fisheries 
along the American shore. Should they be allowed to push too far 
to the north and settle the excellent land which lies between the 
Appalaches, the lakes, and the St. Lawrence River, they would soon 
become sole masters of the fur trade in America. If they carried 
their settlements into the West, along the Ohio and the Mississippi, 
it would be easy for them to advance into New Mexico and the land 
of the new silver mines, and occupy them before the Spaniards could 
come in force to oppose them. 

It is of paramount importance, therefore, at the moment when 
the new power is to be framed and consolidated, to enclose it within 
such boundaries as must, at least for a long time, restrain any am- 
bitious projects, and the following are the means which we think best 
calculated to achieve this purpose : In the first place, to surround 
the possessions of the insurgents with nations capable of mutually 
supporting each other against their enterprises, and whose power 
should be sufficiently great to oppose all projects endangering the 
tranquiUity of this part of the world. 

Further, it appears indispensable that England should sacrifice 
the feeble colony of Georgia, and that the western boundaries of the 
united colonies should be drawn in that country, so that there the 
Spanish territory should end. 

It is clear from this that we take for granted the entire cession 
of Florida to the Spaniards. This sacrifice will be shown to be in- 
dispensable. To insure the solidity of the future peace, we think 
the entire removal of the English from this part of the continent 
absolutely necessary. The ambitious views which they have mani- 
fested in wishing to have the Mississippi River for their boundary, 
the extension which they have tried to give to their commerce in 
this part of the world, the communications which they have estab- 



Appendix. 155 

lished with New Mexico — all these symptoms are a leaven of dis- 
cord which should be removed. The chief object of the future 
treaty of peace must be to insure to every one tranquillity in their 
domains and entire liberty of commerce. Spain must not be able 
to invade or disturb England in either ; but there must be complete 
reciprocity. Only by removing the occasions of so doing will this 
object be achieved. 



Examination of the Motives and Conditions of the 
Treaty of Peace to be made with the Insur- 
gents, WITH the English, and with our Allies. 

(Fragment, June or July, 1782.) 
(Pages 34-38.) 

The treaty of peace which will recognize their independence 
must, first of all, hold them to their original limits, so that the new 
Republic may never be able to extend beyond them, neither by con- 
quest nor by associations between the American colonies. 

The boundaries of their continent must be detailed and circum- 
scribed with the greatest exactness, and all the belligerent powers 
must bind themselves to prevent any transgression of them. It is 
as much in the interest of England as in that of Spain, France, and 
Holland to stop them by force at the first infraction of the limits and 
the first attempt toward extending beyond them. 

The example of England, who has made herself ruler of the seas 
and of the vast commerce of America, notwithstanding the distance 
and smallness of the metropolis, as compared to those European 
nations who hold the strongest interest in the colonies, is a warning 
which makes the greatest caution incumbent on all concerned, in 
order not to exchange one bondage for another and not to become 
dependent on these new-comers, whom their numbers may raise to 
the first rank in America. 

The support given to insurgents against their masters is an exam- 
ple which must strongly impress the nations of those countries who 
think themselves ill-used by their sovereign. None but well-in- 
formed persons know that France has assisted the insurgents only 
long after they had taken up arms. France really sent over help 
only after the battle of Belle-Poule. 

It may be said with some probability that a long time must 
elapse before the new republicans are in a condition to give laws to 



156 Appendix. 

America, or even to play there a conspicuous part, all the more that 
they have a very scanty population, very little cultivated land, very 
little trade, little clothing, no money and many debts, and it will 
always be time enough to act against them and take measures ac- 
cording to circumstances. 

It is true that time is needed to make a conquering or even an 
enterprising people ; indeed, that it is more difficult to Implant the 
spirit of conquest into a republic than into the head of a govern- 
ment entrusted to one person. This fear, in fact, seems to be un- 
founded, as proven by every precedent in ancient or modern history, 
or at least to be removed to a far-distant future. Still, and notwith- 
standing these considerations arising from the common course of 
events in Europe, it appears to me that precautions should be taken 
at once with regard to North America. 

America is to Europe as another world, quite as much as India, 
Persia, or any other nation of the remaining three parts of the world. 
. . . If we consider that a handful of insurgents have, for sev- 
eral years and unaided, stood their ground against the forces of Eng- 
land, who, notwithstanding her immense wealth and the great number 
of tro'ops she sent over to North America, could not bring this 
handful of men to terms, although they had neither experience in the 
craft qf war, nor money, nor protectors, and that England has been 
unable to induce them even to accept an amicable compromise, we 
may judge how difficult they will be to manage if they are allowed 
to extend their boundaries, especially if they increase the popula- 
tion, if they cultivate the land, and have a commerce in proportion 
to the area they cover. We have to do here emphatically with the 
welfare of the State, which is the supreme law of a government, and 
nothing should be forgotten, even at this early stage, to forestall the 
consequences of the new country's independence. 

All these considerations lead me to the conclusion that it is most 
essential to guard against the steps which the insurgents may take in 
America, at any future time, with a view either to extend their own 
dominion or to assist other nations in that part of the world who 
might wish to follow the example given by Americans of the united 
provinces and shake off the yoke of the Europeans, and who, blinded 
by the prosperity of the united provinces, might fancy themselves pos- 
sessed of sufficient strength to acknowledge their masters no longer. 
The only question, then, is by what means to guard against this dan- 
ger. As England, Spain, and Holland are interested in the matter 



Appendix. 157 

equally with France, the necessity of taking pecautionary measures 
must be declared by the minister of one of those powers. The mat- 
ter is considered all the more easy as it is doubted whether Spain 
will acknowledge the independence of the insurgents, on account 
of the bad example to the Peruvians, the Mexicans, and the other 
inhabitants of her different colonies. 

It is believed that the insurgents, before they broke with the 
mother country, got the profits of the greatest part of the free fishing 
\J)eche erranie] about Newfoundland, besides the sedentary fisher- 
ies, which are the most abundant and the most lucrative. But as 
the insurgents are no longer Englishmen, and Newfoundland is no 
dependence of their thirteen provinces, England has as much inter- 
est as France to exclude them from at least the right of free fishing, 
which would give them the promptest and surest means of enriching, 
perhaps even of aggrandizing themselves at England's expense 

It is, therefore, obviously in England's interest to have the French 
as partners at Newfoundland in preference to the insurgents. 



Count de Vergennes to the Chevalier de la 
Luzerne. 

(Page 298.) 

Versailles, October 14, 1782. 
If we are fortunate enough to achieve a peace it is evi- 
dent that the King must then cease to pay the American army, 
which, from being habitually inactive, will then have become en- 
tirely useless. But it might be dangerous, in the present state of 
things, to make such an announcement to the Congress. Therefore 
if they talk to you about subsidies for next year, you will merely say 
that you are still ignorant of the King's intentions on that sub- 
ject. . . . 

. . You know our system regarding Canada; it is un- 
changed, so that everything that will prevent the conquest of it will 
essentially meet our views. But you will yourself, sir, feel that this 
our way of thinking must be an impenetrable secret to the Ameri- 
cans; it would be, in their eyes, a crime which they would never 
forgive us. It behooves to leave them to their illusions, to do every- 
thing that can make them fancy that we share them, and unostenta- 
tiously to defeat any attempts to which these illusions might carry 
t hem if our co operation is required. 



158 Appendix. 

. . Besides, I do not see on what grounds the Americans 
would claim the lands which border on Lake Ontario. These lands 
either belong to the savages or are a dependence of Canada. In 
neither case have the United States any right to them. But I am 
aware of the extravagant pretensions current in America. According 
to the Congress, the charters emanating from the British Crown ex- 
tend the domain of America from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. 
Such is the system proposed by Mr. Jay as the basis of his negotia- 
tion with Spain. Such an aberration [un pareildelire\ is undeserving 
of serious refutation. Yet a confidential note has been placed in 
Mr. Jay's hands, in which note it is pretty well demonstrated that 
the boundaries of the United States south of the Ohio stop at the 
mountains following the water-shed, and that all that skirts those 
mountains, and particularly the lakes, has formerly been a part of 
Canada. All this, however, is meant for your own eye alone. You 
will in no way show that you have any knowledge of these things, 
because we are the less inclined to interfere, at least at the present 
moment, in the discussion between Count Aranda and Mr. Jay, that 
both parties claim land to which neither has a right, and that it will 
be impossible to make them agree. 

. . . But the American agents do not shine by the soundness 
of their views or the adaptation thereof to the political condition of 
Europe. They have all the presumption of ignorance. But there 
is reason to expect that experience will ere long enlighten and im- 
prove them. 

.__ . . In my despatch No. 39 I informed you of the manner in 
which Messrs. Franklin and Jay were situated toward Mr. Oswald. 
The objections which, they have raised against the form of the Eng- 
lish agent's powers, together with the observations which I, on my 
side, had made to Mr. Fitzherbert, have been taken into considera- 
tion by the Council at St. James. 

New powers have been made out, in which the colonies are en- 
titled " United States." These powers have been exchanged against 
those of the American plenipotentiaries. Thus that matter is per- 
fectly regulated according to the wishes and to the satisfaction of 
the Congress. I have been assured that the negotiations on the 
substance of the question had begun, and that the English plenipo- 
tentiary showed himself rather manageable \assez coulant\. But I 
cannot tell you anything positive on the subject, as Messrs. Jay 
and Franklin observed the most absolute reserve toward me. 



Appendix. 159 

. . . This mission [that of Rayneval to England] had no 
other object than to enlighten us on the real intentions of the Eng- 
lish Cabinet, indicated by some overtures which it had caused to be ■ 
made in an indirect way. The first subject treated in the confer- 
ences which M. de Rayneval had there was th©v independence of 
America, and the fact of new powers having been made out for Mr. 
Oswald sufficiently shows how he must have spoken on the subject. 
I enter into these details because they will have learned in America 
M; de Rayneval's journey to England from the newspapers, and it is 
possible that evil-intentioned persons may try to lend a false color 
to that step. ' 



Extracts from M. de Rayneval's Reports on his 
Conferences with the English Ministers. 

(October 13, 1782.) 

(Page 46.) 

America's turn came at last. Lord Shelburne foresaw that they 
would have much difficulty' with America, with regard as well to the 
boundaries as to the fisheries ; but he hopes the King will not sup- 
port them in their claim.- I have answered that I did not doubt the 
King's readiness to do all in his power to restrain the Americans 
within the bounds of justice and reason. And his lordship having de- 
sired to know what I thought of their pretensions, I replied that I did 
not know what they were concerning the fisheries; but that, whatevel- 
they might be, there was, to my thinking, one principle safely to be 
followed in the matter, viz. : that fishing in the" open sea is res 
iiiillius, and that fishing along the coasts belongs of right to the 
owners of those coasts, unless there exist departures from the prin- 
ciple founded on conventions. As to the boundaries, I supposed 
the Americans would go for them ,to their charters, and want the 
whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Lord Shelburne 
said the charters were nonsense, and the discussion was not con- 
tinued because I would neither support the American claim nor 
demolish it. I only said that the English Cabinet should find, in 
the negotiations of 1754 concerning the Ohio, the limits which Eng- 
land, then the sovereign of the thirteen united provinces, thought 
fit to assign to them. 



i6o Appendix. 

(Page 51.) 

London, December 25, 1782. 

. . . I took occasion to speak to Lord Shelburne of the 
precipitancy of the deaUngs with the^ Americans, and I do not con- 
ceal from you, Monseigneur, that I spoke somewhat reproachfully. 

Lord Shelburne observed that to give me an answer was a very 
delicate thing as respects both the Council and the American Com- 
missioners, Still, he said that it is thought desirable here to have 
done with the Americans before the next session of Parliament, and 
with us too, so as to prevent questionings and Parliamentary inter- 
vention ; that moreover he, Lord Shelburne, had not known, be- 
fore the report was made to the Council, that things had gone so far 
and had been made so easy to the Americans, and that he disap- 
proved of it at heart. I attempted to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunity to make some remarks on the embarrassments which would 
arise for Spain out of that article in the treaty which gives to the 
Americans the right of navigation of the Mississippi, but Lord Shel- 
burne replied in a lively tone that this was indifferent to him ; that 
all that concerned Spain mattered little to him; that this power de- 
served courtesy only as being his Majesty's ally, but that he would 
take no step in its favor. It would have been vain to insist. I 
shall wait for a calmer moment before I reply. 



Fragment from a Despatch of Count de Vergennes 
TO M. DE la Luzerne. 

Versailles, November 23, 1782. 
. . . The King will not be remiss in fulfilling his engage- 
ments ; but there is nothing in the treaties obliging him to continue 
the war in order to support the ambitious claims which the Ameri- 
cans may put forward with regard either to the fisheries or to the 
extension of the boundaries. 



APPENDIX D. 



INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR 

PEACE. 

(Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, x., 75, 76.) 

In Congress, June 15, 1781. 
To the Honorable John Adams, Benjamifi Franklin, Johti Jay, 
Heriry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, Ministers Flefiipoten- 
tiary in behalf of the United States to negotiate a treaty of 
peace. 

Gentlemen — You are hereby authorized and instructed to con- 
cur, in behalf of these United States, with his Most Christian Majesty, 
in accepting the mediation proposed by the Empress of Russia and 
the Emperor of Germany. 

You are to accede to no treaty of peace which shall not be such 
as may, first, effectually secure the independence and sovereignty of 
the Thirteen United States, according to the form and effect of the 
treaties subs'isting between the said United States and his Most 
Christian Majesty ; and secondly, in which the said treaties shall not 
be left in their full force and validity. 

As to disputed boundaries and other particulars, we refer you to 
the instructions given to Mr. John Adams, dated August 14, 1779, 
and October 18, 1780,* from which you will easily perceive the de- 
sires and expectations of Congress. But we think it unsafe, at this 
distance, to tie you up by absolute and peremptory directions upon 
any other subject than the two essential articles above mentioned. 
You are therefore at liberty to secure the interest of the United 
States in such manner as circumstances may direct, and as the state 
of the belligerent and the disposition of the mediating powers may 
require. For this purpose you are to make the most candid and 
confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of 

* See these instructions in yolm Adams' Correspondence, vol. iv., p. 339, 
and Secret yournal, vol. ii., p. 339. 
II 



l62 Appendix. 

our generous ally, the King of France ; to undertake nothing in the 
negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge and concur- 
rence ; and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and 
opinion, endeavoring in your whole conduct to make them sensible 
how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual aid in 
everything that may be necessary to the peace, security, and future 
prosperity of the United States of America. 

If a difficulty should arise in the course of the negotiation for 
peace from the backwardness of Great Britain to acknowledge our 
independence, you are at liberty to agree to a truce, or to make 
such other concessions as may not effect the substance of what we 
contend for ; and provided that Great Britain be not left in posses- 
sion of any part of the United States. 

Samuel Huntington, President. 



APPENDIX E. 



OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE TOUCHING THE 
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

(Diplomatic Correspondence, x., 117.) 

The Peace Commissioners to Robert R. Livingston, Secretary 

OF State. 

Paris, December 14, 1782. 
Sir — We have the honor to congratulate Congress on the signature 
of the preliminaries of a peace between the Crown of Great Britain 
and the United States of America, to be inserted in a definitive 
treaty so soon as the terms between the Crowns of France and 
Great Britain shall be agreed on. A copy of the Articles is here 
enclosed, and we cannot but flatter ourselves that they will appear 
to Congress as they do to all of us, to be consistent with the honor 
and interest of the United States, and we are persuaded Con- 
gress would be more fully of that opinion if they were apprised of all 
the circumstances and reasons which have influenced the negotia- 
tion. Although it is impossible for us to go into that detail, we 
think it necessary nevertheless to make a few remarks on such of 
the Articles as appear most to require elucidation. 

We knew this Court and Spain to be against our claims 
to the western country, and having no reason to think that lines 
more favorable could ever have been obtained, we finally agreed to 
those described in this Article ; indeed, they appear to leave us lit- 
tle to complain of, and not much to desire. Congress will observe 
that although our northern line is in a certain part below the lati- 
tude of forty-five, yet in others it extends above it, divides the Lake 
Superior, and gives us access to its western and southern waters, 
from which a line in that latitude would have excluded us. 

. . As we had reason to imagine that the Articles respecting 
the boundaries, the refugees, and fisheries did not correspond with 
the policy of this Court, we did not communicate the preliminaries 



1 64 Appendix. 

to the minister until after they were signed ; and not even then the 
Separate Articles'^ We hope that these considerations will excuse 
our having so far deviated from the spirit of our instructions. The 
Count de Vergennes, on perusing the Articles, appeared surprised, 
but not displeased, at their being so favorable to us. 

. . . With great respect we have the honor to be, Sir, your 
most obedient and most humble servants, 

John Adams, 
B. Franklin, 
John Jay, 
Henry Ladrens. 

Robert R. Livingston, Secretary of State, to the Peace 
Commissioners. 

Philadelphia, March 25, 1783. 

Gentlemen — I am now to acknowledge the favor of your joint 
letter by the Washington, together with a copy of the Preliminary 
Articles ; both were laid before Congress. The articles have met 
with their warmest approbation, and have been generally seen by 
the people in the most favorable point of view. 

The steadiness manifested in not treating without an express 
acknowledgment of our independence previous to a treaty is ap- 
proved, and it is not doubted but it accelerated that declaration. 
The boundaries are as extensive as we have a right to expect ; and 
we have nothing to complain of with respect to the fisheries. My 
sentiments as to English debts you have in a former letter. No 
honest man could wish to withhold them. A little forbearance in 
British creditors till people have recovered in part from the losses 
sustained by the war will be necessary to render this Article palat- 
able, and indeed to secure more eftectually the debt. 

. . But, gentlemen, though the issue of your treaty has been 
successful ; though I am satisfied that we are much indebted to your 
firmness and perseverence, to your accurate knowledge of our situa- 
tion and of our wants for this success, yet I feel no little pain at the 
distrust manifested in the management of it, particularly in signing 

* Separate Article. — It is hereby understood and agreed that in case Great 
Britain, at the conclusion of the present war, shall recover or be put in possession 
of West Florida, the line of north boundary between the said province and the 
United States shall be a line di-awn from the mouth of the river Yazoo, where it 
unites with the Mississippi, due east, to the river Appalachicola. 



i 



Appendix. 165 

the treaty without communicating it to the Court of Versailles till 
after the signature, and in concealing the Separate Article from it 
even when signed. I have examined with the most minute attention 
all the reasons assigned in your several letters to justify these suspi- 
cions. I confess they do not appear to strike me so forcibly as they 
have done you ; and it gives me pain that the character of candor and 
fidelity to its engagements, which should always characterize a great 
people, should have been impeached thereby. The concealment 
was in my opinion absolutely unnecessary ; for had the Court of 
France disapproved the terms you had made after they had been 
agreed upon, they could not have acted so absurdly as to counter- 
act you at that late day, and thereby put themselves in the power of 
an enemy who would certainly betray them, and perhaps justify you 
in making terms for yourselves. 

. . . I intended to have submitted this letter to Congress, 
but I find there is not the least prospect of obtaining any decision 
upon it in time to send by this conveyance, if at all. I leave you to 
collect their sentiments, as far as I know them, from the following 
state of their proceedings. After your joint and separate letters and 
the journals had been submitted to them by me, and had been read, 
they were referred back to me to report upon, when I wrote them a 
letter, and when it was taken into consideration motions were made 
and debated a whole day. After which the letter and motions were 
committed, and a report brought in. This was under consideration 
two days, when the arrival of a vessel from Cadiz with letters from 
the Count d'Estaing and the Marquis de Lafayette, containing ac- 
counts that the preliminaries were signed, induced members to think 
it would be improper to proceed in the report, and in that state it 
remains without any express decision. From this you will draw your 
own inferences. 

I make no apology for the part I have taken in this business. I 
am satisfied you will readily acquit me for having discharged what I 
conceived to be my duty upon such a view of things as you presented 
to me. In declaring my sentiments freely I invite you to treat me 
with equal candor in your letters, and in sending original papers I 
guard against misrepresentations that might give you pain. Upon 
the whole I have the pleasure of assuring you that the services you 
have rendered your country in bringing this business to a happy is- 
sue are very gratefully received by them, however we may differ in 
sentiments about the mode of doing it. 



1 66 Appendix. 

The Peace Commissioners to Robert R. Livingston, Secretary 

OF State. 

Passy, July 1 8, 1783. 

Sir — We have had the honor of receiving by Captain Barney your 
two letters of March 26th and April 21st, with the papers referred to 
in them. 

We are happy to find that the Provisional Articles have been ap- 
proved and ratified by Congress, and we regret that the manner in 
which that business was conducted does not coincide with your ideas 
of propriety. We are persuaded, however, that this is principally 
owing to your being necessarily unacquainted with a number of cir- 
cumstances known to us, who are on the spot, and which will be 
particularly explained to you hereafter, and, we trust, to your satis- 
faction and that of the Congress. 

Your doubts respecting the Separate Article, we think, are capa- 
ble of being removed ; but as a full state of the reasons and circum- 
stances which prompted that measure would be very prolix, we shall 
content ourselves with giving you the general outlines. 

Mr. Oswald was desirous to cover as much of the eastern shores 
of the Mississippi with British claims as possible ; and for this pur- 
pose we were told a great deal about the ancient bounds of Canada, 
Louisiana, etc., etc. The British Court, who had probably not yet 
adopted the idea of relinquishing the Floridas, seemed desirous of 
annexing as much territory to them as possible, even up to the mouth 
of the Ohio. Mr. Oswald adhered strongly to that object, as well 
to render the British countries there of sufficient extent to be (as he 
expressed it) worth keeping and protecting, as to afford a convenient 
retreat to the tories, for whom it would be difficult otherwise to pro- 
vide ; and, among other arguments, he finally urged his being willing 
to yield to our demands to the east, north, and west, as a further 
reason for our gratifying him on the point in question. He also pro- 
duced the commission of Governor Johnson, extending the bounds 
of the Government of West Florida up to the river Yazoo, and con- 
tended for that extent as a matter of right upon various principles, 
which, however, we did not admit, the King not being authorized, in 
our opinion, to extend or contract the bounds of the colonies at 
pleasure. 

We were of opinion that the country in contest was of great 
value, both on account of its natural fertility and of its position, it 



Appendix. 167 

being, in our opinion, the interest of America to extend as far down 
towards the mouth of the Mississippi as we possibly could. We also 
thought it advisable to impress Britain with a strong sense of the im- 
portance of the navigation of that river to their future commerce on 
the interior waters, from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to that of 
the Mississippi, and thereby render that Court averse to any stipu- 
lations with Spain to relinquish it. These two objects militated 
against each other, because to enhance the value of the navigation 
was also to enhance the value of the countries contiguous to it, and 
thereby disincline Britain to the dereliction of them. We thought, 
therefore, that the surest way to reconcile and obtain both objects 
would be by a composition beneficial to both parties. We therefore 
proposed that Britain should withdraw her pretensions to all the 
country above the Yazoo, and that we would cede all below it to her, 
in case she should have the Floridas at the end of the war ; and, at 
all events, that she should have a right to navigate the river through- 
out its whole extent. This proposition was accepted, and we agreed 
to insert the contingent fact of it in a separate Article, for the express 
purpose of keeping it secret for the present. That Article ought 
not, therefore, to be considered as a mere matter of favor to Britain, 
but as the result of a bargain in which that Article was a quid pro 
quo. 

It was in our opinion both necessary and justifiable to keep this 
Article secret. The negotiations between Spain, France, and Brit- 
ain were then in full vigor, and embarrassed by a variety of clashing 
demands. The publication of this Article would have irritated Spain, 
and retarded, if not have prevented, her coming to an agreement 
with Britam. " 

Had we mentioned it to the French Minister he must have not 
only informed Spain of it, but also been obliged to act a part respect- 
ing it that would probably have been disagreeable to America ; and 
he certainly has reason to rejoice that our silence saved him that 
delicate and disagreeable task. 

This was an Article in which France had not the smallest in- 
terest, nor is there anything in her treaty with us that restrains us from 
making what bargain we please with Britain about those or any other 
lands, without rendering account of such transaction to her or any 
other power whatever. The same observation applies with still 
greater force to Spain; and neither justice nor honor -forbid us to 



1 68 Appendix. 

dispose as we pleased of our own lands without her knowledge or 
consent. Spain at that very time extended her pretensions and 
claims of dominion, not only over the tract in question, but over the 
vast region lying between the Floridas and Lake Superior ; and this 
Court was also, at that very time, soothing and nursing those pre- 
tensions by a proposed conciliatory line for splitting the difference. 
Suppose, therefore, we had offered this tract to Spain ; in case she 
retained the Floridas should we even have had thanks for it ? Or 
would it have abated the chagrin she experienced from being disap- 
pointed in her extravagant and improper designs on that whole 
country ! We think not. 

We perfectly concur with you in sentiment. Sir, that " honesty is 
the best policy.'" But until it be shown that we have trespassed on 
the rights of any man or body of men. you must excuse our thinking 
that this remark as applied to our proceedings was unnecessary. 

Should any explanations, either with France or Spain, become 
necessary on this subject, we hope and expect to meet with no em- 
barrassment. We shall neither amuse them nor perplex ourselves 
with flimsy excuses, but tell them plainly that it was not our duty to 
give them the information ; we considered ourselves at liberty to 
withhold It. And we shall remind the French Minister that he has 
more reason to be pleased than displeased with our silence. Since 
we have assumed a place in the political system of the world, let us 
movellike a primary and not a secondary planet. 

We are persuaded. Sir, that your remarks on these subjects re- 
sulted from real opinion, and were made with candor and sincerity. 
The best men will view objects of this kind in different lights even 
when standing on the saiiie ground ; and it is not to be wondered at 
that we, who are on the spot and have the whole transaction under 
our eyes, should see many parts of it in a stronger point of light 
than persons at a distance, who can only view it through the dull 
medium of representation. 

It would give us great pain if anything we have written or now 
write respecting this Court should be construed to impeach the 
friendship of the King and nation for us. We also believe that the 
minister is so far our friend, and is disposed so far to do us good 
offices as may correspond with and be dictated by his system of 
policy for promoting the power, riches, and glory of France. God 
forbid that we should ever sacrifice our faith, our gratitude, or our 



Appendix. 169 

honor to any considerations of convenience ; and may He also for- 
bid that we should ever be unmindful of the dignity and independ- 
ent spirit which should always characterize a free and generous 
people. 

, . We have the honor to be, etc., 

John Adams, 
B. Franklin, 
John Jay. 



APPENDIX F. 



THE ADVICE OF VERGENNES AND THE ACTION 
OF JAY AND FRANKLIN ON OSWALD'S FIRST 
COMMISSION. 

An account of the discussion and action on Oswald's first com- 
mission was given by Jay to Livingston in his letter of November 
17, 1782 (Dip. Corres., viii., 133 et seq.). 

On July 25, 1782, the King issued a warrant to his Solicitor 
General to prepare a commission for Mr. Oswald to treat with any 
person or persons appointed by any or all of the American colonies 
or plantations. Oswald sent a copy of it to Doctor Franklin with 
an assurance that the commission would be ready in a few days, and 
the doctor, after showing it to Jay, sent it to Vergennes, who, on the 
8th of August, wrote from Versailles, "I am going to examine it 
with the greatest attention, and if you will be pleased to come here 
on Saturday morning, I shall be able to confer about it with you and 
Mr. Jay if it should be convenient for him to accompany you." 

On August loth Franklin and Jay waited on the Count and the 
question was discussed. The Count de Vergennes said that it was 
such a one as we might have expected it to be, but that we must 
take care to insert proper articles in the treaty to secure our inde- 
pendence and our limits against all future claims. ... I ob- 
served to the Count that it would be descending from the ground of 
independence to treat under the description of colonies. He replied 
that names signified little ; that the King of Great Britain, styling 
himself King of France, was no obstacle of the King of France treat- 
ing with him ; that an acknowledgment of our independence instead 
of preceding must, in the natural course of things, be the effect of 
the treaty ; and that it would be reasonable to expect .the eft'ect be- 
fore the cause. He added that we must be mindful to exchange 
powers with Mr. Oswald, for that his acceptance of our powers in 
which we were styled Commissioners from the United States of 



Appendix. 171 

America would be a tacit admittance of our independence. I made 
but little reply to all this singular reasoning. The Count turned to 
Doctor Franklin and asked him what he thought of the matter. The 
Doctor said he believed the commission would do. He next asked 
my opinion. I told him that I did not like it, and that it was best 
to proceed cautiously. 

On returning I could not forbear observing to Doctor Franklin 
that it was evident the Count did not wish to see our independence 
acknowledged by Britain until they had made all there was of us. 
It was easy for them to foresee difficulties in bringing Spain into a 
peace on moderate terms, and that if we once found ourselves stand- 
ing on our own legs, our independence acknowledged, and all our 
own terms ready to be granted, we might not think it our duty to 
continue in the war for the attainment of Spanish objects, but on 
the contrary, as we were bound by treaty to continue the war till our 
independence should be obtained, it was the interest of France to 
postpone that event until their own views and those of Spain could 
be gratified by a peace, and that I could not otherwise account for 
ministers advising us to act in a manner inconsistent with our dig- 
nity, and for reasons which he himself had too much understanding 
not to see the fallacy of. 

The Doctor imputed this conduct to the moderation of the 
minister and to his desire for removing every obstacle to speedy 
negotiation for peace. He observed that the Count had hitherto 
Jireated us very fairly, and that suspicions to their disadvantage 
sho'.-ld not be readily entertained. He also mentioned our instruc- 
tions as further reasons for our acquiescing in the advice and opin- 
ions of the minister (p. 136). 

A day or two later Jay had a long conversation with Oswald in 
regard to the commission, referring to the irritation it would cause 
in the States, and wrote : " I also urged in the strongest terms the 
great impropriety and consequently the utter impossibility of our 
ever treating with Great Britain on any other than on equal footing, 
and told him plainly that I would have no concern in any negotia- 
tion in which we were not considered as an independent people. 
Mr. Oswald upon this as upon every other occasion behaved in a 
candid and proper manner. . . . He wished his commission 
had been otherwise, but was at a loss how to reconcile it with the 
King's dignity to make such a declaration immediately after having 
issued such a commission. I pointed out the manner in which I 



1 72 Appendix. 

conceived it might be done ; he liked the thought and desired me to 
reduce it to writing. I did so and communicated it to Doctor 
Franklin." 

The Doctor andjfay corrected the draft, Oswald approved of it, 
and communicated to Jay the fourth Article of his instruction as fol- 
lows : 

" In case you find the American Commissioners are not at lib- 
erty to treat on any terms short of independence, you are to de- 
clare to them that you have our authority to make that cession ; 
our ardent wish for peace disposing us to purchase it at the price of 
acceding to the complete independence of the Western Colonies." 
~ Oswald despatched a courier to London to press the ministry for^ 
permission to acknowledge America's independence without delay. 
Doctor Franklin and Jay communicated to the Count de Vergennes 
the arrival of the first Commissioners under the great seal, and what 
had passed with Mr, Oswald. The Count renewed his argument in 
favor of their treating under the commission as it stood ; Oswald 
was advised by Mr. Secretary Townsend (September i, 1782) of 
the receipt of his letters, without assenting to the proposition. 
Jay learned that the Count de Vergennes had told Fitzherbert that 
the first commission would do, and that Fitzherbert had so informed 
the Court, a circumstance to which Jay attributed the ill success of 
Oswald's application. " These considerations," wrote Jay, " induced 
me to explain to him what I supposed to be the natural policy of 
this Court on the subject, and to show him that it was the interest of 
Britain to render us as independent on France as we were resolved to 
be on her. He soon adopted the same opinion, but was at a loss 
to see in what manner Great Britain, considering what had just 
passed, could consistently take further steps at present. I told him 
that nothing was more easy, for that the issuing of another commis- 
sion would do it." 

Oswald asked Jay to put this in writing, which he did as follows : 

" A commission (in the usual form) to Richard Oswald to treat 
of peace or truce with Commissioners vested with equal power by 
and on behalf of The United States of America, would remove 
the objection to which the present one is liable, and render it proper 
for the American Commissioners to treat with him on the subject of 
preliminaries." 

Jay then reminded Oswald of the several resolutions of Congress 
at different periods not to treat on any other footing than that of 



Appendix. 173 

absolute independence, and intimated that he thought it would be 
best to give this their final and decided determination not to treat 
otherwise, in writing in that form of a letter. 
The next day he prepared the following : 



The Draft Letter to Oswald Declining to Negotiate except 
ON a Footing of Independence. 

Sir — It is with regret that we find ourselves obliged by our 
duty to our country to object to entering with you into negotiations 
for peace on the plan proposed. One nation can treat with another 
nation only on terms of equality ; and it cannot be expected that 
we should be the first and only servants of Congress who would ad- 
mit doubts of their independence. 

The tenor of your commission affords matter for a variety of 
objections which your good sense will save us the pain of enumer- 
ating. The journals of Congress present to you unequivocal and 
uniform evidence of the sentiments and resolutions of Congress on 
the subject, and their positive instructions to us to speak the same 
language. 

The manner of removing these obstacles is obvious, and in our 
opinion no less consistent with the dignity than the interest of Great 
Britain. If the Parliament meant to enable the King to conclude a 
peace with us on terms of independence, they necessarily meant to 
enable him to do it in a manner compatible with his dignity ; and 
consequently that he should previously regard us in a point of view 
that would render it proper for him to negotiate with us. What 
this point of view is you need not be informed. 

We also take the liberty of submitting to your consideration 
how far his Majesty's now declining to take this step would comport 
with the assurance lately given on that subject, and whether hesita- 
tion and delay would not tend to lessen the confidence which those 
assurances were calculated to inspire. 

As to referring an acknowledgment of our independence to the 
first article of a treaty, permit us to remark, that this implies that we 
are not to.be considered in that light until after the conclusion of 
the treaty, and our acquiescing would be to admit the propriety of 
our being considered in another light during that interval. Had this 
circumstance been attended to, we presume that the Court of Great 
Britain would not have pressed a measure which certainly is not del- 



1 74 Appendix. 

icate, and which cannot be reconciled with the received ideas of 
national honor. 

You may rest assured, sir, of our disposition to peace on reason- 
able terms, and of our readiness to enter seriously into negotiations 
for it, as soon as we shall have an opportunity of doing it in the only 
manner in which it is possible for one nation to treat with another, 
viz., on an equal footing. 

Had you been commissioned in the usual manner, we might 
have proceeded ; and as we can perceive no legal or other objection 
to this, or some other such like expedient, it is to be wished that his 
Majesty will not permit an obstacle so very unimportant to Great 
Britain, but so essential and insuperable with respect to us, to delay 
the re-establishment of peace especially, and in case the business 
could be but once begun, the confidence we have in your candor 
and integrity would probably render the settling all our Articles only 
the work of a few hours. 

We are, etc. 

This draft was submitted to Doctor Franklin's consideration, 
who thought it too positive and therefore imprudent, and suggested 
a further difficulty from the instructions of Congress, as stated on 
page Z2, and 34 of the Address. Neither of these had weight with 
Jay, who wrote, " As to the first, I could not conceive of any event 
which could render it proper, and, therefore, possible for America to 
treat in any other character than an independent nation ; and as to 
the second, I could not believe that Congress intended we should 
follow any advice which might be repugnant to their dignity and in- 
terest." 

When Oswald again spoke to Jay of the letter. Jay told him that 
he had prepared a draft, but that on further consideration and con- 
sulting with Doctor Franklin, they thought it best not to take the 
liberty of troubhng the Court with any arguments or reasonings which 
without our aid must be very evident to them. 

Oswald seemed disappointed, and asked to see the draft, which 
he liked. He asked for a copy of it, but Jay doubting the propriety 
of this took time to consider. It appeared to him, on further reflection, 
that no bad consequences would arise from giving him a copy of the 
paper, that though unsigned it would nevertheless convey to the 
British ministry the sentiments and opinions he wished to impress, 
and that, if finally they should not be content to treat with us as in- 



Appendix. 175 

dependent, they were not ripe for peace or treaty with us. " Be- 
sides," wrote Jay, " I could not be persuaded that Great Britain, 
after what the House of Commons had declared, after what Mr. 
Grenville had said, and Sir Guy Carleton had been instructed to do, 
would persist in refusing to admit an independence, provided they 
really believed that we had firmly resolved not to treat on more 
humble terms." 

A copy of the draft letter and of the resolutions of Congress were 
given to Oswald, who sent them by express to London, and the 
matter was not communicated to the Count de Vergennes. 

Jay's conviction that the British ministry would yield the point of 
independence if they really believed the negotiation would not pro- 
ceed without it, proved to be correct. 

When soon after this Vaughan was sent to England by Jay to 
counteract the efforts of Rayneval to prejudice our claims to the 
fisheries and the boundaries, this seems to have been the chief ques- 
tion with the British Cabinet, and when the one question asked of 
Vaughan by Lord Shelburne, Is the new commission necessary ? was 
answered in the affirmative, the new commission to treat with the 
United States of America was instantly ordered. 

Seldom has the draft of an unsigned letter assisted in producing 
results of such historical importance. 



APPENDIX G. 



EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE, CHIEFLY 
"""personal, bearing on the PEACE NEGO- 
TIATIONS. 

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS TO JaY ON HIS APPOINTMENT AS ONE OF THE 

Commissioners to Negotiate a Peace. 
(Morris, i., p. 237.) 

Philadelphia, June 17, 178X. 

Although I believe myself thoroughly acquainted with you, yet 
I cannot tell whether I ought to congratulate or condole with you 
on your late appointment. Ere this reaches you, you will have 
learnt that you are on the part of this country one of the Commis- 
sioners for negotiating a peace. So far is well, but when you come 
to find by your instructions that you must ultimately obey the dic- 
tates of the French Minister, I am sure there is something in your 
bosom that will revolt at the serviHty of the situation. To have re- 
laxed on all sides, to have given up all things, might easily have 
been expected from those minds which, softened by wealth and de- 
based by fear, are unable to gain and unworthy to enjoy the blessings 
of freedom. But that the proud should prostitute the very little 
dignity this country was possessed of, would be indeed astonishing if 
we did not know the near alliance between pride and meanness. 

Jay to Livingston. 
(Diplomatic Correspondence, viii., p. 126.) 

Paris, September 18, 1782. 
I am persuaded (and you shall know my reasons for it) that this 
Court chooses to postpone an acknowledgment of our independence 
by Britain to the conclusion of a general peace, in order to keep us 
under their direction until not only their and our objects are obtained, 
but also until Spain shall be gratified in her demands to exclude 
everybody from the Gulf, etc. ... 



Appendix. lyy 

Count de Vergennes would have us treat with Mr. Oswald 
through his commission, calls us colonies, and authorizes him to 
treat with any description of men, etc. In my opinion we can only 
treat as an independent nation and on an equal footing. . . 
This Court as well as Spain will dispute our extension to the Mis- 
sissippi. ... I ought to add that Doctor Franklin does not see 
the conduct of the Court in the light I do, and that he beheves they 
mean nothing in their proceedings but what is friendly, fair, and 
honorable. Facts and future events must determine which of us is 
mistaken. . . . Let us be honest and grateful to France, but 
let us think for ourselves. 

John Jay to Gouverneur Morris. 
(Jay's Life, ii., p. 105.) 

Paris, October 13, 1782. 

Dear Morris — I have received your festina lente letter, but 
wish it had been at least partly in cipher. You need not be informed 
of my reasons for the wish, as by this time you must know that seals 
are, on this side of the water, rather matters of decoration than of 
use. It gave me nevertheless great pleasure to receive that letter, 
it being the first from you that had reached me, the Lord knows 
when. I find you are industrious, and of consequence, useful ; so 
much the better for yourself, for the public, and for our friend Morris, 
whom I consider as the pillar of American credit. 

The King of Great Britain, by letters patent under the great seal, 
has authorized Mr. Oswald to treat with the Commissioners of the 
Ufiited States of America. His first commission literally pursued 
the enabling act, and the authority it gave him was expressed in the 
very terms of that act, viz., to treat with the colonies, and with any 
or either of them, and any part of them, and with any description of 
men in them, and with any person whatsoever, of and concerning 
peace, etc. 

Had I not violated the instructions of Congress, their dignity 
would have been in the dust ; for the French Minister even took 
pains not only to persuade us to treat under that commission, but 
to prevent the second, by telling Fitzherbert that the first was suffi- 
cient. I told the minister that we neither could nor would treat 
with any nation in the world on any other than on an equal footing. 

We may and we may not have a peace this winter. Act as if 
the war would certainly continue. Keep proper garrisons in your 
12 



178 Appendix. 

strong posts, and preserve your army sufficiently numerous and well 
appointed until every idea of hostility and surprise shall have com- 
pletely vanished. 

I could write you a volume, but my health admits only of short 
intervals of application, . . . 

(TRANSLATION.) 
Count Montmorin to Jay. 

Madrid, February 22, 1783. 

I do not think, my dear sir, that I could find a more suitable 
manner of sending you my compliments on the peace, or one that 
would be more agreeable to you, than in confiding them to M. le Mar- 
quis de la Fayette, who is your friend and your adopted countryman, 
and who will be numbered by posterity among those who have con- 
tributed the most to the great Revolution in which you were one of 
the principal actors, and which the peace has just completed. 

I shall not speak of the feeling and inclinations of Spain : M. de 
la Fayette will tell you better than I what he has seen of them. He 
leaves here satisfied with what he has been shown, and I hope you 
also will be so. I shall have a very real satisfaction if I see har- 
mony and a good understanding established between Spain and the 
United States of America, and I shall think myself very happy if I 
can contribute in any way to this end. You know my sentiments 
with regard to your country ; they always have been and always will 
be the same. 

M. de la Fayette is leaving immediately for Paris, and only gives 
me time to assure you of the perfect and unchangeable attachment 
with which I have the honor to be, my dear sir, your most humble 
and obedient servant, Montmorin. 

Pray allow me herewith to send to Mrs. Jay the assurance of my 
respect. 

Jay to Robert R. Livingston. 

Paris, December 14, 1782. 
Dear Sir — From our preliminaries and the King's speech, the 
present disposition and system of the British Court may, in my opin- 
ion, be collected. Although particular circumstances constrained 
them to yield us more than perhaps they wished, I still think they 
meant to make (what they thought would really be) a satisfactory 
peace with us. In the continuance of this disposition and system 



Appendix. 179 

too much confidence ought not to be placed, for disappointed vio- 
lence and mortified ambition are certainly dangerous foundations to 
build implicit confidence upon ; but I cannot forbear thinking that 
we ought not, in the common phrase, to throw cold water upon it 
by improper exultation, extravagant demands, or illiberal publica- 
tions. Should such a temper appear, it would be wise to discounte- 
nance it. It is our policy to be independent in the most extensive 
sense, and to observe a proper distance toward all nations, minding 
our own business and not interfering with, or being influenced by, 
the views of any further than they may respect us. 

. . . Our affairs have a very promising aspect, and a little pru- 
dence will secure us all that we can reasonably expect. The boun- 
daries between the States should be immediately settled, and all 
causes of discord between them removed. It would be imprudent 
to disband the army while a foreign one remains in the country ; 
and it would be equally unwise to permit Americans to spill the 
blood of our friends in the islands, for in all of them there are many 
who wish us well, 

Robert Morris to John Jay. 

Philadelphia, January 3, 1783. 

Dear Sir — ... I cannot take time at present to enter on 
any political discussions. But you must allow me to declare my 
perfect satisfaction in, and approbation of, your conduct in Europe. 
All who have had the opportunity of knowing what it has been are 
struck with admiration at your patience under difficulties and your 
firmness in rising superior to them. Go on, my friend ; you de- 
serve and will receive the gratitude of your country. History will 
hand down your plaudits to posterity. The men of the present day, 
who are generally least grateful to their contemporaries, esteem it 
an honor to be of your acquaintance. 

I am sorry to hear that Mrs. Jay and yourself have been indis- 
posed, but I hope you are recovered and partaking the enjoyments 
of this season with the gay, sprightly inhabitants of Versailles and 
Paris. My best wishes ever attend you. . . . 

Jay to the Marquis de Lafayette. 

Rouen, January 19, 1783. 
. . . If I am not mistaken, a copy of the American prelimi- 
naries has been sent to Spain, and I flatter myself that Count de 



1 80 Appendix. 

Montmorin will think them perfectly consistent with our engage- 
ments to our allies. It appears to me singular that any doubts 
should be entertained of American good faith, for as it has been 
tried and remains inviolate they cannot easily be explained on 
principles honorable to those who entertain them, America has so 
often repeated and reiterated her professions and assurances of 
regard to the treaty alluded to that I hope she will not impair her 
dignity by making any more of them, but leave the continued up- 
rightness of her conduct to inspire that confidence which it seems 
she does not yet possess although she has always merited. 

Our warmest acknowledgments are due to you for the zeal you 
manifest to serve America at all times and in all places, but, sir, I 
have little expectation that your plan of a Spanish loan will succeed. 
I confess that I am far from being anxious about it. In- my opinion 
America can with no propriety accept favors from Spain. . . . 

John Jay to Benjamin Vaughan, Esq. 

Paris, March 28, 1783. 

. . . So far as the peace respects France and America, I am 
persuaded it was wise in Britain to conclude it. The cessions to 
France are not, in my opinion, extravagant, and the terms settled 
with America, by removing all causes of future variance, certainly 
lead to conciUation and friendship. 

It appears to me that the discussion of this subject might have 
been more ample and satisfactory. Why was not Parliament told 
of our offers as to commerce and the mutual navigation of the 
American waters ? The word reciprocity would not then have been 
deemed so nugatory. 

We have received particular instructions on the business of 
commerce, and Mr. Fitzherbert has been informed of our readiness 
to add to the provisional treaty an article for opening and regulat- 
ing trade between us on principles as liberal and reciprocal as you 
please. What more can be said or done ? Mr. Pitt's bill was a 
good one, a wise one, and one that will for ever do honor to the ex- 
tent and policy of his views, and to those of the administration 
under whose auspices it was formed. For my own part, however, I 
think that America need not be exceedingly anxious about the mat- 
ter, for it will be in our power to derive from a navigation act of 
our own full as many advantages as we should lose by the restric- 
:tions of your laws. 



Appendix. i8i 

The objections drawn from your treaties with Russia, etc., ap- 
pear to- nie weak and have been answered ; but why not give them 
similar terms on similar conditions ? They furnish you with raw 
materials chiefly and you them with manufactures only ; the gain, 
therefore, must be yours. With respect to carriage and navigation 
they stand in a very different predicament from us. 

As to the Tories who have received damage from us, why so 
much noise about thevi, and so little said or thought of Whigs who 
have suffered ten titpes as much from these same Tories, not to 
mention the desolations of an unjust and licentious war ? 

We forget our sufferings and even agree to recommend to favor 
a set of men of whom very few would consider the having their 
deserts in the light of a blessing. How does reciprocacy stand in 
this account ? 

Some, it seems, think that New York should be retained as a 
rod to drive us on in this business of the Tories. Strange that the 
idea of driving us should still be entertained. I pledge myself to 
you that should such a design be adopted and become apparent, the 
refugees will get nothing, and the progress of reconciliation will be 
as slow as the warmest Gallican could wish. 

I hear there is to be a congress here ; that is, that Britain and 
France have requested the two imperial Courts to send mediatorial 
ambassadors here for the purpose of being witnesses to the execu- 
tion of the definite treaties — a very important errand, no doubt, and 
very complimentary to those sovereigns. Is it probable that a con- 
gress should be called for that poor, single, simple purpose ? Why 
your Court agreed to it is hard to conceive. 

I have written to my countrymen that Lord Shelburne's system 
respecting them appeared to me to be liberal and conciliatory, but 
that his hesitations about avowing the acknowledgment of our inde- 
pendence discouraged extensive confidence without furtner facts. 
I always think it best to be candid and explicit. I hope we shall 
soon be in the full possession of our country and of peace, and as 
we expect to have no further cause of quarrel with Great Britain, 
we can have no inducement to wish or to do her injury ; on the 
contrary, we may become as sensible to her future good offices as 
we have been to her former evil ones. A little good-natured wis- 
dom often does more in politics than much slippery craft. By the 
former the French acquired the esteem and gratitude of America, 
and by the latter their minister is impairing it. . . . 



1 82 Appendix. 

. . . Mrs. Jay charges me to say civil things to you. You 
are a favorite of hers and deserve to be so of everybody. ... I 
must not, however, forget my worthy friend Mr. Oswald. He de- 
serves well of his country, and posterity will not only approve but 
commend his conduct. Assure him of my esteem and attach- 
ment. ... 

John Jay to George Washington. 

Passy, June 13, 1783. 

My Dear Sir — I have, within these few days past, read and ad- 
mired your address to the army and their proceedings in conse- 
quence of it. Such instances of patriotism are rare, and America 
must find it difficult to express, in adequate terms, the gratitude she 
owes to both. Such a degree of glory, so virtuously acquired and 
so decently sustained, is as new as our political constellation and 
will forever give lustre to it. May every blessing be yours. 

Mr. Hartley has just informed me that orders have been sent to 
the British commander-in-chief to evacuate the United States. Our 
attention will then, I hope, be turned to the preservation and im- 
provement of what we have gained ; and a sense of the importance 
of that task leads me to wish that the execution of it may be facili- 
tated by your counsels and application. 

John Jay to Gouverneur Morris. 

Passy, July 17, 1783. 
. Orders are gone to evacuate New York. The present 
British Ministry are duped, I believe, by an opinion of our not hav- 
ing decision and energy sufficient to regulate our trade so as to re- 
taliate their restrictions. Our ports were opened too soon. I^et us, 
however, be temperate as well as firm. 

Our friend Morris, I suspect, is not a favorite of this Court. They 
say he treats them as his cashier. They refuse absolutely to supply 
more money. Marbois writes tittle-tattle, and I believe does mis- 
chief. Congress certainly should remove to some interior town, 
and they should send a minister forthwith to England. The French 
ambassador at Petersburg has thrown cold water on Dana's being 
received before a peace. 

The ministers of this Court are qualified to act the part of Pro- 
teus. The nation, I think, is with us, and the King seems to be well 
disposed. Adieu. 



Appendix. 183 

Jay tc Governor Livingston. 

Passy, July 19, 1783. 

. . . I am happy to hear that the Provisional Articles meet 
with general approbation. The Tories will doubtless cause some dif- 
ficulty, but that they have always done, and as this will probably be 
the last time, we must make the best of it. A universal indiscrimi- 
nate condemnation and expulsion of those people would not re- 
dound to our honor, because so harsh a measure would partake 
more of vengeance than of justice. For my part, I wish that all ex- 
cept the faithless and the cruel may be forgiven. That exception 
would indeed extend to very few ; but even if it applied to the case 
of one only, that one ought, in my opinion, to be saved. 

The reluctance with which the States in general pay the necessary 
taxes is much to be regretted. It injures both their reputation and in- 
terest abroad as well as at home, and tends to cherish the hopes and 
speculations of those who wish we may become and remain an un- 
important, divided people. The rising power of America is a seri- 
ous object of apprehension to more than one nation, and every 
event that may retard it will be agreeable to them. A continental, 
national spirit should therefore pervade our country, and Congress 
should be enabled, by a grant of the necessary powers, to regulate 
the commerce and general concerns of the confederacy ; and we 
should remember that to be constantly prepared for war is the only 
way to have peace. The Swiss on the one hand and the Dutch on 
the other bear testimony to the truth of this remark. 

The General and the army have, by their late moderation, done 
themselves infinite honor ; and it is to be hoped that the States will 
not only be just, but generous to those brave and virtuous citizens. 
America is at present held in a very respectable point of view, 
but as the eyes of the world are upon her, the continuance of that 
consideration will depend on the dignity and wisdom of her con- 
duct. . . . 

John Jay to R. R. Livingston. 
(Jay's Life, i., p. 174.) 

Passy, July 19, 1783. 
Dear Robert — Our despatches by Barney must be ready the' 
day after to-morrow. The many letters I have written and have 
still to write by him, together with conferences, company, etc., keep 



1 84 Appendix. 

nie fully employed. You will, therefore, excuse my not descending 
so much to particulars as both of us indeed might wish. As little 
that passes in Congress is kept entirely secret, we think it prudent 
at least to postpone giving you a more minute detail than you have 
already received, of the reasons which induced us to sign the Pro- 
visional Articles without previously communicating them to the 
French Minister. For your private satisfaction, however, I will 
make a few remarks on that subject. 

Your doubts respecting the propriety of our conduct in that 
instance appear to have arisen from the following circumstances, 
viz. : 

First. — That we entertained and were influenced by distrusts and 
suspicions which do not seem to you to have been altogether well 
founded. 

Second. — That we signed the articles without previously com- 
municating them to this Court. 

With respect to the first : In our negotiation with the British 
Commissioner it was essential to insist on and, if possible, obtain 
his consent to four important concessions. 

1. That Britain should treat with us as being what we were, 
viz., an independent people. The French Minister thought this 
demand premature, and that it ought to arise from, and not precede, 
the treaty. 

2. That Britain should agree to the extent of boundary we 
claimed. The French Minister thought our demands on that head 
extravagant in themselves, and as militating against certain views of 
Spain which he was disposed to favor. 

3. That Britain should admit our right in common to the 
fishery. The French Minister thought this demand too extensive. 

4. That Britain should not insist on our reinstating the Tories. 
The French Minister argued that they ought to be reinstated. 

Was it unnatural for us to conclude from these facts that the 
French Minister was opposed to our succeeding on these four great 
points in the extent we wished ? It appeared Evident that his plan 
of a treaty for America was far from being such as America would 
have preferred ; and as we disapproved of his model, we thought it 
imprudent to give him an opportunity of moulding our treaty by it. 
Whether the minister was influenced by what he really thought best 
for us, or by what he really thought would be best for France, is a 
question which, however easy or difficult to decide,Js not very im- 



Appendix. 185 

portant to the point under consideration. Whatever his motives 
may have been, certain it is that they were such as opposed our 
system ; and as in private Hfe it is deemed imprudent to admit op- 
ponents to full confidence, especially respecting the very matters 
in competition, so in public affairs the like caution seems equally 
proper. 

Secondly. — But admitting the force of this reasoning, why, when 
the articles were completed, did we not communicate them to the 
French Minister before we proceeded to sign them ? For the follow- 
ing reasons : 

The expectations excited in England by Lord Shelburne's 
friends, that he would put a speedy period to the war, made it nec- 
essary for him either to realize those expectations or prepare to quit 
his place. The Parliament being to meet before his negotiations 
with us were concluded, he found it expedient to adjourn it for a 
short term, in hopes of then meeting it with all the advantages that 
might be expected from a favorable issue of the negotiation. Hence 
it was his interest to draw it to a close before that adjournment 
should expire ; and to obtain that end both he and his Commissioner 
became less tenacious on certain points than they would otherwise 
have been. Nay, we have, and then had, good reason to believe 
that the latitude allowed by the British Cabinet for the exercise of 
discretion was exceeded on that occasion. 

I must now remind you that the King of Great Britain had 
pledged himself, in Mr. Oswald's commission, to confirm and ratify 
tiot what Mr. Oswald should verbally agree to, but what he should 
formally sign his name and affix his seal to. 

Had we communicated the articles, when ready for signing, to 
the French Minister, he doubtless would have complimented us on 
the terms of them ; but at the same time he would have insisted on 
our postponing the signature until the articles then preparing be- 
tween France, Spain, and Britain should also be ready for signing — 
he having often intimated to us that we should all sign at the same 
time and place. 

This would have exposed us to a disagreeable dilemma. Had 
we agreed to postpone signing the articles the British Cabinet might, 
and probably would, have taken advantage of it. They might, if 
better prospects had offered, have insisted that the articles were still 
res ififectcB, that Mr. Oswald had exceeded the limits of his instruc- 
tions, and for both these reasons that they conceived themselves 



1 86 Appendix. 

still at liberty to depart from his opinions and to forbid his execut- 
ing, as their Commissioner, a set of articles which they could not ap- 
prove of. 

It is true that this might not have happened, but it is equally 
true that it might ; and therefore it wds a risk of too great impor- 
tance to be run. The whole business would, in that case, have been 
set afloat again, and the minister of France would have had an op- 
portunity at least of approving the objections of the British Court 
and of advising us to recede from demands which in his opinion 
Vere immoderate and too inconsistent with the claims of Spain to 
meet with his concurrence. 

If, on the other hand, we had, contrary to his advice and re- 
quest, refused to postpone the signing, it is natural to suppose that 
such refusal would have given more offence to the French Minister 
than our doing it without consulting him at all about the matter. 

Our withholding from him the knowledge of these articles until 
after they were signed was no violation of our treaty with France, 
and therefore she has no room for complaint, on that principle, 
against the United States. 

Congress had indeed made and published a resolution not to 
make peace but in confidence and concurrence with France. 

So far as this resolution declares against a separate peace, it 
has been incontestably observed ; and admitting that the words " in 
confidence and in concurrence with France" mean that we should 
mention to the French Minister and consult with him about every 
step of our proceedings, yet it is most certain that it was founded on 
a mutual understanding that France would patronize our demands 
and assist us in obtaining the objects of them. France, therefore, 
by discouraging our claims ceased to be entitled to the degree of 
confidence respecting them which was specified in the resolution. 

It may be said that France must admit the reasonableness of 
our claims before we could properly expect that she should pro- 
mote them. She knew what were our claims before the negotiation 
commenced, though she could only conjecture what reception they 
would meet with from Britain. If she thought our claims extrava- 
gant, she may be excusable for not countenancing them in their full 
extent ; but then we ought also to be excused for not giving her the 
full confidence on those subjects which was promised on the im- 
plied condition of her supporting them. 

But Congress positively instructed us to do nothing without the 



Appendix. 1 87 

advice and consent of the French Minister, and we have departed 
from that Hne of conduct. This is also true ; but then I apprehend 
that Congress marked out that Hne of conduct for their own sake, 
and not for the sake of France. The object of that instruction was 
the supposed, interest of America, and not of France ; and we were 
directed to ask the advice of the French Minister because it was 
thought advantageous to our country that we should receive and be 
governed by it. Congress only, therefore, have a right to complain 
of our departure from the line of that instruction. 

If it be urged that confidence ought to subsist between allies, I 
have only to remark that, as the PYench Minister did not consult us 
about his articles, nor make us any communication about them, our 
giving him as little trouble about ours did not violate any principle 
of reciprocity. 

Our joint letter to you by Captain Barney contains an explana- 
tion of our conduct respecting the separate article. . . . 

Benjamin Franklin to John Jay. 

Passy, September lo, 1783. 

Sir — I have received a letter from a very respectable person in 
America containing the following words, viz. : 

" It is confidently reported, propagated, and believed by some 
among us that the Court of France was at bottom against our ob- 
taining the fishery and territory in that great extent in which both 
are secured to us by the treaty ; that our minister at that Court 
favored or did not oppose this design against us ; and that it was 
entirely owing to the firmness, sagacity, and disinterestedness of Mr. 
Adams, with whom Mr. Jay united, that we have obtained these im- 
portant advantages." 

It is not my purpose to dispute any share of the honor of that 
treaty which the friends of my colleagues may be disposed to give 
them, but having now spent fifty years of my life in public offices 
and trusts, and having still one ambition left — that of carrying the 
character of fidelity at least to the grave with me — I cannot allow 
that I was behind any of them in zeal and faithfulness. I therefore 
think that I ought not to suffer an accusation which falls little short 
of treason to my country to pass without notice when the means of 
effectual vindication are at hand. You, sir, was a witness of my 
conduct in that affair. To you and my other colleagues I appeal 
by sending a similar letter with this, and I have no doubt of your 



1 88 - Appendix. 

readiness to do a brother Commissioner justice by certificates that 
will entirely destroy the effect of that accusation. 

John Jay to Benjamin Franklin. 

Passy, September ii, 1783. 

Sir — I have been favored with your letter of yesterday and will 
answer it explicitly. 

I have no reason whatever to believe that )'ou was averse to our 
obtaining the full extent of boundary and fishery secured to us by 
the treaty. Your conduct respecting them throughout the negotia- 
tion indicated a strong and a steady attachment to both these ob- 
jects, and in my opinion promoted the attainment of them. 

I remember that in a conversation which M. de Rayneval, the 
First Secretary of Count de Vergennes, had with you and me in the 
summer of 1 782 you contended for our full right to the fishery and 
argued it on various principles. 

Your letters to me, when in Spain, considered our territory as 
extending to the Mississippi, and expressed your opinion against 
ceding the navigation of that river in very strong and pointed terms. 

In short, sir, I do not recollect the least difterence in sentiment 
between us respecting the boundaries or fisheries ; on the contrary, 
we were unanimous and united in adhering to and insisting on them ; 
■ nor did I ever perceive the least disposition in either of us to recede 
from our claims or be satisfied with less than we obtained. 

Jo^n Jay to Robert Morris. 

Passy, July 20, 1783. 

. . . The loan in Plolland goes on, and from that quarter your 
bills must be saved, if at all. Mr. Adams set out for Amsterdam 
the day before yesterday and will push on that business. If the 
Dutch began to draw benefit from our trade they would lend more 
cheerfully. 

The British Ministry have not yet authorized Mr. Hartley to con- 
sent to anything as to commerce. They amuse him and us and 
deceive themselves. I told him yesterday that they would find us 
like a globe — not to be overset. They wish to be the only carriers 
between their islands and other countries ; and though they are ap- 
prized of our right to regulate our trade as we please, yet I suspect 
they flatter themselves that the different States possess too little of 



Appendix. 1 89 

a national or continental spirit ever to agree in any one national 
system. I think they will find themselves mistaken. 



Franklin to Livingston. 

(Dip. Corresp., iv., pp. 138-9.) 

July 23, 1783. 
. . . I will only add that with respect to myself, neither the 
letter from Monsieur Marbois, handed in through the British nego- 
tiators (a suspicious channel), nor the conversation concerning the 
fishery, the boundaries, the royalists, etc., recommending modera- 
tion in our demands, are of weight sufficient in my mind to fix an 
opinion that this Court wished to restrain us in obtaining any de- 
gree of advantage we could prevail on our enemies to accord, since 
these discourses are fairly resolvable by supposing — a very natural 
apprehension — that we, relying too much on the ability of France to 
continue the war in our favor, might insist on more advantages than 
the English would be willing to grant, and thereby lose the oppor-' 
tunity of making peace, so necessary to all our friends. 

The Count de Vergennes to M. de la Luzerne. 

July 21, 1783. 
After remarking that what would suit them best was that " the 
United States may not assume the political consistency of v^^hich 
they are capable," and referring disapprovingly to England's cession 
to the United States of the navigation of the Mississippi, the Count 
expressed his regret at learning that Franklin had requested his 
recall, adding, in words to which his secret correspondence in regard 
to the peace negotiation give no little significance : "I wish Con- 
gress might reject it, at least for the present, for it would be impos- 
sible to give Mr. Franklin a successor so wise and so conciliating 
as himself. Besides, I should be afraid lest they should leave us Mr. 
Jay ; and this is the man with whom I should like least to treat of 
affairs. He is an egoist, and far too accessible to prejudices and 
humor. We are much occupied with everything relative to our com- 
merce with America, and we feel more than ever the necessity of 
granting it encouragements and favors." * 

* Bancroft's Const. History, i., p. 325. 



1 90 Appendix. 

(Franklin to R. R. Livingston. 

(Franklin, ix., p. 582.) 

Passy, July 22, 1783. 

I shall now answer yours of March 26th, May 9th, and May 
31st.* It gave me great pleasure to learn by the first that the news 
of peace diffused general satisfaction. I will not now take it upon me 
to justify the apparent reserve respecting this Court which you dis- 
approve. We have touched upon it in our general letter, f I do 
not see, however, that they have much reason to complain of that 
transaction. Nothing was stipulated to their prejudice, and none of 
the stipulations were to have force but by a subsequent act of their 
own. I suppose, indeed, that they have not complained of it or 
you would have sent us a copy of the complaint that we might have 
answered it. I long since satisfied Count de Vergennes about it here. 
We did what appeared to us best at the time, and if we have done 
wrong Congress will do right, after hearing us, to censure. Their 
nomination of five persons to the service seems to mark that they 
had some dependence on our joint judgment, since one alone could 
have made a treaty by direction of the French_^Ministry as well as 
twenty. 

Alexander Hamilton to Jay. 

Philadelphia, July 25, 1783. 

. . . I have been witness with pleasure to every event which 
has had a tendency to advance you in the esteem of your country, 
and I may assure you with sincerity that it is as high as you could 
possibly wish. All have united in the warmest approbation of your 
conduct. I cannot forbear telling you this, because my situation 
has given me access to the truth, and I gratify my friendship for you 
in communicating what cannot fail to gratify your sensibility. 

The peace, which exceeds in the goodness of its terms the expec- 
tations of the most sanguine, does the highest honor to those who 
made it. It is the more agreeable as the time has come when think- 
ing men began to be seriously alarmed at the internal embarrassments 
and exhausted state of this country. The New England people talk 

* Dip. Corres., xiv., pp. 84, 107, 109. f ^^id., x., p. 187. 



Appendix. igi 

of making you an annual fish-offering, as an acknowledgment of 
your exertions for the participation of the fisheries. 

We have now happily concluded the great work of independence, 
but much remains to be done to reap the fruits of it. Our prospects 
are not flattering. Every day proves the inefficacy of the present 
confederatioji, yet the common danger being removed, we are re- 
ceding instead of advancing in a disposition to amend its defects. 

. , . After having served in the field during the war, I have 
been making a short apprenticeship in Congress ; but the evacua- 
tion of New York approaching, I am preparing to take leave of pub- 
lic life, to enter into the practice of the law. Your country will con- 
tinue to demand your services abroad. . . . 

John Jay to Col. Alexander Hamilton. 

Passy, September 28, 1783. 

. . . I am happy to hear that the terms of peace and the con- 
duct of your negotiators give general satisfaction ; but there are 
some of our countrymen, it seems, who are not content, and that, 
too, with an article which I thought to be very unexceptional, viz., 
the one ascertaining our boundaries. Perhaps those gentlemen are 
latitudinarians. 

The American newspapers for some months past contain advices 
that do us harm . . . and impeach our good faith in the opin- 
ions of some and our magnanimity in the opinions of many. Our 
reputation also suffers from the apparent reluctance to taxes and 
the ease with which we incur debts without providing for their pay- 
ment. The complaints of the army, the jealousies respecting Con- 
gress, the circumstances which induced their leaving Philadelphia, 
and the too little appearance of a national spirit, pervading, uniting, 
and invigorating the confederacy, are considered as omens which 
portend the diminution of our respectability, power, and felicity. I 
hope that as the wheel turns round other and better indications will 
soon appear. I am persuaded that America possesses too much 
wisdom and virtue to permit her brilliant prospects to fade away for 
the want of either. But whatever time may produce, certain it is 
that our reputation and our affairs suffer from present appearances. 

The Tories are as much pitied in these countries as they are 
execrated in ours. An undue degree of severity toward them 
would therefore be impolitic as well as unjustifiable. , . . 

. . . Victory and peace should, in my opinion, be followed 



192 Appendix. 

by clemency, moderation, and benevolence, and we should be care- 
ful not to sully the glory of the Revolution by licentiousness and 
cruelty. These are my sentiments, and however unpopular they 
may be, I have not the least desire to conceal or disguise 
them. ... 

John Jay to Gouverneur Morris. 

Passy, September 24, 1783. 
. . You have heard that the Ottoman and Russian empires 
are on the point of unsheathing the sword. The objects of the contest 
are more easy to discern than the issue ; but if Russia should extend 
her navigation to Constantinople we may be the better for it. That 
circumstance is an additional motive to our forming a treaty of 
commerce with her. Your commercial and geographical knowledge 
render it unnecessary for me to enlarge on this subject. But what- 
ever we may have to do abroad, it is of little consequence when 
compared to what we have to do at home. 

I am perfectly convinced that no time is to be lost in raising 
and maintaining a national spirit in America. Power to govern the 
confederacy, as to all general purposes, should be grafited and 
exercised. The governments of the different States should be 
wound up and become vigorous. America is beheld with jealousy, 
and jealousy is seldom idle. Settle your boundaries without delay. 
It is better that some improper limits should be fixed than any left 
in dispute. In a word, everything conducive to union and consti- 
tutional energy of government should be cultivated, cherished, and 
protected, and all counsels and measures of a contrary complexion 
should at least be suspected of impolitic views and objects. 

The rapid progress of luxury at Philadelphia is a frequent topic 
of conversation here ; and what is a little remarkable, I have not 
heard a single person speak of it in terms of approbation. 

Robert Morris to John Jay. 

Philadelphia, November 27, 1783. 
My Dear Sir — I congratulate you on the signing of the definite 
treaty, and on the evacuation of New York, which took place on 
Tuesday. . . . 

. . We are dismissing the remains of our army and getting 
rid of expense, so that I hope to see the end of my engagement be- 



Appendix. 193 

fore next May, but I doubt whether it will be in my power to ob- 
serve that punctuality in performing them which I wish and have 
constantly aimed at. 

I am sending some ships to China in order to encourage others 
in the adventurous pursuits of commerce, and I wish to see a foun- 
dation laid for an American navy. 

'^ Otto to Vergennes. 

(Bancroft's Const. History, pp. 479, 480.) 

January 10, 17S6. 
The political importance of Mr. Jay increases daily. Congress 
seems to me to be guided only by his directions, and it is as difficult to 
obtain anything without the co-operation of that minister as to bring 
about the rejection of a measure proposed by him. . . . It is 
very unfortunate for us that for a place so important the choice of 
Congress should have fallen upon the very man who does not love 
us. The affair of the fisheries still lies heavy upon his heart. For 
the rest, whatever the prejudices of this minister toward us may be, 
I cannot deny that there are few men in America better able to fill 
the place which he occupies. The veneration with which he has 
inspired almost all members of Congress proves more than anything 
else that even the jealousy so inseparable from the American dhar- 
acter has not prevailed against him, and that he is as prudent in his 
conduct as he is firm and resolute in his political principles and in 
his coolness toward France. 
13 



APPENDIX H. 



AN ERROR CORRECTED. 

Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, in his "Life of Shelburne " (iii., 
252), says : 

"Jay also intimated, in order to alarm Oswald, that he was about 
to sign a treaty of commerce and alliance with Spain, containing 
claims in regard to the conclusion of peace of a character similar to 
those in the treaty with France." 

There seems to be an error here which I think deserves correc- 
tion. The intimation was given by Franklin to Oswald, and was 
communicated by Oswald to Townsend on August 5, 1782. In one 
of the despatches quoted in a note Mr. Oswald wrote : 

". . . About a week past, when I was with the Doctor 
[Frankhn], and having told him 1 had waited on Mr. Jay, and hap- 
pening to say I thought him a good-natured man, the doctor replied 
he was so, and also a man of good sense ; that he had been ill 
but was now recovering, and at present was busy with the Spanish 
ambassador ; that while at Madrid he had been trying to conclude 
a: treaty with Spain, but they had delayed and put him off from 
time to time, so that he was at last obliged to quit Spain and repair 
to Paris to join him; but that now the Court of Spain had sent to 
■ their ambassador here all power to conclude. 

"I asked the Doctor what sort of treaty it was. He said a treaty 
of commerce, and after a short hesitation added alliance, and at 
last said it was just the same kind of treaty as they had with France. 
I said no doubt it was so and made no further observation. 

" This information came from the Doctor in the easy way of con- 
versation, as any matter of less importance would have passed ; yet 
I imagined with a view of its being properly marked and communi- 
cated, and most likely also with the same intention, as on former oc- 
casions, of showing the expediency of getting on with the business." 



APPENDIX I. 



NOTE OF THE DEBATES ON THE PEACE IN THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY, 1783, AS 
CONFIRMATORY OF THE WISDOM OF THE 
AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS. 

In the Congressional Library at Washington may be found "A 
Full and Faithful Report of the Debates in both Houses of Parliament 
on Monday, February 17, and Friday, 21, 1783, on the Articles of 
Peace. London : Printed for S. Bladon, 13 Paternoster Row." 

See also the "Parliamentary History," vol. xxiii., for the de- 
bate in the Lords, pp. 373-435, and that in the Commons, pp. 436- 
498. 

The House of Commons, February 17. 1783, was more crowded 
than had been known for many years, more than four hundred and 
fifty members being in the house at one time. 

Mr. Thomas Pitt rose to move the Address, after the clerk at 
the table had read the Articles of Peace with France and Spain, and 
the Provisional Articles with America. 

Mr. Pitt showed that the interest on the public debt was in- 
creased from less than four and a half millions at the beginning of 
Lord North's war, to near nine and a lialf millions at the present time ; 
that this six-year war had cost us, therefore, considerably more 
than all the successes of the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Chat- 
ham, and all the wars put together from the time of the Revolution 
for near a century. Mr. Pitt moved the address to express " our sat- 
isfaction that his Majesty has, in consequence of the power entrusted 
to him, laid the foundation by the Provisional Articles with the 
States of North America for a treaty of peace which we trust will 
insure perfect reconciliation and friendship between the two coun- 
tries." 

Mr. Wilberforce seconded the motion. 



196 Appendix. 

He regretted and dwelt with intense emotion on the part rela- 
tive to the loyalists, but concluded by expressing the hearty appro- 
bation of the peace and of the motion which he rose to second. 

Lord John Cavendish moved an amendment of " will consider" 
instead of *' have considered," which Mr. St. John seconded. 

Lord North said that unsuccessful as we had been in the war 
with America, he was certainly prepared for concessions and sacri- 
fices, but he was free to say that the concessions which were made 
had surpassed those which he had ever had in contemplation in the 
most calamitous state of affairs. . . . He had never dreamed 
of those concessions which were now to be made. 

He condemned the treatment of the loyalists and the concession 
of the fisheries, which was without reciprocity, for they were not se- 
cured the right of fishing, which they used formerly to have on the 
coast of America. 

Mr. Powys spoke for the original motion. 

Lord Mulgrave said since the peace was made he would abide 
by it. 

Mr. Geo. Townsend defended the treaty and said : " In regard 
to the boundaries of Canada, had they been left in the situation they 
were prior to the provisional treaty, they would have been an eter- 
nal bone of contention between us and Canada, because some of 
the boundaries of the colonies were included in those of Canada." 

Mr. Burke said he never heard in the course of his life anything 
so ridiculous as the defence set up by the honorable gentlemen in 
support of the peace. 

He declared solemnly on the whole that the articles were so de- 
grading as to merit obliteration, if it were possible to effect it, out of 
the history of the country (page ^t^). 

The Lord Advocate was very warm in his panegyric on ministers 
and strenuous in the approval of the peace. He was very pointed 
on the noble lord in the blue ribbon, and Mr. Fox, on their sup- 
posed confederacy and coalition, and on the warmth of their zeal in 
the honeymoon of their loves. 

Gov. Johnston declared the peace unwise, unpolitic, and to the 
last degree dishonorable. 

He recognized the right of the Crown to make peace, but con- 
tended that the cession of any part of the dominion of this country 
was not constitutional in the Crown. 

Mr. Sheridan held that the treaty was of the most disgraceful na- 



Appendix. 197 

ture and relinquished everything that was glorious and great in this 
country (page 46). 

Among the other speakers were Mr. Banker, for the address ; 
Sir Wm. Dreben, who was against the right of cession of territory ; 
Mr. Mansfield ; Sir Francis Besset ; Mr. James Grenville ; Mr. Fox, 
wha said, " It was everywhere concession ; " Mr. Chancellor Pitt, 
who spoke for the address; and Mr. Sheridan, who replied. The re- 
sult was : 

Ayes for amendment 224 

Nays 208 

A majority against the ministers of 16 

On the same day, February 17th, the debate took place in the 
House of Lords, where there were present one hundred and forty-five 
more persons than had been present before during the reign of 
George III. Lord Pembroke and Lord Carmarthen were the mover 
and seconder of the address, and Lord Carlisle the mover of the 
amendment. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, in his " Life of Shel- 
burne " (iii., 346), says : 

**The chief supporters of the amendment in the House of Lords 
were Lord Townsend, Lord Stormont, Lord Sackville, Lord Wal- 
singham. Lord Keppel, and Lord Loughborough. Against them 
were ranged the Duke of Grafton, Lord Grantham, Lord Howe, the 
successor of Lord Keppel at the Admiralty, Lord Shelburne, and the 
Chancellor. The Duke of Richmond expressed himself dissatisfied 
with the preliminaries, but refused to vote against them ; Lord Gower 
adopted a similar course. 

"The principal points selected for attack in the American treaty 
were the boundary line between the two countries throughout its whole 
length, the clause relating to the fisheries, and the alleged neglect of 
the loyalists.* In the French and Spanish treaties hardly a clause, 

* Mr. Lecky, in his History of England (vol. iv., 287, 289, quoting Sabine's 
American Loyalists, pp. 86 and 87, and Jones' History of New York, ii., 259, 
268, 500, 509, and Wilmot's Historical View of the Commission for Inquiring 
into the Losses and Claims of the Loyalists, pp. 15-16), estimates the loyal emi- 
grants to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick alone at 35,000, and the total number 
of refugee not much less than 100,000. In 178.'', and for some years later, Eng- 
land paid more than ^40,000 a year to 315 persons. Later additional sums were 
voted in annuities and half- pay, besides gra::t= of land. In 1790 the claimants in 
England, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Cr.naJa were 5,072, of whom 954 



198 Appendix. 

except that relating to Minorca, remained unchallenged. The na- 
tional interests, it was declared, had been entirely abandoned; the 
fleet, it was alleged, especially by Keppel, had never been in so ef- 
ficient a condition, and the glorious recollections of 1763 were 
evoked to put to shame the negotiators and the ministers of 1782, 
who, it was further asserted, had no right to sign the treaty without 
consulting ParUament. The condition of the finances of the coun- 
try was too prosaic a subject to be deemed worthy of much attention 
by the excited critics of the day. 

" The debate in the House of Lords continued till a very early 
hour of the following morning. Late at night Shelburne rose to re- 
ply to the objections which had been urged against the treaty. He 
began by dwelling on the difficulty of the position at the moment he 
was called to the head of affairs, and pointed out how numerous 
and intricate the questions which he was called to consider. . 
As to the cession of the back lands of Canada, he showed that, con- 
sidering the small amount of their exports and imports, it was pre- 
posterous to argue that their loss would ruin the trade of England, 
while it should be recollected that the best fur districts were in the 
country which was retained. . . . ' What then,' he said, ' is the 
result of this part of the treaty? Why, this : you have given Amer- 
ica, with whom every call under heaven urges you to stand on the 
footing of brethren, a share in a trade the monopoly of which you 
sordidly preserved to yourselves at the loss of the enormous sum of 
^750,000. Monopolies, some way or other, are ever justly pun- 
ished. They forbid rivalry, and rivalry is the very essence of the 
well-being of trade. This seems to be the era of Protestantism in 
trade. ... If there is any nation under heaven which ought 
to be the first to reject monopoly, it is the English. Situated as we 
are, between the old world and the new, and between Northern and 
Southern Europe, all we ought to covet upon earth is free trade and 
fair equality.' . . . On the question of the loyalists Shelburne ap- 
pealed to his own past conduct as a proof that he was not likely to 
have neglected their interests. Lord Sackville, he said, had declared 
his belief that the recommendation of Congress on their behalf would 
prove of no avail; but the word 'recommendation' was that which 

either withdrew or failed to establish their claims, and among the remainder 
;^3, 110,000 was distributed. Comparing the number of i^fw^yf^i? claimants in 
1790 with the estimate of 100,000 refugees, the latter would seem to be exagger- 
ated. 



Appendix. 159 

Congress had always used to the provincial assemblies in all their 
measures relating to money and men. It was difficult, from the 
nature of the Constitution of the United States, to procure more 
than a recommendation. . . . In reply to the question, * Why have 
you given America the freedom of fishing in all your creeks and har- 
bors, and especially on the banks of Newfoundland, and why have 
you not stipulated for a reciprocity of fishing in the American creeks 
and harbors ? ' he showed that for the first reason it would have 
been impossible to exclude the American fishermen, while in the 
second there would be plenty of room for both parties, and no ne- 
cessity for the English fishermen to feel hampered by the presence 
of those of the United States. . . . But in such a day as this 
your lordships must be told what were the difficulties which the 
King's ministers had to encounter in the course of the last campaign. 

. . What have been my anxieties for New York ! What have 
I suffered from the apprehension of an attack on that garrison, 
which, if attacked, must have fallen ! What have I suffered from 
the apprehensions of an attack on Nova Scotia or Newfoundland ! 
The folly, or the want of enterprise by our enemies, alone pro- 
tected those places ; for had they gone there instead of to Hudson's 
Bay, they must have fallen. . . . The noble Viscount (Lord 
Keppel) has told us the case of the fleet with which he was sent 
to the relief of Gibraltar. He could hardly venture to swim home 
in the Victory. How many of our ships were, in fact, under- 
manned? Did the House know this? . . . Are not these things 
so, and are not these things to be taken into the account before min- 
isters are condemned for giving peace to the country ? . . . 
You will pardon me if I have been earnest in laying before your 
lordships our embarrassments, our difficulties, our views, and rea- 
sons for what we have done. I submit them to you with confi- 
dence, and rely on the nobleness of your natures, that in judging of 
men who have hazarded so much for their country, you will not be 
guided by prejudice nor influenced by party." 

The debate concluded with a legal battle between Loughborough 
and Thurlow on the right of the Crown to sign a treaty ceding na- 
tional territory without the previous consent of Parliament. The 
speech of Thurlow upon this occasion is generally considered to 
have settled the question in the affirmative (Shelburne's Life, iii., 

346, 355)- 

At half-past four in the morning the Lords divided, the contents 



•S200 Appendix. 

■ and proxies being 72, the non-contents and proxies 59 — a majority 
'for the address of 13. Of the bishops but thirteen were present, 
and only seven voted for the ministry. " Their consistency, how- 
ever," remarks Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, " may be admired in not 
desiring to associate their names with the conclusion of a war which 
they had done so much to excite end embitter." 

On February 21st Lord John Cavendish brought forward his 
resolution, " which," says Lord Edmond, " with sublime indiffer- 
ence to the declaration of its predecessor that the House had not 
yet had time to examine the preliminaries and therefore could not 
applaud them, proposed to censure them in the lump without even 
calling for papers." " Such a gross indecorum," says Walpole, " was 
perhaps occasioned by the desire of saving Lord North from any 
retrospect the neglect of which they could not justify if they went 
into the article against Lord Shelburne." Late in the evening Pitt 
.rose to reply to the attacks upon the ministry, and after remarking 
that the debate obviously originated rather in an inclination to force 
the Earl of Shelburne from the Treasury than in any real conviction 
'that ministers deserved censure for the concessions they had made, 
►he pronounced an eulogium upon his powerful abilities, his habitual 
'Uprightness, and the honest and honorable part that he had acted, 
■remarking, " but his merits are as much above my panegyric as the 
lot to which he owes his defamation are beneath my attention " 
^(Shelburne, iii., 365). At half-past three in the morning the House 
•divided — for the Government, 190 \ for the opposition, 207 ; a majority 
of 17 censuring the terms of peace. This result led to the resigna- 
tion of Shelburne on February 23d, recommending the King to 
■send for Pitt, who would not undertake the task without a moral' 
certainty of a majority in the House of Commons. He then, on 
March 9th, sent for Lord Ashburton, and after an unsuccessful 
attempt to resist the force of the coalition, the King wrote to Shel- 
burne (April 2, 1783) : "I have taken the bitter potion of appoint- 
ing the seven ministers named by the Duke of Portland and Lord 
North to kiss hands. ... I do not mean to grant a single 
peerage or other mark of favor." On December i8th the resig- 
nation of the two secretaries was demanded by the King, and 
Pitt accepted the premiership. On October 31, 1784, Shelburne 
was made Marquis of Lansdowne. 

Apart from the general historic interest of the Parliamentary 



Appendix. 201 

debates on the treaty with America and the admitted unpopularity 
of its concessions, these facts have an important value in illustrating 
the wisdom of the American Commissioners in signing the Prelimi- 
nary Articles without communicating them to France, and showing 
that the danger to which Jay referred in his letter to Livingston 
(dated Passy, July 19, 1782 — Jay's Life and Writings, i,, 174) as likely 
to occur had they communicated the articles to Vergennes, as Liv- 
ingston thought they should have done, would almost inevitably 
have happened. 

The letter will be found ante, in Appendix, page 183, and show?, 
first, that they were well advised of Lord Shelburne's position ; that 
the necessity of concluding a peace before Parliament met made 
them less tenacious on some points than they would otherwise have 
been ; and that they had reason to suppose that the British Com- 
missioner and his advisers were rather exceeding the discretion 
intended by the British Cabinet. This view, it may be remarked in 
passing, would seem to be confirmed by a passage in the letter of 
M. de Rayneval to Mr. Monroe on the peace negotiations (dated 
Paris, November 14, 1795 — -Rives' Madison, i., Appendix, 658) if 
M.,de Rayneval's statements had not been so frequently proven to 
be erroneous or exaggerated. He says of his Second visit to Lord 
Lansdowne (meaning Lord Shelburne) after the signing of the 
Preliminary Articles : 

"Je ne dois pas omettre de vous dire, Monsieur, que Milord 
Lansdowne, chez qui j'etais a I'instant oil il apprit cette signature, 
me dit que c'etait un incident qu'il ne concevait pas, et qu'il 
n'aurait des idees nettes a cette egard, qu'aprds la lecture des 
depeches. Je revis le premier Ministre le lendemain, et il me dit 
que le traite, dont il s'agit avait fait la plus vive sensation sur le 
conseil ; qu'il avait retourne les esprits." 

Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice states (Shelburne, iii., 302) that at the 
last moment it was a question "whether the English Commissioners 
could venture to sign without consulting their principals," and 
Strachey wrote Nepean (November 29, 1782) : " Now are we to be 
hanged or applauded for thus rescuing England from the American 
war ? " 

The second point shown by Jay's letter is that Great Britain was 
pledged to ratify not what Oswald should verbally agree to, but 
what he should formally sign and affix his seal to ; that if the 
articles had been shown to Vergennes he would have complimented 



202 Appendix. 

the Commissioners on the terms obtained, but would have insisted 
on a postponement of the signing till the articles between France, 
Spain, and Britain were also ready for signing. This is clear from 
the language of Vergennes. If the Commissioners had rejected 
such advice it would have given more offence to France than their 
doing it without consulting her, and if she had assented to delay the 
signing the British Cabinet might have declined to approve the 
articles as still res infectcz, and the French Minister would have had 
an opportunity at least of approving the objections of the British 
Court, and of advising us to recede from our demands as immoder- 
ate and opposed to the wishes both of France and Spain, 



APPENDIX J. 



EXTRACTS FROM HISTORICAL WRITERS TOUCH- 
ING THE PEACE. 

No. I. 

(From Wraxall's Memoirs of His Own Time, 1 772-1 784. New Vork and Lon- 
don, Vol. II., pp. 391. 18S4.) 

Sir William Wraxall remarks (November, 1782) that ''while 
Lord Howe thus placed in security the most brilliant foreign possession 
belonging to the British Crown in Europe [by relieving Gibraltar], 
negotiations of a pacific measure were carrying on at Paris, both with 
America and with the other coalesced powers. The Provisional 
Articles concluded with the insurgent colonies which were first 
signed did not indeed demand any considerable length of time or 
superior diplomatic talents in order to conduct them to a prosper- 
ous termination, where almost every possible concession was made 
on the part of England merely to obtain from America a cessation 
of hostilities. Not only their independence was recognized in the 
most explicit terms ; territories, rivers, lakes, commerce, islands, 
forts and fortified places, Indian allies, loyalists — all were given up 
to the Congress. In fixing the boundaries between Canada and the 
United States ideal limits ignorantly adopted on our part were laid 
down amidst unknown tracts." 

Sir Nathaniel William Wraxall, after summing up the result of 
the general pacification to each of the parties engaged in the war, 
somewhat as Mr. Lecky has done, remarked : 

" America triumphed in the contest, and the greatest statesmen 
whom England had produced, though they concurred in scarcely 
any other political opinion, yet agreed upon the point that with the 
defalcation of the thirteen colonies from the Crown the glory and 
g,reatness of England were permanently extinguished " (pp. 439- 
440). Wraxall quotes as having solemnly expressed that idea at 
different periods, the elder Chatham, Shelburne, Lord George 



204 Appendix. 

Germain, and Dunning. Shelburne had said even so late as July 
10, 1782, when constituted First Lord of the Treasury, " Whenever 
the British Parliament should recognize the sovereignty of the thir- 
teen colonies, the sun of England's glory was forever set" (p. 440). 

No. 2. 

M. BRISSOT DE WARVILLE ON THE PART 
BORNE BY JAY IN THE PEACE NEGOTIA- 
TIONS. 

As these pages are passing through the press, the Magazine of 
American History for March, 1884, reproduces (p. 246) in a paper 
on " Brissot de Warville : His Notes on America in 1788," the fol- 
lowing translation of his comments on the Peace Negotiations of 
1782: 

When M. de Warville reached New Rochelle he wrote : " This 
place will always be celebrated for having given birth to one of the 
most distinguished men of the last Revolution — a Republican re- 
markable for' his firmness and his coolness, a writer eminent for 
his nervous style and his close logic — Mr. John Jay, present Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs. The following anecdote will give an idea 
of the firmness of this Republican : At the time of laying the foun- 
dation of the peace of 1783 M. de Vergennes, actuated by secret 
motives, wished to engage the ambassadors of Congress to confine 
their demands to the fisheries, and to renounce the western terri- 
tory ; that is, the vast and fertile country beyond the Alleghany 
Mountains. This minister [Vergennes] required particularly that 
the independence of America should not be considered as the basis 
of the peace, but simply that it should be conditional. To succeed 
in this project it was necessary to gain over Jay and Adams. Mr. 
Jay declared to M. de Vergennes that he would sooner lose his life 
than sign such a treaty ; that the Americans fought for independ- 
ence ; that they would never lay down their arms till it should be 
fully consecrated ; that the Court of France had recognized it ; and 
that there would be a contradiction in her conduct if she should 
deviate from that point. It was not diflficult for Mr. Jay to bring 
Mr. Adams to this determination, and M. de Vergennes could never 
shake his firmness. Consider here the strange concurrence of events. 
The American who forced the Court of France and gave law to the 
English Minister was the grandson of a French refugee of the last 



I 



Appendix. 205 

century who fled to New Rochelle. Thus the descendant of a man 
whom Louis XIV. had persecuted with a foolish rage imposed his 
decisions on the descendant of that sovereign, in his own palace, a 
hundred years after the banishment of the ancestor. Mr. Jay was 
equally immovable by all the efforts of the English Minister, whom 
M. de Vergennes had gained to his party, and his reasoning de- 
termined the Court of St. James. . . . When Mr. Jay passed 
through England to return to America Lord Shelburne desired to see- 
him. Accused by the nation of having granted too much to the 
Americans, the English statesman desired to know, in case he had 
persisted not to accord to the Americans the western territory, if 
they would have continued the war. Mr. Jay answered that he be- 
lieved it and that he should have advised it." 



No. 3. 

THE NEW YORK REVIEW ON JAY'S ACTION. 

From a paper by the late Professor John McVickar, D.D., 
OF Columbia College, New York. October, 1841. 

. . . Jay's characteristic caution, with which his fame has 
been taunted, was the result of principle and not of selfishness. 
His caution was for his country's safety, not for his own, still less 
for private benefit. Not against peril, through duty, whether of 
person, fame, or fortune, did Jay ever display it, but solely against 
aught which threatened the common good. "iW quid deirimefiti 
respuMica caperet." On the whole, we conclude that few men of 
less rigidness of character would so successfully have resisted the 
alternate cajoling and threatening arts by which, both at Madrid and 
Paris, the American negotiator was literally beset, in the vain hope 
that he might be entrapped or browbeaten into satisfactory terms. 
It affords to men in all time an instructive and comforting picture 
of such contest, one, to the wordly eye, so fearfully unequal as re- 
publican simplicity matched against the trained diplomacy and cor- 
rupt management of Europe — an instructive and a proud picture, 
too, for " the race here was not unto the swift, nor the battle to the 
strong." Spain was finally caught in her own net : waiting, with 
selfish wisdom, for American infancy to succumb, she found herself 
at length in the arms of a giant Hercules, and, by delaying the boon 



2o6 Appendix. 

she might have sold till America no longer needed it, she lost the 
equivalent the young Republic stood ready at first to offer. 

. . . The French Government had solicited and received, 
from a too confiding Congress, the control of an absolute guardian 
in negotiating the terms of peace. The question is whether to that 
trust her acts showed her faithful or faithless ; for surely in the latter 
case it were an act of the highest wisdom in Jay to detect such 
double-dealing, as well as of the highest patriotism at any risk to de- 
feat it. We think it was so proved, and rank Jay accordingly. 

. . . On one point, at least, we cannot but condemn Frank- 
lin, though in a matter more, perhaps, of judgment than patriotism. 
We know that he was for waiving the all-important honorable ques- 
tion whether independence was to precede or follow the treaty — 
whether we were to stand before England in the light of revolted 
colonies or of independent States. In the celebrated interview of 
August loth, Jay made short answer to what he well termed Ver- 
gennes' "singular reasoning" on this subject in favor of Oswald's 
commission. The Count then turned to Doctor Franklin and asked 
him what he thought of the matter. The Doctor said he believed 
the commission would do. " I told the minister," says Jay, " that 
we neither could nor zuould treat with any nation in the world on any 
other than an equal footing" (letter to Gouverneur Morris, xi., 
io6). In private conference too, with Jay, such was his argument, 
"the good faith of the French" and "obedience to instructions ;" 
and, in accordance with these views, Franklin declined putting his 
name to the letter drawn up by Jay refusing to treat except on 
terms of equality. But this, as before said, touches not his love for 
his country or his sense of duty, though still in neither in accord- 
ance with ours. As to his clear-sightedness into the views of France, 
Franklin stands also, in our estimation, condemned of the blind- 
ness either of partiality or culpable remissness. The course of 
France in the matter of American liberty during the contest had 
been, on the part of individuals, one of high and generous enthusi- 
asm, and on the part of her Government, one of liberal though cal- 
culating policy. This was for the lowering of England. But when 
it came to the question of a solid and permanent independence to 
the States, that was another question ; and herein we hold the pol- 
icy of the French Government (saving, perhaps, the King person- 
ally) to have been one alike selfish, arrogant, and false, and therebj', 
too, dishonorable, inasmuch as it was the abuse of a guardianship 



Appendix. 207 

with which she herself had sought to be entrusted for tlie benefit not 
of herself, but of America, or rather, we should say, through her 
minister at Philadelphia arrogantly claimed (see Count Luzerne's 
letter to Congress), and which trust she now held up to the Ameri- 
can negotiators and to the world at large in proof of her pledged 
generosity and disinterestedness. She had feared, it seems, the " im- 
practicability," as her minister worded it, of Adams as negotiator of 
the treaty, and solicited coadjutors to him. The selfish prayer was 
heard and answered, and truly was a boon granted unto her when Jay, 
" the truly impracticable," became the substitute. In his quiet charac- 
ter the French Government obviously read not at first their difficulty, 
and various were the arts used, as it opened upon them, to entrap or 
overawe him. We refer more especially to the interviews of August 
loth and September 27th, and to the unofficial interference of M. . 
de Rayneval, Vergennes' private secretary, a convenient agent 
whose words and acts might be sustained or abandoned at pleasure, 
one who might gain much and could pledge nothing. (See his let- 
ter and memoir of September 6th.) Under these circumstances Jay 
broke his instructions, opened a direct communication on his own 
personal responsibility with the British Government, demanded and 
obtained from their new Ministry the previous recognition of Ameri- 
can independence — a starting-point against which not England, but 
France, as he had truly suspected, was the bar — and thus did he ef- 
fect the provisional treaty, securing to us, under our own guarantee, 
rights which, under French guardianship, we never should have ob- 
tained. Now, to such conclusion no unprejudiced mind, we think, 
but must arrive from the documentary evidence here exhibited in 
Mr. Jay's two volumes. But such conclusion becomes demonstration 
under the new proof we now are enabled to adduce. The witness 
we bring forward is an unquestioned one — the late Lord St. Helens, 
then Mr. Fitzherbert, the English Minister Resident in Paris, and a 
party to the very negotiation in question. In returning to a friend, 
through whom it comes to us, a copy of the volumes before us, lent 
him for his perusal. Lord St. Helens accompanied them with the 
following testimony: "These memoirs are indeed highly deserving 
of further attention on both sides of the Atlantic, and as you justly 
foresaw, particularly interesting to myself, from my intimate acquaint- 
ance and political intercourse with Mr. Jay, when we were respec- 
tively employed at Paris in 1782; and I can safely add my testi- 
mony to the numerous proofs afforded by these memoirs, that it 



2o8 Appendix. 

was not o?ily chiefly, but solely, through his means that the negotia- 
tions of that period between England and the United States were 
brouglit to a successful conclusion." — Grafton Street, July 29, 1838. 
To this conclusive language as to Mr. Jay's course, we would yet 
add two of his lordship's marginal notes bearing upon the French 
question. 

(Vol. i., p. 145.) 

"N.B. — This letter (Marbois', in Appendix, p. 490) was inter- 
cepted by a British cruiser and communicated to the American Com- 
missioners, and the sequel of this narrative (which is perfectly true 
throughout) will show that this important disclosure of the machina- 
tions of France led to the immediate conclusion of the provisional 
treaty between England and America, being in reality quite tanta- 
mount to a separate treaty. — St. H." 

(Last visit, p. 149.) 

" These propositions related entirely to a certain enlargement of 
the limits of the French fisheries, as defined by former treaties. But 
in the course of these discussions M. de Vergennes never failed to in- 
sist on the expediency of a concert of measures betzueen France and 
England for the purpose of excluding the American States from 
these fisheries,* lest they should become a nursery for seamen. — St. H," 

Such is the new light thrown on this once dark question, and suf- 
ficient, we think, to settle it forever. Let us have no more, there- 
fore, of these charges against Jay of " unfounded jealousy of 
France," or against his friends either of " an overrated estimate of 
the value of his services." 

* That this matter was well understood at the time, and that to Jay ia chief 
belonged the merit of saving the fisheries, is clear. In a letter immediately subse- 
quent Adams thus writes to Jay : " I have received several letters from Boston 
and Philadelphia, from very good hands, which make very honorable and affec- 
tionate mention of you. You have erected a monument lo your memory in every 
New England heart" (vol. ii., p. 153). To the same effect Hamilton writes: 
" The New England people talk of making you an annual fish offering as an 
acknowledgment of your exertions for the participation of the fisheiies" (vol. 
ii., p. 123). 



Appendix. 209 

No. 3. 
VIEWS OF JOHN OUINCY ADAMS. 

Mr. Adams to Judge Jay. 

The Magazine of American History for January, 1879, con- 
tains a correspondence between Mr. Adams and Judge William Jay. 
From one of Mr. Adams' letters, which are marked by. his usual 
vigor of thought and expression, the following is an extract : 

QuiNCY, August j8, 1832. 

I learn with great satisfaction from your letter of the loth inst. 
that you are occupied in preparing for the press a memoir of your 
father's life. The affectionate respect entertained for him by my 
father to the last period of his own life was witnessed by me through 
a long series of years, and has ever been cordially participated in by 
myself. 

The recent efforts, to which you allude, to exalt the reputation 
of Doctor Franklin at the expense of that of his colleagues excited 
my surprise, until I perceived the motives and impulses in which they 
originated. They were the more unjust in regard to your father, as he 
and Doctor Franklin were, as I have understood, always upon terms 
of mutual good understanding. Doctor Franklin was a great favorite 
at the Court of Versailles, and particularly more in, favor with the 
Count de Vergennes, a very equivocal character in public morals, 
though perhaps well adapted to the rotten condition of the French 
monarchy at the close of the reign of Louis XV. and during that of 
his successor until the moment preceding his fall. 

Tlie political system of Vergennes toward our country at the 
commencement of our Revolution is disclosed in some remarks of 
Mr. Turgot upon a memoir of the Count in April, 1776, upon the 
question what course France and Spain should take on that occa- 
sion. He thought the /"^^Z/rF of France was neutrality, her interest 
that the insurrection should be suppressed ; because if Great Britain 
should put us down she would be too much weakened by the nec- 
essary exertions to keep us down to be dangerous to France. 

Even this policy he did not honestly pursue ; but, while profess- 
ing neutrality, he did give clandestine assistance to keep the strug- 
gle up, and the surrender of Burgoyne brought him to another 
14 



2IO Appendix. 

conclusion. He then bound us to France by a treaty of commerce 
and an eventual treaty of alliance. The object of these treaties, he 
further decUred in another memoir in March, 1 784, had been to curb 
the ambition and pride of England, and to prevent the Ainerican 
Revolution from turnitig to the disadvantage of durance. 

During the War of the Revolution and at the negotiations for 
peace Vergennes was against us upon the fisheries, upon the west- 
ern boundary, upon the indemnities to the Tories, and upon the 
navigation of the Mississippi. This your father and mine well knew, 
and therefore did not communicate to the Count de Vergennes the 
progress of their negotiations with Mr. Oswald for peace, but only 
the substg,nce of the treaty when concluded. That treaty, however, 
was not to take effect until the peace between Great Britain and 
France should also be concluded. This the Count de Vergennes 
was negotiating with Mr, Fitzherbert without communicating the 
])rogress of it to the American Commissioners. Doctor Franklin 
did not separate from his colleagues in withholding the details of 
the negotiation from the knowledge of the French Court, but he ap- 
pears to have acquiesced in it with some reluctance, and was far 
more confiding in the friendship of France than she merited. 



APPENDIX K. 



JAY'S VIFAV OF THE POLICY OF FRANCE AND 
THE COMMENTS OF VARIOUS HISTORIANS. 

It may be proper in closing this Appendix to quote the last 
paragraphs of Jay's elaborate letter to Livingston of November 17, 
1782 (Dip. Corres., viii., 206), giving a history of the negotiation 
from his arrival in Paris. It was to this letter that Mr. S|mrks ap- 
pended his " Observations," which have misled so many at home 
and abroad, by his personal assurance that Jay's view of the policy 
of France toward America was contradicted by the secret corre- 
spondence of Vergennes and his diplomatic agents. I add in notes 
two or three extracts from that correspondence as given by de Cir- 
court, and additional passages of equal significance have been al- 
ready given, which show that Jay could hardly have portrayed Ver- 
gennes' policy more accurately, nor in vi^ords mpre nearly identical, 
if the confidential instructions of that.diplomaiist to his agents at 
Madrid and Philadelphia had been lying before Jay as he warned 
Livingston and Congress against -the danger of leaning with an 
excess of confidence on the French Court, " her love of liberty, her 
affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity." 

" I am sensible," said Jay, "of the impression which this letter 
will make npon you and upon Congress, and how it will affect the 
confidence they have in this Court. These are critical times, and 
great necessity there is for prudence and secrecy. 

" So far, and in such matters as this Court may think it their . 
interest to support us, they certainly will, but no further, in my 
opinion. 

"They are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and 
on that point we may, I believe, depend upon them ; but it is not 



212 



Appendix. 



their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, 
and therefore they will not help us to become so.* 

" It is not their interest that such a treaty should be formed be- 
tween us and Britain as would produce cordiality and mutual confi- 
dence. They will, therefore, endeavor to plant such seeds of jealousy, 
discontent, and discord in it as may naturally and perpetually keep 
our eyes fixed on France for security, f This consideration must in- 
duce them to wish to render Britain formidable in our neighbor- 
hood,! and to leave us as few resources of wealth and power as 
possible. 

" It is their interest to keep some point or other in contest be- 
tween us and Britain to the end of the war, to prevent the possibili- 
ty of our sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the 
war, and dependent on them for supplies. Hence tliey have fa- 
vored and will continue to favor, the British demands as to matters 
of boundary and the tories. § 

" The same views will render them desirous to continue the war 
in our country as long as possible. 

" . . . Such being our situation, it appears to me advisable to 
keep up our army to the end of the war, even if the enemy should 
evacuate our country ; nor does it appear to me prudent to listen 

* Nous ne desirous pas, a beaucoup pres, que la nouvelle Republique qui 
s'eleve demeure maitresse exclusive de tout cet immense continent. — Le Comte 
de Vergennes au Comte de Montmoiin, Versailles, 30 Octobre, 1778 (de Circourt, 
iii., 310). 

" Je dis sans interet parce que nous n'en avons aucun a voir I'Amerique Sep- 
tentrionale jouer le role d'une puissance," etc.— M. de Vergennes a M. de la 
Luzerne, 25 Septembre, 1779 (ibid., p. 284). 

•f- "L'independance de I'Amerique Septentrionale et son union permanente avec 
la France ont ete le but principal du roi." — Memoire pour servir d'instruction au 
Sieur Gerard, approuve le 29 Mars 1778, par le roi (de Circourt, iii., 255, 260). 

\ "Suivant ce que M. Gerard me mande 11 faudra bien du temps, et meme des 
siecles, pour que cette nouvelle Republique prenne une consistance qui la mette 
en etat de jouer un role exterieur. Neanmoins il n'en est pas moins interessant 
que les Anglais demeurent maitres du Canada et de la Nouvelle-Ecosse ; ils feront 
la jalousie de ce peuple, qui pourrait bien se retourner ailleurs, et de lui faire 
sentir la necessite d' avoir des garants, des allies et des protecteurs." — Le Comte 
de Vergennes au Comte de Montmorin, 30 Octobre 1778 (de Circourt, iii., 311). 

§ " Here Rayneval played into the hands of English ministers by expressing a 
strong opinion against the American claims to the Newfoundland fishery and to 
the valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio." — Life of Shelburne by Fitzmaurice, 
relating the conversation of Rayneval in England with Shelburne and Grantham 
(vol. iii., p. 263). 



Appendix. 2 1 3 

to any overtures for carrying a part of it to the West Indies, in 
case of such an event. 

"I think we have no rational dependence except on God and 
ourselves, nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has either 
wisdom, virtue, or magnanimity enough to adopt a perfect and 
liberal system of conciliation. If they again thought they could 
conquer us, they would again attempt it. 

"We are, nevertheless, thank God, in a better situation than we 
have been. As our independence is acknowledged by Britain, every 
obstacle to our forming treaties with neutral powers, and receiving 
their merchant ships, is at an end, so that we may carry on the war 
with greater advantage than before, in case our negotiations for 
peace should be fruitless. 

" It is not my meaning, and therefore I hope I shall not be under- 
stood to mean, that we should deviate in the least from our treaty 
with France ; our honor and our interest are concerned in inviolably 
adhering to it. I mean only to say, that if we lean on her love of 
liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity, 
we shall lean on a broken reed that will sooner or later pierce our 
hands, and Geneva as well as Corsica justifies this observation. 

" I have written many disagreeable things in this letter, but I 
thought it my duty. I have also deviated from my instructions, 
which, though not to be justified, will, I hope, be excused on account 
of the singular and unforeseen circumstances which occasioned it. 

" Let me again recommend secrecy, and believe me to be, dear 
sir, etc." 



APPENDIX L. 



VIEWS OF AMERICAN AND SOME FOREIGN 
AUTHORS. 

Mr, Pitkin's HtstORY. 

The accuracy of Jay's view of the French policy, enforced by 
the proofs from the French archives alluded to in the review of their 
action by the Cabinet of Washington, were quoted by his biographer, 
Chief Justice Marshall; and the Honorable Timothy Pitkin, whose 
character and services as a statesman added weight to his authority 
as an historian, in his " Political and Civil History of the United 
States of America," published at New Haven in 1828, gave a fair 
sketch of the peace negotiations, and after speaking of the policy of 
Spain, said : 

" From this communication (of Rayneval) and the claim made 
by the Spanish ambassador, there could be no doubt that France and 
Spain intended to secure the western country to themselves, or 
yield it to Great Britain for an equivalent elsewhere. Nor Was there 
less doubt as to the real view of the French Court with regard to the 
fisheries. With respect to the loyalists, the Count de Vergennes 
himself expressed an opinion to Mr. Adams in favor of some pro- 
vision for them." 

Having alluded to the decision of Jay and Adams to act for 
themselves and conclude the treaty without consulting the French 
Court, and to Franklin's agreement to act with them, M\\ Pitkin 
said : " This negotiation, so interesting to the United States, was 
fortunately entrusted to gentlemen distinguished for their fairness, as 
well as talent and integrity. They knew too well how much the 
future prosperity and happiness of their country depended on secur- 
ing the fisheries, the western country and a part of the lakes, to run 
the hazard of losing them at the suggestion or advice of any power 
whatever.'* 



Appendix. 2 1 5 

Mr. jAREt) Sparks. 

Two years later> in 1830, appeared the " Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence of the American Revolution," in twelve volumes, published con- 
formably to a resolution of Congress of March 27, 1818, edited by 
Jared Sparks, and his editorial note to Jay's letter (viii., 208, referred 
to ante) pages 16, 17, 41, 42, 112, and 113) contained the extra- 
ordinary statement which he repeated in his lives of Franklin and 
Gouverneur Morris, and in a review of Pitkin's history in the North 
Americari Review (January, 1830, p. 15), and which seems to have 
been accepted with unquestioning faith and an almost childlike 
credulity, that the correspondence of Vergennes developing the 
policy and designs of the French Court showed Jay to be mistaken 
in regard to their aims and their plans. 

Apart from the mystery of Mr. Sparks' extraordinary misreading 
and misrepresentation of the document, in the French archives, now 
brought to light, of which the only explanation thus far suggested 
beyond the personal eccentricity which induced him to improve the 
style of Washington's letters (ajite, p. 112, note) is a possible want 
of familiarity with the French language, to which some plausibility 
is given by the mistranslation already referred to of a part of a note 
from Rayneval to Vergennes (ante, pp. 41-42, note), there is an- 
other point on which his literary executors or friends may, perhaps, 
throw light. It is not quite easy to understand why he should have 
taken such pains to prove that Doctor Franklin Avas right in his first 
view of the question when he inclined to obey the instructions of 
Congress to follow the advice of Vergennes, and to act under the 
first commission, which treated the United States as colonies or 
plantations, and when he refused to sign the letter prepared by 
Jay. Had Doctor Franklin continued to hold this position, one 
can understand a biographer desiring to vindicate its correctness^ 
But Doctor Franklin himself abandoned his first position, and on 
the arrival of Adams announced his readiness to proceed with 
Adams and Jay without consulting the French Court, and a little 
later Franklin joined with his associates in explaining to Congress^ 
as the apology for their conduct, that they " knew that the French 
Court was against our claim to the western boundary, and they had 
reason to imagine that the Articles respecting the boundaries, the 
refugees, and the fisheries, did not correspond with its policy." 

Then, again, even if Mr. Sparks was himself insensible to the 



2 1 6 Appendix. 

force of the intercepted Marbois letter about the fisheries, and to the 
official pretensions of D'Aranda to the western territory, and the 
careful memoir presented to Jay as the personal views of Rayneval, 
and to the support given by Vergennes himself to the claims of 
Spain, it does not appear why, in making his repeated charge, that 
" the suspicions of the Commissioners were sustained by no other evi- 
dence than that of circumstances, personal conjectures, and decep 
tive appearances :" he omitted to allude to the review of the whole 
case by Washington, and the proofs quoted in Mr. Pickering's letter, 
and referred to in Marshall's " Life of Washington," of "the Mach- 
iavelian policy " of France, and of the duplicity " which reigned 
over the negotiations for peace," as shown by the letters of Ver- 
gennes and Montmorin, which had aroused the indignation of the 
French Directory. 

Mr. Schlosser's History. 

Among the foreign writers who have quoted Mr. Sparks as their 
authority for distortion of historic truth and curious abuse of Jay 
and Adams for obtaining from England such excellent terms, was 
Schlosser, the author of a " History of .the Eighteenth Century," 
etc. (translated by Davidson, vol. v., 295 et seq.: London, 1845). 

Schlosser says : " In July Fitzherbert, afterward well known under 
the name of Lord St. Helens, was commissioned to negotiate with the 
European powers at Versailles concerning the preliminaries of a peace, 
and Oswald was despatched to treat with Franklin in Paris concerning 
North America. Franklin would willingly have delayed the final set- 
tlement of the preliminaries out of gratitude to France and a sense 
of propriety, at least till England had come to an understanding 
with France at Versailles ; but he was overruled by Jay and Adams, 
and the latter signed the treaty without even asking Vergennes, to 
whom America owed so much. The English ministry not only ac- 
knowledged the independence of the Republic, but made conces- 
sions with regard to the territory beyond the Blue Mountains, where 
the most flourishing provinces and towns now are, as well as in re- 
gard to forts, islands, and the right of fishery ; nay, in order to sep- 
arate America from France as soon as possible, they did not even re- 
quire an exact definition of the boundary on the north of the United 
States, in consequence of which a -serious difference has arisen 
within these last few years, according to the universally received prop- 
osition in America that the principal end of human wishes is and 



Appejidix. 217 

ought to be the gieatest wealth and external advantages. The 
American lawyers, Ja-y and Adams, behaved very properly in op- 
posing their colleague Franklin. The American quibblers invented 
a word on this occasion in order to avoid that condition in their 
treaty with Fjance according to which they were not to sign any 
preliminaries before France had done the same. They called the 
Articles on which they had agreed Provisional Articles. The Eng- 
lish Ministry were able to excite the jealousy of the Americans, 
and the latter urged on Franklin's colleagues to out- vote him, and to 
hasten the conclusions of the treaty. Franklin's most recent biog- 
rapher (" Sparks' Life of Benjamin Franklin," vol. i., p. 489) has 
plainly asserted what Franklin himself only hints at in his letters, that 
he by no means approved of the ruse by which Messrs. Jay and 
x^dams had deceived the French Ministry. Vergennes felt himself 
justly offended, and was very much surprised. . . . The States 
of Holland were entirely French in their opinions ; they trusted in 
Vergennes because he was an honorable man,* although honor and 

* England declared war against Holland December 20, 1780. She had com- 
plained that Paul Jones had been allowed to bring his prizes into Dutch harbors 
and remain for weeks, itnd that American privateers were fitted out at St.'Eusta- 
tius ; that that island had long been the chief source of American supplies, and 
that among the papers of Henry Laurens, when captured near Newfoundland 
was an inchoate treaty of commerce and amity made by Neufville, of Amster- 
dam, between Holland and the United States (Lecky, iv., 172, 174). The de- 
claration of war, says Lecky, was treated by the English Opposition as a great 
crime, and many later writers have adopted the same view. The plenipoten- 
tiaries of Holland in the peace negotiations were Berkenroode and Brandlzen 
and after suffering fearfully during the war she was fated to suffer by the peace. 
Judge William Jay, in the Life of John Jay (vol. i., p. 173), says that Jay ob- 
tained a copy of the instructions of the Dutch Minister, and left it amonn- his 
papers. 

From this document it appears that the Duke de Vauguyon, French Am- 
bassador at the Hague, had there performed a part similar to that acted by Count 
Luzerne at Philadelphia ; and that through his representations the Dutch Minis- 
ters were required to act in concert with liie French Court, and " /t; t)iake confi- 
dential comnitmications of all things to them. " 

Mr. Adams wrote, on June i6th, of the difficulties experienced by the Dutch 
and said : "And this difficulty probably arises from the instructions in question, 
by which they made themselves of no importance, instead of acting the part of a 
sovereign, independent, and respectable power." If they had held their own ne- 
gotiations in their own hands they would probably have obtained better terms. 
In August Mr. Adams wrote again that one of the Dutch Ministers in speaking 
of the Count de Vergennes said : " He certainly deceived me. The States-Gen- 



2i8 Appendix. 

honesty are seldom found in connection with the prudence necessary 
for a diplomatist, and principally for this reason Franklin was vexed 
at the quibble which his colleagues had practised on two such men 
as Vergennes and Louis XVI. " 

Mr. Coxe's House of Austria. 
Mr. Coxe, in his " History of the House of Austria" (vol. v., p. 
327, 2d ed.), viewing the negotiations from a different standpoint, 
and referring particularly to the communication of the intercepted 
letters of Marbois, says : " Mr. Fitzherbert fulfilled his delicate office 
with great ability and address. While he treated with Vergennes he 
succeeded in alarming Franklin, Adams, and Jay, and prevailed on 
them to sign a separate and provisional article." 

Mr. Hildreth's History. 

Hildreth, in his " History of the United States," says : " France 
was inclined to favor the interests of Spain, her family ally ; she was 
also very anxious to speedily terminate a war, the whole financial 
burden of which her American allies seemed inclined to shift upon 
her shoulders. Such appears to have been the only foundation for 
the suspicions entertained of the designs of the French Court. In 
his whole intercourse with America, Vergennes seems to have 
acted an honorable part, contributing according to his best judg- 
ment to secure the professed object of the treaty of alliance, the 
political and commercial independence of the United States " (Hil- 
dreth, iii., 421). 

In an earlier part of the same volume, M. Hildreth refers to the 
small encouragement which Mr. Dana received in his mission to 
St. Petersburg from the French Minister at that capital, and re- 
marked that Dana and Adams concurred in the opinion that France 
was seeking an exclusive control over the foreign relation's of the 
United States. 

Mr. Rives' Life of Madison. 

The late Honorable William C. Rives, in his " Life and Times 
of Madison," devotes Chapters XI. and XII., Volume I., to the 

eral did very wrong to bind me to leave so much to the French Minister ; but I 
thought him an honest man, and that I could trust liim, so I left things to him 
according to my instructions, depending on his word, and at last I found myself 
his dupe" (Dip. Corr.,vii., 150). 



Appendix. 219 

instructions and negotiations for peace, and under the heading 
of " Unfounded Suspicions of the Sincerity of France Manifested by 
Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams," remarked : 

" An historical inquirer [meaning Mr. Sparks] whose candor and 
love of truth are worthy of his superior industry and judgment, and 
who nas had free access to the diplomatic archives of both the French 
and British Governments, and especially the confidential corre- 
spondence of Count de Vergennes and Monsieur Rayneval during 
the period of the suspected mission of the latter, has in his investi- 
gations found every one of Mr. Jay's suspicions not merely unsus- 
tained, but contradicted by the record. How monitory this lesson 
of the delusion to which the highest intellect is exposed when swayed 
by suspicion and prejudice," etc. 

Mr. Flanders' Chief Justices. 

Mr. Henry Flanders, in " The Lives and Times of the Chief 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States " (vol. i., p. 343), 
remarks : 

" . . . This statement of Fitzherbert (touching Vergennes 
and the fisheries) is of historical importance. It comes from an' 
actor on the scene, and abundantly confirms the suspicions enter- 
tained by Mr. Jay of the object contemplated by the French Court. 
The letter of M. Marbois spoke his sentiments as to the fisheries, 
and we may safely conclude from thence that M. de Rayneval in 
his letters and conversations equally spoke his sentiments as to the 
Western lands and the navigation of the Mississippi. 

" . . . Had the American Commissioners governed their con- 
duct by their instructions, and submitted to the advice of Vergennes, 
we think it apparent that the United States would have been de- 
prived of the fisheries, of the Western lands, and the navigition of the 
Mississippi ; but in spite of the conviction thus forced upon us we 
cannot forget the generous aid France afforded this country in her 
struggle to secure a national existence. She sent a fleet and army 
to fight our battles ; she loaned us eighteen millions of livres and 
gave us twelve millions. That she should propose to herself some 
equivalent gain for the expenses of the war is not surprising. We 
do not look for wholly interested conduct in the dealings of nations. 
But when it is obvious that one ally is endeavoring by indirection, 
by concert with the enemy and another ally, to deprive a third one 



220 Appendix. 

of advantages justly belonging to him, it is well that the intrigue 
should be counteracted and its profligacy exposed. Previous good 
conduct may soften the severity of our condemnation, but it cannot 
justify guilt" (pp. 343' 344). 

Frank Leslie's Monthly. 

A paper entitled "The Treaty of Paris, 1783," in Frank Les- 
lie's Popular Monthly, for September, 1883, illustrated by engrav- 
ings : " The Signing of the Treaty of Paris," a view of Versailles, and 
portraits of Laurens, Franklin, Jay, Vergennes, and Adams, curiously 
illustrates some of the popular blunders about the relative positions 
toward the American claims occupied by France and Spain in the 
peace negotiations. The writer quotes " the judicious Jared Sparks " 
as authority for the statement that "Jay was the victim of ground- 
less suspicions." 

." . . . The Commissioners met frequently at Mr. Jay's rooms, 
. . . but there was little harmony at first, and several times the 
negotiations seemed on the point of being suspended owing to the 
opposition of Jay. 

" John Jay had been the means of great delay and apprehensions 
on account of the distrust he seemed to have of every nation. The 
negotiations were from time to time almost brought to an end 
through his distrust of France. . . . 

" John Jay's persistent refusal to accede to the demands of Spain, 
aided and abetted by Adams to more delay. Count de Vergennes 
in a letter to the French King alluded to Adams as being a most 
embarrassing navigator. 

" . . . England and France were harmonious in nearly every 
respect, and finally matters were arranged through the strenuous 
efforts of Rayneval the French plenipotentiary and Count Aranda. 

" . . . The treaty of Paris gave to the United States all 
and more than they sought for at first. . . . Franklin's . . . 
success was marvellous. . . . John Jay, whose enmity and dis- 
trust of France led to so many and vexatious delays, was even as 
Franklin himself said, ' the cause of the great concessions that were 
made, and all honor was due to him ; ' . . . sturdy John Adams, 
the most practical and stubborn of all the Commissioners, . . . 
was fully alive to the interests and danger of the New England 
States." 



Appeftdix. 221 

Mr. Van Santvoord's Chief Justices. 
Mr. George Van Santvoord, in his " Lives of the Chief Jus- 
tices " (p. 29), after quoting Jefferson and Hamilton in regard to the 
greatness of the terms obtained by the peace, justly remarked : 
"These terms and this successful negotiation were not achieved 
without the most painful anxiety and difficult labor. England was 
of course prepared to grant but few concessions to her revolted 
colonies, and France, our generous ally, had her own designs to sub- 
serve, and was as dangerous to America in diplomacy as she had 
been formidable to England in war," 

Mr. Greene's Historical View. 

The late George Washington Greene, in his " Historical View 
of the American Revolution " (Boston, 1865), says, on the other 
hand, of Adams, Jay, and Laurens (p. 266) : " But unfortunately they 
did not all share Franklin's well-founded confidence in the sincerity 
of the French Government. . . . History has justified his con- 
fidence, the most careful research having failed to bring to light 
any confirmation of the suspicions of his colleagues." 

The researches of Mr. Greene could hardly h'ave included a 
careful reading of the lives of Franklin, Jay, or Adams, of which the 
historian Lecky says, " both Jay and Adams have found powerful de- 
fenders in their descendants and biographers" (Lecky, iv., 282 ?iote) ; 
nor the letter of Pickering, embodying the proofs that convinced the 
mind of Washington ; nor the letter of the French Minister for For- 
eign Affairs when Genet was named as Minister to America, of which 
the original is given by Mr. C. F. Adams (AdamS' "Life and Works," 
Appendix, p. 675), and in which he said :* 

* This letter was published in the " Moniteur Universe)," No. 358, for Sun- 
day, December 23, 1792, as having been read at the seance of Friday, the 21st, fol- 
lowing the letter in the Adams' Appendix, i. , 675, in the address of the French 
Convention to the United States, in which occurred this passage : " Les fitats 
Unis de I'Amerique auront peine a le croire ; I'appui que I'ancienne Cour de 
France leur preta pour recouvrer leur independance n'etoit que le fruit d'une vile 
speculation ; leur gloire offusquait ses vues ambitieuses ; et ses ambassadeurs 
avaient I'orde criminel d'arreter le cours de leur prosperite." 

John Adams, in his paper on the Peace Negotiations, orginally published in 
the Boston Patriot in 181 1, and reprinted in the Appendix to his Life, says that 
Vergennes' system of finesse toward America was presented in the memorial to 
the King, afterward published under the title Politique de tous les Cabinets de 
I'Europe, and he adds : " The publication of it is a confirmation of all that was 
ever said or thought of the Court by me or by Mr. Jay " (Adams, 658). 



222 Appendix. 

" Le conseil executif s'estfait representer les instructions donn^es 
par le Ministre precedent aux agens dans ce pays. 11 y a vu avec 
indignation que dans le terns meme oii ce bon peuple nous exprimait 
de la mani^re la plus louchante son amitie et sa reconnaissance, 
Vergennes et Montmorin pensaient qu'il ne convenait point a la 
France de lui donner toute la consistance dont il etait susceptible ; 
pas qu'il acquerrait une force dont il serait probablement tente 
d'abuser. ... la meme duplicite fut employee dans les nego- 
ciations pour la paix." 

Mr. Parton's Life of Franklin. 

Mr. James Parton, in his " Life of Franklin" (New York : Mason 
Brothers. 1864, ii,, chap, xv.), followed with apparent confidence 
and in a sportive tone the theory of Dr. Sparks, and after alluding 
for example to Jay's remark that Doctor Franklin appeared to have a 
great degree of confidence in the French Court, with Jay's addition 
as quoted by Mr. Parton, "Time will show which of us is right," 
Mr. Parton adds^ " Time has shown," and then quotes as proof what 
he calls " the explicit testimony of Dr. Sparks " about the Ver- 
gennes correspondence — testimony so strangely and emphatically 
contradicted by the correspondence itself that it takes its place 
among the curiosities of literature as an unsurpassed example of his- 
torical fictions which have passed as facts. 

The remark of Jay alluded to by Mr. Parton occurs in his letter 
to Livingston of September i8th (Dip, Corres., viii., 126, J 2 7), en- 
closing a translation of Marbois' intercepted letter about the fish- 
eries, a letter that — whether from accident or design does not ap- 
pear — was omitted from the volume. In that letter Jay said : 

" This Court as well as Spain will dispute our extension to the 
Mississippi. You see how neoessary prudence and circumspection 
will be on your side, and, if possible, secrecy. I ought to add that 
Doctor Franklin does not see the conduct of the Court in the light 
I do, and that he believes they mean nothing in their proceedings 
but what is friendly, fair, and honorable. Facts and future events 
must determine which of us is mistaken. . . . Let us be honest 
and grateful to France, but let us think for ourselves." 

Apart from the proofs afforded by the correspondence that the 
Court of France was against us as regards the fisheries, the boundaries, 
and the Mississippi, Mr. Parton may note in a future edition that 



Appendix. 223 

three years before the date of Jay's letter, on April 12, 1779, the 
secret bargain had been concluded between De Vergennes and De 
Florida Blanca, so clearly told by Bancroft, of which, in return for 
Spain's joining in the war, France was to assist Spain in procuring, at 
our expense, "every part of the basin of the St. I^awrence, and of 
all the land between that river and the AUeghanies " (Bancroft, x., 
chap. viii.). 

Ignoring and ridiculing as if it were a myth, that compact be- 
tween France and Spain, the existence and meaning of which Jay 
and Adams detected and defeated, Mr. Parton speaks of " those two 
rare diplomatists — John Adams and John Jay — who " believed that 
the French Government wished to limit the power, the growth, and 
the boundaries of the United States" (p. 501). " In vain," he says, 
"did Doctor Franklin essay to remove these groundless impressions 
from the mind of Mr. Jay" ([). 482), and of tlie refusal of Jay to ac- 
ce|)t the advice of Vergennes to treat under the designation of 
colonists, Mr. Parton speaks of Franklin groaning "during the 
month wasted upon this nonsense.''' 

A misconception of so momentous a factor in the history of the 
negotiation naturally leads to the widest difference in the conclusions 
drawn by different historians of the actors in the transaction. While 
Lecky finds it impossible not to be struck with the skill, hardihood, 
and good fortune which won so much of what was obtained by the 
American Commissioners in opposition to the two great powers by 
whose assistance they had triumphed, Mr. Parton rei)resents Jay as 
" a timid adventurer," a " slave of mistrust," and says that Franklin, 
who was ready to be guided by Vergennes, knew the road and could 
have guided hmi safely through. 



Mr. George T. Curtis. 

The paper of the Honorable George Ticknor Curtis in successive 
numbers of Harper's Magazine for April and May, 1883, on "The 
Treaty of Peace and Independence," appeared some nineteen years 
later than the life of Franklin by Mr. Parton, and in a year when the 
learned author had the same opportunity of which Mr. Lecky has so 
amply availed himself in-his " History of England," to correct the mis- 
conceptions of former writers on the subject by the light afforded by 
the recent volumes of Bancroft, de Circourt, and Lord Edmond 



224 Appendix. 

Fitzmaurice, and, most of all, by the correspondence so long hidden 
and so absolutely misrepresented of the Count de Vergennes. 

The paper is illustrated by portraits of George III., Lords North, 
Rockingham, and Thurlow ; of Burke, Fox, Shelburne, and Pitt ; 
of Louis XVI., and the Count de Vergennes ; of Franklin, John 
Adams, and Henry Laurens, while for Jay, by a mistake which rather 
seemed to harmonize the iUustration with the text, as presenting 
with similar inexactness his features and his diplomacy, there was 
given the portrait of a gentleman wlio, at the signing of the Prelimi- 
nary Articles, had not completed his eighth year,* and this young 
stranger to the negotiation appeared among the celebrities associated 
with that event marked " John Jay." 

Mr. Curtis very justly observes that "there is something quite 
dramatic in the involutions and convolutions of that remarkable 
negotiation, in which the fate of our country was entangled in the 
affairs of Europe, and in the conflicts of parties in England." 

As regards the greatness of the powers whose differing policies 
were involved, the eminence and skill of the trained diplomatists to 
whom the furthering of these policies was entrusted, the grandeur of 
the issue at stake, being in fact the future of the American continent, 
and the profound interest of Christian civilization — such was the dip- 
lomatic contest for which France and Spain had been secretly pre- 
paring from the convention at Aranjuez in April, 1779, of which 
separate acts had been played by Montmorin and Florida de Blanca 
at Madrid, by Gerard and Luzerne with the Congress at Philadelphia, 
by Rayneval, closely followed by Vaughan, with Shelburne and Gran- 
tham at London, by Jay at' Paris with the Spanish ambassador 
D'Aranda, by Adams, Jay, and Franklin with Vergennes, and Rayn- 
eval, Oswald, Fitzherbert, and Strachey, down to the closing scene 
of the signing of the Preliminary Articles, which gave us the great 
territory at the west and north, with the Mississippi and the fisheries, 
of all which France and Spain had combined to deprive us. 

The American writer who in our day treats of the triumph by 
the American Commissioners, which Vergennes had deemed impos- 
sible, and which the English historian pauses to apostrophize, may 
see that the results of the intelligence and sagacity which guided the 
American negotiation may now be seen not only in the boundaries 
then secured with 820,000 square miles, but in the consequent retire- 

* The late Peter Augustus Jay, eldest son of John Jay, who was born Janu- 
ary 24, 1776. * 



Appendix. 225 

inent of Fiance from the territory of Orleans in 1803, giving us a 
yet larger area of 899,000* square miles, and in the cession by Spain 
of Florida in 18 19, leaving the Republic what Vergennes v^^ished it 
might not become, the virtual " mistress of this immense con- 
tinent." * 

But the central fact of this great drama seems to have escaped 
Mr. Curtis, who refers to what he calls the "suspicions" of Jay and 
Adams, and says that " these suspicions were honestly entertained, 
and that at the same time they were entirely unfounded, seem to 
me propositions equally clear." 

Mr. George Sumner on Spain. 

An effort quite as hopeless and almost as grotesque as that of Mr. 
Sparks to show that the Court of France favored our claims to the 
boundaries and the fisheries, was made some twenty-five years later 
by the late Mr. George Sumner, in an oration before the municipal 
authorities of Boston, on July 4, 1859, to awaken the sympathy 
and gratitude of the American people to Spain for her treatment 
of the United States during the war of the Revolution. 

" When," said Mr. Sumner, " we are disposed to stretch the hand 
of covetousness toward any possession of now weakened Spain, let 
us remember the helping hand she gave to us in our hour of suffer- 
ing and of peril." 

In that effort to whiten the record of the Spanish Court during 
our Revolution, and to establish for it a claim to American gratitude, 
Mr. Sumner was not alone, and after referring to the dissent ex- 
pressed by the press he wrote : " Let me say here that Mr. Sparks 
fully concurs in the view I have taken, and declares that it is the 
first time justice has been done by Spain." f 

On September 16, 1781, Jay, in the draft of a note to the Spanish 
Minister, written to be submitted to the French Ambassador, the 
Count de Montmorin, said : " I will only add my most sincere wishes 
that the annals of America may inform succeeding generations that 
the wisdom, constancy, and generous protection of his Catholic 
Majesty Charles the Third, and of his minister the Count de Florida 
Blanca, are to be ranked among the causes that insured success to a 

* Vergennes to Montmorin, October 30, 1778 (de Circourt, iii., 310). 
f George Sumner to John Jay — MS. letter dated " St. Denis Hotel, New 
York, September 8, 1859." 
15 



226 Appendix. 

revolution which patriots will consider as one of the most important 
and interesting events in modern history " (Dip. Cor., vii., 488). 

Neither the King nor his minister availed themselves of that 
great opportunity of earning the eternal gratitude of the American 
people, and it was well understood before the close of our Revolution 
that Spain was the implacable enemy of our national independence 
and our national progress, and that her course was in great part the 
result of her American colonial policy, as shaped by her dislike and 
fear of our politics and religious freedom, and what she conceived to 
be our growing ambition. We knew that the paltry loans Avhich, with 
reluctance and delay, she ungraciously made to enable Jay to meet 
the earlier drafts rashly drawn by Congress in reliance upon her 
readiness to assist us, demanded small gratitude on our part when, 
after encouraging a belief that she would make further advances to 
sustain the credit of the Republic, she allowed that credit to be 
openly protested, for the want of a paltry sum under circumstances 
which, as it now appears, aroused the indignation and contempt of 
■the French Ambassador, Count de Montmorin, who wrote of the 
shabby transaction to Vergeimes as exhibiting " the absolute in- 
difference or even the repugnance of Spain to aid the establishment 
of the independence of America." * 

We knew from the words and conduct of Rayneval and Vergennes 
at Paris that the Court of France was devoted to the support of 
the Spanish pretensions to the valley of the Mississippi, and Mr. C. F. 
Adams had remarked that "nothing is more remarkable throughout 
the struggle than the patient deference manifested by the Count to 
• all the caprices, the narrow ideas, and the vacillations of the Spanish 
Court" (Adams' Works, i., 310). 

But we did not know, as we now know, the reasons for that patient 
deference to the Court of Spain, and his persistent efforts to accom- 
plish her policy of excluding us from the Mississippi and the lakes, 
until Mr. Bancroft's disclosure of the secret compact at Madrid by 
which, as the only means of securing Spanish support in the war, 
Vergennes — however he may have despised Spain and her selfish 
policy, and however kindly he may have felt toward the Republic 
which he assisted to establish — had agreed to betray and defeat the 

claims of the Americans to the great territories to the West and 

* 

* Le Comte de Montmorin au Comte de Vergennes, Madrid, 30 Mars, 1782 
(de Circourt, iii., p. 327). 



I 

J 



Appendix. 227 

North to which they regarded themselves as entitled as essential to 
their present safety and their future greatness. 



Mr. Bancroft's History. 

Mr. Bancroft's account of the peace negotiation is contained in 
his '• History of the United States " (vol. x., first edition. London 
and Boston, 1S74). 

The opportunity kindly given me by Mr, Bancroft to examine his 
most interesting MSS. bearing on the peace — volumes which, from 
the extent of the ground they cover and their high authority as selected 
by Mr. Bancroft, and copied under his supervision, should certainly 
be secured by the National Government — enabled me to quote in this 
address several important extracts from the secret correspondence 
from London and Paris confirmatory of those published by the Count 
de Circourt, developing in the clearest light the aims and intent of 
the hostile policy toward America of that astute diplomat the Count 
de Vergennes, which Jay and Adams so accurately divined, while 
Franklin, even so late as July 23, 1783, wrote to Livingston that he 
disclaimed the " opinion that the Court [of France] wished to restrain 
us in obtaining any degree of advantage we could prevail on our 
enemies to accord." 

No previous writer has disclosed the secret documents which 
show not only the aims but the methods of the French Minister 
at Philadelphia, notable among which was that of " donatives." or 
bribes, the sort of treaty, and the limited boundaries, which would 
have resulted from an adherence to the instructions of Congress. 

Mr. Bancroft, in his preface, justly remarks that it has been pos- 
sible for him to place some questions of European as well as Ameri- 
can history in a clearer light, and among these questions stands pre- 
eminent those connected with the treaty of Aranjuez, and bearing 
directly on the negotiations for peace. Mr. Bancroft remarks in the 
preface that " the requirement of the change in Oswald's commission, 
so grateful to the self-respect of America, is due exclusively to 
Jay," and he suggests that " the embarrassments of Vergennes " — the 
term " embarrassments " reminds us that Mr. Bancroft is at once 
historian and diplomat — explain and justify the proceedings of the 
American Commissioners in signing preluninaries of peace in ad- 
vance. 



228 Appendix. 

These passages, written presumably after the volume had been 
completed, present a different idea of the responsibilities devolved 
upon the Commission by the duplicity of Vergennes, from that which 
seems to be implied by some paragraphs in the text, apparently of an 
earlier date, and which rather appear to proceed upon the old fiction 
which Mr. Bancroft's proofs have so thoroughly exposed, that Frank- 
lin was correct in supposing that France favored the American claims, 
and that the American Commissioners should have obeyed the 
instructions of Congress and been guided by the opinion of Ver- 
gennes. 

Those proofs have so completely revolutionized the history of the 
negotiation, as erroneously imagined and sketched by Sparks, that 
some who have accepted his misstatement of the secret correspond- 
ence of Vergennes may find it difiicult at once to appreciate the 
dangers threatened to America by the compact made by P'rance and 
Spain in 1779, and which were not dispersed until the signing of the 
Provisional Articles in November, 1782. 

But the student of history can now read intelligently in the corre- 
spondence of Vergennes with Montmorin, Gerard, Marbois, Luzerne, 
and Rayneval, the progress and meaning of the compact as described 
by Mr. Bancroft in his sixth and eighth chapters, subjecting the 
interests of America to that of Spain ; and can appreciate the fact 
thus brought to light, that the scheme of the most accomplished 
diplomats of Europe, framed and directed at Paris and Madrid, and 
l)romoted at Philadelphia with a skill which deceived ev^, Dr. 
Franklin in that day, and intelligent historians in our own, was 
detected and defeated by the vigilance and sagacity of Jay and 
Adams. 

Mr. Bancroft's presentation of that scheme to forestall the future 
greatness of America, has given a new interest to the conduct of the 
American Commission by which it was overthrown. Little informa- 
tion perhaps can be expected on this branch of the subject, beyond 
that given by the dispatches of Jay, the briefer accounf by Franklin, 
the interesting diary of Adams, and the full and interesting letters of 
Oswald purchased by our government with the Franklin papers, and 
which should be promptly published. But possibly Mr. Bancroft, 
from his own rare collection, and especially from the Shelburne 
papers, of which he was generously allowed by Lord Edmond Fitz- 
maurice to make transcripts, can furnish some particulars in refer- 
ence to the mission of Rayneval and the conclusion reached by Lord 



Appendix. 229 

Shelburne and the Council, after the arrival of Vaughan with Jay's 
memorandum,* in addition to the brief paragraphs given by'I^ord 
Edmond in the " Life " of his grandfather, to the arrivals of Rayneval 
and Vaughan, almost sim^jltaneously, and producing suddenly on the 
part of the British Cabinet a complete change of policy in favor of 
America. Mr. Bancroft's exposure of the entanglements of Ver- 
gennes with Florida Blanca, and Lord Edmond's brief mention of 
the disclosure to England of their hostility to America, as expressed 
by Rayneval, have given an unusual interest to this part of the 
peace negotiations, and solved what has hitherto been an historic 
problem. 

The biographers of Jay and Adams both held that what verbal 
overtures were made by Rayneval to the British Minister would prob- 
ably never be known. 

And now, after an hundred years, the secret is disclosed by the 
biographer of Shelburne in the remark that "Rayneval played 
into the hands of the English Ministers by expressing a strong 
opinion against the American claims to the Newfoundland fishery, 
and to the valley of the Mississippi and the Ohio," and that " these 
opinions were carefully noted by Shelburne and Grantham." 

Then followed Vaughan with Jay's memorandum answering the 
points of Rayneval which had been so accurately anticipated, on the 
boundaries, the fisheries, and the Mississippi, and recommending the 
English Ministers to secure our confidence and our friendship. It 
reminded them that America would not treat except on an equal 
footing, and that it was the interest of England, by a recogni ion of 
our independence, to cut the cord which bound America to France, 
whose policy it was to oblige the Americans to continue in the war, 
whereas with independence acknowledged they would be ready to 
make peace the moment that Great Britain should be ready to ac- 
cede to the terms of France and America, without being restrained 
by the demands of Spain, with whose views they had no concern. 

Mr. Bancroft's suggestion may be here recalled (x., 19), that the 
United States "were not bound to continue the war till Gibraltar 
should be taken, still less till Spain should have carried out her views 
hostile to their interests." 

It would be certainly interesting to have the entire correspond- 
ence and the minutes of this meeting of " the King's confidential ser- 
vants," held on the 20th September, when " it was at once agreed to 
* For the substance of this memorandum see ante, pages 36, 37, and 38. 



230 Appendix. 

make the alterations in the Commission proposed by Mr. Jay," and 
refei^nces to the matter in the private journals of the ministers would 
all be pertinent. But the result we know ; an immediate order, after 
six weeks of delay, for the new Commission, which was intrusted to 
Vaughan, to whom it showed how things stood. On the 23d Octo- 
ber, Shelburne wrote to Oswald : " We have put the greatest con- 
fidence, I believe, ever placed in man in the American Commis- 
sioners," and in that confidence he conceded to the United States 
all of which France and Spain had desired to deprive them, granting 
terms and boundaries so generous in their magnificence as to startle 
and displease the English Parliament, to bewilder the French Cab- 
inet, and to surprise and delight the American people. 

The world is indebted to Mr. Bancroft for having brought to light 
the magnitude of the task which was devolved upon the American 
Commission by the unfriendly policy of the Bourbon houses, ham- 
pered as. it was by peremptory instructions ; and it seems peculiarly 
fitting that his great history of the war should close with the most 
perfect presentation possible of the negotiations for peace. 

No one could be better fitted, both as a skilled historian and ex- 
perienced diplomat, to understand the difficulty in defending the 
Republic against the secret hostility of the Court which was still our 
great and generous ally in the war, or to appreciate the calmness and 
firmness, the delicacy and the skill, with which each step was taken, 
with a single regard to the national honor and national interest. 
Next to the completeness of the triumph secured by the American 
Commissioners is the incident, not to be forgotten, that this task 
was accomplished with such loyal faith to our treaty obligations 
with France that the international harmony continued unbroken ; and 
with such respectful tact toward Doctor Franklin, that the venerable 
philosopher not only followed the lead of his younger associates, 
signing their official letters and preserving the unity of their action, 
but to the close of his life maintained with Jay an affectionate and 
trustful friendship. 

Lvjkd Zdmond Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne. 

To the great value of the sketch given by Lord Edmond Fitz- 
maurice of the peace negotiations, from an English point of view, 
and as illustrated by the papers of Lord Shelburne, a just tribute 
has already been paid in the frequent use made of that sketch in the 
preparation of this address. 



Appendix. 231 

Lord Shelburne's biographer has not only supplemented from his 
papers the accounts given in the American despatches of all that 
occurred at Paris, but he has furnished the key to the most impor- 
tant part of the peace negotiations when he gives first the substance 
of Rayneval's communication to Shelburne and Grantham, and then 
the conclusion reached by the British Minister after the arrival of 
Vaughan with the views intrusted to him by Jay. 

These London scenes constituted the closing act in the plot 
whose action commenced with the Treaty of Aranjuez. The mis- 
sion of Rayneval developed the overtures to the British Ministry to 
assist the schemes of France and Spain for the partition of the west- 
ern and northern territories claimed by the United States ; that of 
Vaughan showed the calm resolve of America to resist the threat- 
ened wrong, and her reminder to England that her honor and her 
interest forbade her adoption of the French and Spanish policy. 

These opposing missions, interesting as showing the aims and 
methods that marked that last great struggle for European supremacy 
in America, are yet more interesting from their results. They re- 
sulted in what Mr. Lecky calls " the curious spectacle of a kind of 
alliance between the English and American diplomatists in opposi- 
tion to those of France and Spain." 

It was this '* kind of alliance " forced upon America by the plot- 
tings of her alhes in the war to deprive her of its fairest fruits, that 
made the success of the Republic in her negotiations for peace even 
more remarkable than in the war. With France and Spain to assist 
her in winning her independence, she secured by the aid of England 
at its close, under the far-sighted guidance of Lord Shelburne, a ter- 
ritory as large again as that to which those allies wished to confine 
her ; and a dignity, power, and prestige which shattered the hopes 
of Spanish dominion in America, and left the United States free to 
extend the beneficent influence of Anglo-American civilization first 
to the Mississippi, and later to the Pacific. 

To Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice the students of modern history, 
and especially of modern diplomacy, are greatly indebted. 



Mr. Leckv's History of England. 

Mr. Lecky's fourth volume of the "History of England " has 
also been quoted with great advantage. Its breadth of view, dis- 
criminating judgment, and careful research, including on this subject 



232 Appendix. 

the latest publications of Bancroft, de Circourt, and Fitzmaurice, 
enable the author to relate with accuracy and to speak with author- 
ity, and entitle the work to the careful attention of American stu- 
dents, as exhibiting the candid views of one of the most eminent of 
English historians of " the skill, hardihood, and good fortune that 
marked the American negotiation " {ante, p. 108). 

Should Mr. Lecky revise his '• History of England," as Mr. Ban- 
croft at an age full of years and honors is revising his " History of 
America," he may perhaps think proper to refer to the details, which 
will then probably be better known, of the secret missions to Eng- 
land despatched by Vergennes and Jay, to which he simply alludes 
(vol. iv., 279) without giving either their action or their results as 
related by Lord Ed^iiond. 

Mr. Lecky may perhaps see fit also to correct in a future edition 
what seems an inconsistency of expression in speaking of the Amer- 
ican negotiation, which might easily occur after reading what he 
calls " the valuable commentary of Mr. Sparks," if one should for- 
get for a moment that Mr. Sparks' comments were based upon an 
assumed premise of fact which is now shown to be absolutely incorrect. 

In his fourth volume, page 282, Mr. Lecky intimates that the 
distrust of France by Jay and Adams was entirely groundless, while 
on the opposite ])age — 283 — and also on the preceding pages — 276, 
277, and 278 — Mr. Lecky has shown the jealousy entertained by the 
French Ministers of the expansion of the new State — their desire to 
subject America to the balance-of-power principle of Europe, and 
to deprive her of the Mississippi, the Canadian border, and the fish- 
eries — measures at variance with the American claims and all calcu- 
lated to keep the Republic " in a state of permanent and humiliating 
dependence." 

There will probably be some difference of opinion as to-the ex- 
actness of Mr. Lecky's remark on page 279, that by the signing of 
the Provisional Articles " the alliance between France and America 
was seriously impaired." 

It is undoubtedly true that the uni)leasant surprise to Vergennes 
and Rayneval of the sudden and utter overthrow of the schemes to 
which years had been devoted, a defeat accomplished without a con- 
test and without a warning, created on their part, for the moment at 
least, the feeling of discontent of which something appeared in the 
complaining note of Vergennes to Franklin, to which Franklin re- 
turned so courtly and apologetic a reply. 



Appendix. 233 

But the confirmation by Vergennes of the new loan to America 
was significant of the consciousness of that cool-headed and astute 
statesman that the alliance with America, especially in view of her 
newly acquired dignity and power, was not to be rashly broken ; 
and there was no little significance in the remark of Vergennes to 
Lucerne, July 21, 1783 (Bancroft's " History- of the Constitution," 
i., 325) : "We are much occupied with everything relative to our com- 
merce with America, and we feel more than ever the necessity of 
granting it encouragement and favors." 



Mr. Charles Francis Adams on the Negotiation. 

This eminent diplomatist, in the life of his father, to which fre- 
quent reference has been made (" Works of John Adams," vol. i., 
Boston, 1856), discusses the phases of the peace negotiation, the 
policy of Vergennes, and the views and conduct of the American 
Commissioners, with the same ability and cool judgment which 
marked his own judicious powers while representing the Republic at 
the Court of St. James during a period of our history second only in 
critical importance to that of the Revolution. The appendix con- 
tains several papers on the subject of the peace communicated by 
John Adams to the Boston Patriot in 181 1, and in a note to vol. viii. 
(p. 15) there is a reference to the confidential letters addressed to 
Lord Shelburne by Mr. Vaughan, a copy of which had been deposited 
by. Mr. Vaughan with Hon. John Quincy Adams. These letters 
should be promptly secured by the Government at Washington as 
supplying an interesting link in the history of the negotiation. 

Mr. Adams' diary and letters pending the negotiation are charac- 
terized by his robust sense and sturdy patriotism ; and their rebuke 
of the blind credulity on which Congress had based its instructions 
should not be forgotten in our own day. 

"I have lived long enough," he wrote to Livingston, "and had 
experience enough of the conduct of governments and people, na- 
tions and courts, to be convinced that gratitude, friendship, unsus- 
pecting confidence, and all the most amiable passions in human 
nature are the most dangerous guides in politics" (Adams, viii., 27), 
He scouted the idea that Jay and himself had been guided in their 
departure from the instructions of Congress by "suspicion." "We 
knew," he wrote to Livingston (July 9, 1783), "they [the French 
Court] were often insinuating to the British Minister things against 



234 Appendix. 

us respecting the fisheries lines, etc., during the negotiation, and 
Mr. Fitzherbert told me that the Count de Vergennes had fifty times 
reproached him for ceding the fisheries, arid said it was ruining the 
English and French both. It was not suspicion, it was certain 
knowledge that they were against us on the points of the Tories — 
fisheries, Mississippi, and the western country — all this knowledge, 
however, did not influence us to conceal the treaty ; we did not in 
fact conceal it." 

Of Jay he wrote to Livingston (February 5, 1783): 

" If I had the honor to give my vote in Congress for a minister 
at the Court of Great Britain, provided injustice must be finally 
done to him who was the first -ebject of his country's choice, such 
have beeh the activity, intelligence, address, and fortitude of Mr. Jay, 
as well as his sufferings in his voyage, journeys, and hard services, 
that I should think of no other object of my choice than that gentle- 
man " (Adams, viii., 40). 

Touching the complaint of Livingston of their want of confidence 
in the French Court, Adams wrote (Paris, May 10, 17S3) : 

"To talk in a general style of confidence in the French Court is 
to me a general language which may mean almost anything or almost 
nothing. To a certain degree, and as far as the treaties and engage- 
ments extend, I have as much confidence in the French Court as Con- 
gress has, or even as you, sir, appear to have. But if by confidence 
in the French Court is meant an opinion that the French Office of 
Foreign Affairs would be advocates with the English for our rights 
as to the fisheries, or to the Mississippi River, or our western terri- 
tory, or advocates to persuade the British Minister to give up the 
cause of the refugees and to make parliamentary provision for them, 
I own I have no such confidence, and never had. Seeing and 
hearing what I have seen and heard, I must have been an idiot to 
have entertained such confidence. I should be more of a Machiavel- 
ian or a Jesuit than I ever was or will be to counterfeit it to you or 
to Congress" (Adams, viii., 89). 

Of the dangers which they had escaped Adams wrote to Robert 
Morris (July 6, 1 783) : 

" I thank you, sir, most affectionately for your kind congratula- 
tions on the peace. . . . When I consider the number of nations 
concerned, the complication of interests, extending all over the globe, 
the character of the actors, the difficulties which attended every step 
of the progress ; how everything labored in England, France, Spain, 



Appendix. 235 

and Holland ; that the armament at Cadiz was on the point of sailing, 
which would have rendered another campaign inevitable; that an- 
other campaign would probably have involved a continental war, as 
the Emperor would in that case have joined Russia against the 
Porte ; that the British Ministry was then in so critical a situation 
that its duration for a week or a day depended on its making peace ; 
that if that Ministry had been changed it could have been succeeded 
only either by North and company or by the coalition ; that it is 
certain that neither North and company nor the coalition would 
have made peace on any terms that either we or the other powers 
would have agreed to ; and that all these difficulties were dissipated 
by one decided step of the British and American Ministers, I feel 
too strongly a gratitude to heaven for having been conducted safely 
through the storm to be very solicitous whether we have the appro- 
bation of mortals or not" (Adams, viii., 82). 

John Quincy Adams on Franklin and his Colleagues, 

Two letters of the Honorable John Quincy Adams to Judge 
William Jay in 1832 {Magazine of American History, January, 1879), 
one of which has been partly quoted {a?iie, p. 209), may be named 
among the papers from eminent statesmen bearing upon the differ- 
ences of view between Doctor Franklin and his colleague. 

Judge William Jay on the Peace. 

I cannot close this mention of authors who have treated of the 
peace — a mention which may possibly prove convenient to future 
students of that satisfactory and brilliant chapter of American diplo- 
macy — without alluding to the sketch of the negotiation given by my 
father (" Life of John Jay," by his son, William Jay. J. & J. Harper, 
New York, 1833. Chapters V. and VI.), which was the fullest that had 
appeared until the recent appearance of the Life of Lord Shelburne, 
by his grandson, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. 

The historic narrative of Judge Jay, its exposition of the policy 
of France and Spain, and the significant action of their chief diplo- 
matists, was conscientious and exact : it was illustrated and en- 
forced by the writer's researches, and by the views of V^rgennes, 
Montmorin, Luzerne, Marbois, and Rayneval, so far as they were 
then known; and all the light thrown upon the subject during the 
last half century has, I believe, discovered no single error in his 



236 Appendix. 

statements. The disclosure of the confidential correspondence of 
France and Spain gathered by Mr. Bancroft, which has so completely 
overthrown the guesses and assumptions of visionary commentators 
who have attempted to shape history to their own wishes, and to 
establish fanciful theories by the bold assertion of imaginary facts, 
has as thoroughly confirmed the correctness of Judge Jay's portrai- 
ture of the negotitation, as it has proven the profound sagacity of 
Jay and Adams. 

Mr. Sparks, when he supplemented his bold attempt to improve 
the style of Washington's letters, by an endeavor as editor of the 
" Diplomacy of the Revolution," to reform on the historic page the 
efforts of France and Spain, at the conclusion of the war, to restrain 
the future greatness of America : and to modify or reverse by sturdy 
denials the instructions given by Vergennes, seems to have regarded 
with equal dislike the clear-sighted diplomacy of Jay and the faithful 
record of it by his son. 

Mr. Sparks condemned Jay's refusal to treat except on a footing of 
equal dignity. The change which Jay demanded and obtained in the 
British Commission froui "Colonies or Plantations" to '"the United 
States " — a change from subserviency and weakness to national 
dignity and strength — Mr. Sparks pronounced " a thing of form and 
not of substance " (Franklin, i., 484). He declared that what he 
called Jay's surmises and suspicions " had no just foundation in 
fact" (Franklin, i., 493), apparently unconscious that the secret cor- 
respondence to which he appealed as disproving them would 
more than confirm their truth \ and then turning from Jay to his life 
by his son, Mr. Sparks met its careful narrative and the logic of its 
facts with the complaint, that " the author adopts all Mr. Jay's sus- 
picions of the French Court as historical facts [as they are now 
shown to be], and appears to have acquired but a limited knowledge of 
the actual history of the negotiation" — "actual history" here seem- 
ing to refer to the exploded fictions which by many were so long 
accepted with unquestioning credulity. 

The direct tribute paid to the accuracy of my father's narrative 
by the late Lord St. Helens {ante, p. 20S) was the tribute not simply 
of an actor in the Parisian scenes, but of an actor whose distin- 
guished position, marked abilities, and acknowledged services in the 
American negotiation, give to his testimony the highest authority. 

Important use has been made of Judge Jay's volumes by Lord 
Edmond Fitzmaurice in his Life of Shelburne, and by Mr. Lecky 



Appendix. 237 

in his "History of England," and the revelations of the French 
policy both as regards its aims and its methods made in the Life 
of Shelburne, the history of Bancroft, and the inedited documents 
printed by de Circourt, combine to show the accuracy and truth- 
fulness of my father's history of the negotiation. 

As illustrating the far-sighted views of thoughtful European states- 
men of the effects of the favorable terms obtained at the peace 
upon the future of the Republic, there may be properly added as the 
conclusion to this appendix an allusion to a still unpublished let- 
ter of Signer Dolfin, Ambassador to France from Venice, dated 
February 10, 1783. The letter occurs in the Venetian correspond- 
ence bearing upon the American negotiation, procured by his Ex- 
cellency George P. Marsh, under the instruction of Mr. Evarts, 
and very courteously submitted to me (May 7, 188 1) by Mr. Sec- 
retary Blaine, with other interesting correspondence on the subject. 
After describing at length the terms of the preliminary articles dated 
November 3, 1782, which Signor Dolfin thought would be forever a 
memorable epoch in the history of the nation, his Excellency re- 
marks that "if the union of the American provinces shall continue, 
they would become by force of time and of the arts the most formi- 
dable power in the world." 

A brief extract from an unpublished note of Lord Lansdowne to 
John Jay, dated Bowood Park, 4th of September, 178^, indicates his 
interest in our country and his particular regard for Jay ; while Jay's 
reply contains an honorable tribute to Lord Lansdowne for far- 
sighted statesmanship in his plan of peace, looking to a permanent 
friendship with America. Lord Lansdowne wrote : 

" 1 have great pleasure in telling you that the new principles re- 
garding both trade and finance are making an evident progress among 
the public. It must be expected that they will meet with some inter- 
ruption from the influence of old prejudice and the activity of parties. 
But I have no doubt of their overcoming both, if they are not pre- 
cipitated or too rigorously pushed in every instance. 

" I am anxious to hear that the Government of the United States 
has taken a solid countenance upon those wise and comprehensive 
foundations which you stated to me. I shall always look upon this 
country as deeply interested in whatever regards your prosperity 
and reputation, and, above all, your internal tranquillity. 

" I am, with particular esteem and regard, sir, 

"Your faithful and most obedient servant, 

" Lansdowne." 



238 Appendix. 

Jay's answer to the letter dated New York, April 20, 1786, is 
given in full in the second volume of Jay's '• Life," pages 183 and 1815. 
It is marked by a hopeful view that things would gradually come 
right, and a very frank suggestion " that a little more good nature on 
the part of Britain would produce solid and mutual advantages to 
both countries," is followed by this frank tribute to the wise policy 
adopted by Lord Lansdowne in the peace after the visit of Rayneval 
and Vaughanhad disclosed the plans of France and Spain on the one 
hand, and the firm resolution of the Republic on the other : 

" My Lord, I write thus freely from a persuasion that your ideas 
of policy are drawn from those large and liberal views and principles 
which apply to the future as well as the present, and which embrace 
the interests of the nation and of mankind rather than the local and 
transitory advantages of partial systems and individual ambition ; for 
your lordship's plans on the peace were certainly calculated to make 
the revolution produce only an exchange of dependence for friend- 
ship, and of sound and feathers for substance and permanent bene- 
fits." 

The century that has passed since those prominent actors in the 
negotiations for peace laid the foundation of a permanent friendship 
between the two countries, has confirmed their policy and verified 
their hopes ; and this brief review of that interesting business whose 
importance increases as time advances may fitly close with the or- 
der made by the President at Yorktown on October 19, 1881. 

The salute to the British flag by the army and navy of the United 
States crowned the centennial festival in which our countrymen were 
joined by our European friends from across the sea, and especially 
by the representatives of Lafayette, Rochambeau, De Grasse, and 
their brave companions of the army and navy of France, to whom 
that decisive victory was so largely due. 

The salute was more than a picturesque and sentimental feature 
of the occasion. It illustrated the peace of an hundred years ago, 
and emphasized the gravest lesson which history can present to the. 
diplomatist and the statesman. 

In recognition of the friendly relations so long and so happily 

subsisting between Great Britain and the United States, in the trust 

and confidence of peace and good-will between the two countries 

^ for all centuries to come, and especially as a mark of the profound 



Appendix. 239 

respect entertained by the American people for the iUustrious sov- 
ereign and gracious lady who sits upon the British throne, it is hereby 
ordered : that at the close of these services commemorative of the 
valor and success of our forefathers in their patriotic struggle for in- 
dependence, the British flag shall be saluted by the forces of the 
army and navy of the United States now at Yorktown. The Sec- 
retary of War and the Secretary of the Navy will give orders accord- 
ingly. Chester A. Arthur. 
By the President : 

James G. Blaine, 

Secretary of State. 



ERRATA. 

Page 47, fifth line, for Granville read Grenville. 
Page 109, third line from foot, for gjiest read quest. 
Page 112, note, for Frescott x^z.^ Trescott. 



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